Muller six systems of Indian philosophy. Philosophy of ancient India - briefly, the most important thing
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Philosophy Ancient India– briefly, the most important thing. This is another topic from a series of publications on the basics of philosophy. In the previous article we looked at. As already mentioned, the science of philosophy arose simultaneously in different parts of the world - in Ancient Greece and in Ancient India and China approximately in the 7th-6th centuries. BC. Often the philosophy of Ancient India and Ancient China are considered together, as they are very connected and have had a great influence on each other. But still, I propose to consider the history of the philosophy of Ancient China in the next article.
Vedic period of Indian philosophy
The philosophy of Ancient India was based on the texts contained in the Vedas, which were written in the most ancient language - Sanskrit. They consist of several collections written in the form of hymns. It is believed that the Vedas were compiled over a period of thousands of years. The Vedas were used for religious service.
The first philosophical texts of India are the Upanishads (late 2nd millennium BC). The Upanishads are an interpretation of the Vedas.
Upanishads
The Upanishads formed the main Indian philosophical themes: the idea of an infinite and one God, the doctrine of rebirth and karma. The One God is the incorporeal Brahman. Its manifestation – Atman – is the immortal, inner “I” of the world. The Atman is identical to the human soul. The goal of the human soul (the goal of the individual Atman) is to merge with the world Atman (the world soul). Anyone who lives in recklessness and impurity will not be able to achieve such a state and will enter the cycle of rebirth according to the cumulative result of his words, thoughts and actions, according to the laws of karma.
In philosophy, the Upanishads are ancient Indian treatises of a philosophical and religious nature. The oldest of them date back to the 8th century BC. The Upanishads reveal the main essence of the Vedas, which is why they are also called Vedanta.
In them the Vedas received the greatest development. The idea of the connection of everything with everything, the theme of space and man, the search for connections, all this was reflected in them. The basis of everything that exists in them is the inexpressible Brahman, as the cosmic, impersonal principle and basis of the whole world. Another central point is the idea of the identity of man with Brahman, of karma as the law of action and samsara, like a circle of suffering that a person needs to overcome.
Philosophical schools (systems) of Ancient India
WITH 6th century BC The time of classical philosophical schools (systems) began. Distinguish orthodox schools(the Vedas believed the only source Revelations) and unorthodox schools(they did not recognize the Vedas as the only authoritative source of knowledge).
Jainism and Buddhism referred to as unorthodox schools. Yoga and Samkhya, Vaisheshika and Nyaya, Vedanta and Mimamsa These are the six orthodox schools. I listed them in pairs because they are pair friendly.
Unorthodox schools
Jainism
Jainism is based on the tradition of hermitage (6th century BC). The basis of this system is personality and it consists of two principles - material and spiritual. Karma binds them together.
The idea of rebirth of souls and karma led the Jains to the idea that all life on Earth has a soul - plants, animals and insects. Jainism preaches such a life so as not to harm all life on Earth.
Buddhism
Buddhism arose in the middle of the 1st millennium BC. Its creator was Gautama, a prince from India, who later received the name Buddha, which means awakened one. He developed the concept of the way to get rid of suffering. This should be the main goal of life for a person who wants to gain liberation and go beyond samsara, the cycle of suffering and pain.
To break out of the circle of suffering (to enter nirvana), one must observe 5 Commandments (Wikipedia) and engage in meditation, which calms the mind and makes one's mind clearer and free from desires. The extinction of desires leads to liberation and deliverance from the cycle of suffering.
Orthodox schools
Vedanta
Vedanta was one of the most influential schools Indian philosophy. Exact time its appearance is not known, approximately - 2 c. BC e. The completion of the doctrine is attributed to the end of the 8th century AD. e. Vedanta is based on the interpretation of the Upanishads.
In it the basis of everything is Brahman, which is one and infinite. The Atman of man can know Brahman and then man can become free.
Atman is the highest "I", the absolute, which is aware of its existence. Brahman is the cosmic, impersonal principle of everything that exists.
Mimamsa
Mimamsa is adjacent to Vedanta and is a system that explained the rituals of the Vedas. The core was the idea of duty, which was a sacrifice. The school reached its culmination in the 7th-8th centuries. It had an impact on strengthening the influence of Hinduism in India and reducing the importance of Buddhism.
Sankhya
This is the philosophy of dualism founded by Kapila. Two principles operate in the world: prakriti (matter) and purusha (spirit). According to her, the main basis of everything is matter. The goal of Samkhya philosophy is to divert spirit from matter. It was based on human experience and reflection.
Sankhya and Yoga are connected. Sankhya is the theoretical basis for yoga. Yoga is a practical method for achieving liberation.
Yoga
Yoga. This system is based on practice. Only through practical exercises can a person achieve reunification with the divine principle. A lot of such yoga systems have been created, and they are still very famous all over the world. It is this that has become most popular now in many countries, thanks to a set of physical exercises that make it possible to be healthy and not get sick.
Yoga differs from Samkhya in the belief that every person has a supreme personal Deity. With the help of asceticism and meditation, you can free yourself from prakriti (material).
Nyaya
Nyaya was a teaching about various forms of thinking, about the rules of discussion. Therefore, its study was mandatory for everyone who was engaged in philosophizing. The problems of existence in it were explored through logical comprehension. Man's main goal in this life is liberation.
Vaisesika
Vaisheshika is a school related to the Nyaya school. According to this system, every thing is constantly changing, although there are elements in nature that are not subject to change - these are atoms. Important topic schools - classify the objects in question.
Vaisheshika is based on the objective cognizability of the world. Adequate Cognition This is the main goal of systematic thinking.
Books on the philosophy of Ancient India
From Samkhya to Vedanta. Indian philosophy: darshans, categories, history. Chattopadhyaya D (2003). The Calcutta University professor wrote this book specifically for Europeans who are just beginning to get acquainted with the philosophy of Ancient India.
Six systems of Indian philosophy. Muller Max (1995). The professor at Oxford University is an outstanding expert on Indian texts, he owns translations of the Upanishads and Buddhist texts. This book is referred to as a fundamental work on the philosophy and religion of India.
Introduction to Indian Philosophy. Chatterjee S and Dutta D (1954). The authors present the views of Indian philosophical schools briefly and in simple language.
The philosophy of Ancient India - briefly, the most important thing. VIDEO.
Summary
I think the article " Philosophy of Ancient India - briefly, the most important thing" became useful for you. You learned:
- about the main origins of the philosophy of ancient India - the ancient texts of the Vedas and Upanishads;
- about the main classical schools of Indian philosophy - orthodox (yoga, sankhya, vaisheshika, nyaya, vedanta, mimamsa) and unorthodox (jainism and Buddhism);
- about the main feature of philosophy Ancient East- about understanding the true purpose of a person and his place in the world (it was considered more important for a person to focus on inner world than on the external circumstances of life).
I wish everyone always a positive attitude for all your projects and plans!
DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAS
Thus, we became acquainted with the important fact that all these ideas - metaphysical, cosmological and other - appeared in India in great abundance, without any system and represented real chaos.
We should not assume that these ideas follow one another in chronological order. And here the truer clue will not be Nacheinander, but Nebeneinander. It must be remembered that this ancient philosophy existed for a long time without being recorded in written literature, that there was no control, no authority, no public opinion to protect it. Each settlement (ashram) was a separate world; often there were no simple means of communication, rivers or roads. It is surprising that, despite all these conditions, we still find so much unity in numerous conjectures regarding the truth, we owe this, as they say, to the paramparas, that is, to the people who transmitted the tradition and, finally, collected everything that could be saved.
It would be a mistake to think that there has been a continuous development in the different meanings assumed by such significant terms as prajapati, brahman and even atman. It will be much more consistent with what we know of the mental life of India from the Brahmanas and Upanishads to admit the existence of a large number of mental centers scattered throughout the country, in which there were influential advocates of various views. Then we will better understand how Brahman, which at first signified that which opens and grows, received the meaning of speech and prayer, as well as the meaning of creative power and creator, and why atman signified not only breath, but also life, spirit, soul, essence and what I dare to convey by the term I (das Selbst) of all things.
But if during the period of Brahmanas and Upanishads we have to fight our way through religious and philosophical ideas, as through an impenetrable thicket of creeping plants, then as we approach the next period, characterized by persistent attempts at clear and systematic thinking, the path becomes easier.
We should not think that here too we will already find correct historical development in various philosophical systems. The sutras, or aphorisms, representing fragments of six systems of philosophy, completely separate from one another, cannot be considered the first attempts at systematic exposition; they represent rather a summation of what has developed over many generations of isolated thinkers.
PRASTHANA-BHEDA
What the Brahmins themselves thought about this philosophical literature we can learn even from such new works as the Prasthana-bheda, from which I gave several extracts in the introduction to several of my articles on one of the systems of Indian philosophy back in 1852 in the Journal of the German Orientalist Society . It must be said that the honor of opening this treatise by Madhusudana Sarasvati and indicating its significance belongs to Colebrook himself. I myself became acquainted with him through my old friend Triten, who prepared a critical edition of the treatise, but did not have time to publish it due to illness and death. It was printed earlier by Professor Weber in his Indische Studien of 1849, and I think it will not be useless to make some extracts from it here.
“Nyaya,” he writes, “is the logic taught by Gotama in his five adhyanas (lessons). Its object is to know the nature of the sixty padarthas through name, definition and investigation. These padarthas are very important or essential parts of Nyaya philosophy; but it turned out to be completely inappropriate to translate the word padartha with the word category. It is not clear why such things as doubt, example, struggle, etc., can be called categories (praedicabilia); and it is not surprising that Ritter and others spoke of nyaya with disdain if such things were presented to them as categories of Indian logic.
“There is also the Vaisheshika philosophy taught in Canada. Its purpose is to establish, through similarities and differences, the six padarthas, namely:
1) dravya – essence;
2) guna – property;
3) karma – activity;
4) samanya – common to several objects. The highest samanya is comma, or being;
5) vishesha - various or special, inherent in eternal atoms, etc.
6) samavaya - an inseparable connection, as between cause and effect, parts and the whole, etc.
To this we can add
7) abhava – negation.
This philosophy is also called Nyaya.
These Vaisesika padarthas, at least the first five, can be called categories, for they represent everything that can serve as predicates of the objects of our experience or, with Indian point sight, everything that can be a predicate higher meaning(artha) words (pada). Therefore, padartha, literally meaning "word," is used in Sanskrit in the sense of things in general or objects. It is possible to translate this word as "category" when applied to the five padarthas of Canada, but such a translation, which is dubious when applied to the sixth and seventh Vaisheshika padarthas, would be completely inappropriate in relation to Gotama's padarthas.
Madhusudana continues: “Mimamsa is also twofold, namely karma mimamsa (working, active philosophy) and shariraka mimamsa (philosophy of the embodied spirit). Karma Mimamsa is expounded by the Venerable Jaimini in twelve chapters.”
The object of these twelve chapters is stated briefly and so obscurely that it can hardly be understood without reference to the original sutras. Dharma, the object of this philosophy, consists, as is clear from the explanations, of acts of duty, mainly sacrificial. The second, third and fourth chapters treat the differences and changes of dharma, its parts (or additional members, as opposed to the main act) and the main purpose of each sacrificial act. In the seventh chapter, and more fully in the eighth, indirect rules are treated. The ninth chapter treats inferrible changes, adapting to any change or imitation of known sacrificial acts, recognized as typical or exemplary; and the tenth chapter talks about exceptions. The eleventh chapter deals with the incidental action, and the twelfth deals with the coordinated consequence, that is, the assistance of several acts to obtain one result is the subject of the eleventh chapter, and the twelfth talks about the accidental consequence of an act performed for a different purpose.
“There is also the Samkarshanakanla, consisting of four chapters, composed by Jaimini, and this, known by the name of Devatakanda, belongs to the Karma Mimamsa, as it teaches the action or act of upasana (worship).”
This is followed by the Shariraka Mimamsa, which consists of four chapters. Its subject is the clarification of the unity of Brahman and Atman (I) and the exposition of rules teaching the study of this unity through the study of the Vedas, etc. This is indeed a much more philosophical system than Purvamimansa, it had various names: uttara-mimansa, brahma-mimansa, Vedanta, etc.
“In the first chapter it is pointed out that all the passages of Vedanta agree to refer, directly or indirectly, to the internal, indivisible, without second (that is, single) Brahman. The first section examines those passages of the Vedas in which there are clear indications of Brahman; in the second - places where there are unclear instructions and relate to Brahman, since he is the object of worship; in the third - places where there are dark indications of Brahman and for the most part refer to him, since he is an object of knowledge. Thus ends the examination of the Vedanta texts and in the fourth section such words as avyakta, aja and others are considered, in relation to which one can doubt whether they refer to the ideas accepted and sanctioned by the Samkhya philosophers, what are pradhana, prakriti, which in general - although completely incorrectly - translated: nature, as independent of Brahman or Purusha.
Having thus established the agreement of all the texts of the Vedanta regarding the one, without a second Brahman, Vyasa (or Badarayan), fearing resistance through the arguments put forward by the recognized Smritis and various other systems, proceeds to refute them and tries to establish in the second chapter the incontestability of his arguments. In the first section he answers the objections regarding the agreement of the Vedanta passages on Brahman made by the Smriti Samkhya Yogis, Kanada and the followers of the Samkhya, since every study must consist of two parts: from establishing one’s own teaching and from refuting the teaching of opponents. In the third section (first part), the contradictions between the passages of the Vedas related to the creation of elements and other objects are eliminated, and in the second part, the contradictions related to individual souls are eliminated. The fourth section deals with all the apparent contradictions between the passages of the Vedas relating to the senses and to the objects of the senses.
In the third chapter, the author studies the means of salvation; in the first section, having examined the transition to another world and the return from it (transmigration of souls), dispassion is considered. In the second section, the meaning of the word you is clarified, and after that, the meaning of the word is. In the third section a collection of words is given, which, if not representing a complete tautology, all refer to the unqualified Brahman referred to in the various Shakhas, or branches of the Veda, and at the same time discusses the question whether certain attributes can be accepted in their totality , attributed by other Shakhas in their teaching to a qualified or unqualified Brahman. The fourth section examines the means of obtaining knowledge of the unqualified Brahman - both external means, such as sacrifice and observance of the four principles in life, and internal means - tranquility, self-government and contemplation.
In the fourth chapter there is an examination of the special reward or fruits of knowledge of the qualified or unqualified Brahman. The first section describes the salvation of a person in this life, freed from the influence of good or evil deeds and realizing unqualified Brahman through constant study of the Vedas, etc. The second section discusses the method of departure to another world for a dying person. In the third - the further (northern) path of a person who died with full knowledge of unqualified Brahman. The fourth section first describes the achievement of disembodied loneliness of a person who has known the unqualified Brahman, and then the arrival in the world of Brahman, promised to everyone who knows the qualified (that is, lower) Brahman.
This teaching (Vedanta), undoubtedly, is the most important of all teachings, all others are only additions to it, and therefore only Vedanta is revered by all who yearn for liberation, and this is in accordance with the interpretation of the venerable Shankara - this is a secret.”
Thus we see that Madhusudana considered the Vedanta philosophy, as interpreted by Shankara, if not as the only true one, then as the best of all philosophies. He made an important distinction between four systems: Nyaya, Vaisheshika, Purva and Uttara Mimamsa on the one hand, and Yoga and Samkhya on the other. It is curious that little attention has been paid to this difference until now. According to Madhusudana, the philosophies of Gotama and Kanada are simply smritis or dharmashastras, like the laws of Manu, even like Vyasa's Mahabharata or Valmiki's Ramayana. Of course, these systems of philosophy cannot be called smriti in the ordinary sense of the dharmashastra; but since they are smrspi (tradition), and not shruti (revelation), then we can say that they teach dharma, if not in the legal, then in the moral sense of the word. In any case, it is clear that Samkhya and Yoga were considered to belong to a different order from that to which belonged the two Mimamsas, even the Nyaya and Vaisheshika, and other recognized branches of knowledge, which together were considered to be the eighteen branches of the Traya (i.e., the Vedas). Although it is not easy to understand the real reason for this difference, it should not be overlooked.
“The Sankhya,” continues Madhusudana, “was expounded by the venerable Kapila in six adhyas. The first of these deals with the subjects to be discussed; in the second - the consequences or products of pradhana (primary matter); in the third - alienation from sensory objects; in the fourth - stories about people who have renounced passions, like Pinjala (IV, 11), an arrow maker, etc.; in the fifth, opposing opinions are refuted; the sixth contains a general summary. the main task Samkhya philosophy - to teach the difference between prakriti and purusha.
This is followed by the yoga philosophy taught by the venerable Patanjali, which is divided into four parts. In the first part, contemplation that stops activity and distraction of the spirit are considered, and as a means to this, constant exercise and renunciation of passions; in the second, eight aids are considered that produce deep contemplation even in people whose thoughts are entertained, which are: restraint, observation, posture of the body, regulation of breathing, piety, contemplation and reflection (meditation); the third part talks about supernatural forces; in the fourth - about solitude, loneliness. The main task of this philosophy is to achieve concentration (concentration) by stopping all randomly coming thoughts.
This is followed by a brief account of the systems of groping/ and pancaratra and then a repetition of all the most interesting. Here Madhusudana says: “After understanding the various systems, it is clear that there are only three roads:
1. Aramba-vada, theory of agglomeration of atoms.
2. Parinama vada, theory of evolution.
3. Vivarta-vada, theory of illusion.
The first theory asserts that the atoms (anu) of four kinds (atoms of earth, water, fire and air), becoming sequentially double, etc. atoms, created the world, the highest point of which was the egg of Brahman.
This first theory, that of the Tarkikas (Nyaya and Vaisheshika) and the followers of the Mimamsa, teaches that an effect that did not exist (the world) is produced by the activity of existing causes.
The second theory, that of the Samkhyas, Yogapatanjalas and Pashupatas (followers of the Sankhyas, Yogas and Pashupatas), states that only pradhana, sometimes called prakriti (primordial matter), is composed of the gunas: sattva (good), rajas (moderate) and tamas (evil, evil), developed through the stages of mahat (perception) and ahankara (subjectivity) in the form of the world (subjective and objective). From this point of view, the world existed before the real world, although in a subtle (invisible) form and became obvious (manifested) through the activity of the cause.
The third theory, the theory of the Brahmavadins (Vedanta), says that the self-luminous and completely blissful Brahman, having no second, is mistakenly represented as the world through the power and force of Maya, while the Vaishnavas (Ramanuja, etc.) claim that the world is the real and the true development of Brahman.
But in reality, all the munis who expounded these theories agree in their desire to prove the existence of one supreme Lord, without a second, leading to the theory of illusion (vivarta). These munis cannot be mistaken because they are omniscient, and the different views were proposed by them only to eliminate nihilistic theories and because they were afraid that people with their inclination towards worldly objects could not immediately know the true purpose of man.
But everything will be fine if we understand that people, not understanding the true purpose of these munis, imagine that they propose something contrary to the Vedas and, accepting their opinions, become their followers on their various paths.
Much of what is here translated from the Prasthana-bheda of Madhusudana - although it represents only a general overview - is not clear, but then when we consider each of the six philosophical systems separately in itself, it will become intelligible; It is also not entirely certain that Madhusudana’s view of the development of Indian philosophy is correct. But in any case, he proves a certain freedom of thought, which we meet from time to time in other writers (for example, in Vijnanabhikshu), who are also inclined to the idea that behind the differences between Vedanta, Samkhya and Nyaya lies the same truth, although expressed in different ways and that there may be many philosophies, the truth is one.
However much we may marvel at the insight of Madhusudana and others, it is our duty as a historian of philosophy to study the various ways in which different philosophers, by the light of revelation or by the light of their unfettered reason, have endeavored to discover the truth. The very multiplicity and diversity of these paths constitutes the main interest of the history of philosophy, and the fact that these six different philosophical systems have hitherto maintained their position among the large number of philosophical theories proposed by the thinkers of India indicates that we must first evaluate them characteristics before trying, together with Madhusudana, to eliminate their distinctive features.
These philosophers are as follows:
1. Badarayana, also called Vyasa Dvapayana or Krishna Dwapayana, the supposed author of the Brahma Sutras, also called the Uttara Mimamsa Sutras or Vyasa Sutras.
4. Patanjali, also called Shesha or Phanin, author of the Yoga Sutras.
5. Kanada, also called Kanabhug, Kanabhakshaka or Uluka, author of the Vaisesika Sutras.
6. Gotama (Gautama), also called Akshapada, author of the Nyaya Sutras.
It is clear that the philosophers to whom the sutras are attributed cannot be considered the first to create Indian philosophy. These sutras often make reference to other philosophers who must have existed before the time when the sutras received their final form. The fact that some of the sutras cite and refute the opinions of others cannot be explained without recognizing that different schools of philosophy developed side by side during the period preceding their final elaboration. Unfortunately, in such references we do not always find even the title of the book or the name of its author, and even less often a literal reproduction of the opinion of this author, his ipsissimu verba. When they refer to such things as purusha and prakriti (spirit and matter), we know that they are referring to sankhya; when they talk about anus (atoms), we know that these remarks indicate Vaisesika. But it does not at all follow from this that they refer to the Samkhya or Vaishe-shika sutras exactly in the form in which we know them. Some of the sutras have been proven to be so new that ancient philosophers could not quote them. For example, Gall proved that our Sankhya Sutras are not older than 1380 AD. e. and perhaps even belong to a later time. Astonishing as such a discovery may be, nothing can, of course, be objected to Gall's arguments, or to the evidence with which Professor Garbet supported his discovery; so far simple alterations (rifaccimento), replacing older sutras, which were probably already in the sixth century AD. e. were supplanted by the popular Samkhya Karikas and then forgotten. Such a late date for our Sankhya Sutras may seem incredible; but although I continue to be of the opinion that the style of the sutras arose at a period when writing for literary purposes was still in its infancy, we know that even at the present time there are scholars (pundits) who have no difficulty in imitating it ancient style sutra The sutra period, dating back to the reign of Ashoka in the third century and to his council in 242 BC. e., includes not only the famous sutras of Panini, but is defined as the period of greatest philosophical activity in India, apparently caused by the strong shock produced by the emergence of the Buddhist school of philosophy and subsequently the Buddhist religion.
It is very significant that of the technical names of the six systems of philosophy, only two are found in the classical Upanishads - namely, Samkhya and Yoga or Samkhya Yoga. Vedanta is not found except in Svetashvatara, Mundaka and in some of the later Upanishads. Mimamsa occurs in the general meaning of the study. Nyaya and Vaisheshika are completely absent; we do not find such words as hetuvidya or anvinshiki, nor the names of the supposed creators of the six systems, with the exception of the names of the founders of the two mimansas - Badarayana and Jaimini. The names of Patanjali and Kanada are completely absent, and the names of Kapila and Gotama, although found, seem to refer to completely different personalities.
SIX SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
It cannot be supposed that the men whose names are mentioned as the authors of these six philosophical systems were anything other than the mere last publishers or editors of the sutras as we know them. If the third century BC. e. seems to us to be too late a date for the introduction of writing in India for literary purposes, we must remember that even inscriptions older than those of Ashoka have not been found; and there is a big difference between inscriptions and literary works. Southern Buddhists claim that their sacred canon was written down no earlier than the first century BC. e., although it is known that they maintained close relations with their northern co-religionists who were familiar with the letter. Therefore, during all this time, from 477 to 77 BC. e., various theories of the world, originating from Vedanta Samkhya or yoga, even theories of Buddhist origin, could appear and be preserved in mnemonic form in various ashrams. It is not surprising that a significant part of such literature, as transmitted only from memory, is irretrievably lost, and therefore we should not look at what is left to us in ancient darshans as the complete result of the philosophical activity of all India for so many centuries. We can only affirm that philosophy in India arose during the period of the Brahmanas and the Upanishads, even during the period of some of the Vedic hymns, that the existence of the Upanishads - although not necessary in the form as we know them - is recognized by the Buddhist canon and, finally, the name the suttas as a constituent part of this canon must be later than the name of the more ancient Brahmanical sutras, since during this time the meaning changed again; it no longer meant short sayings stored from memory, but real speeches. Perhaps the original word sutra denoted the text explained in a sermon, and only then did long Buddhist sermons begin to be called suttas.
BRIHASPATI SUTRAS
That some of the philosophical sutras have been lost is shown by the example of the Brihaspati Sutras. It is argued that these sutras expounded completely materialistic or sensualistic teachings (Lokayatikas or Charvakas), denying everything except what is given by the senses. Bhashkacharya refers to them in the Brahma Sutras (III, 3, 53) and gives us extracts from them, so that they probably still existed at that time, although their records have not yet been found in India. The same can be said about such sutras as the Vaikhanasa Sutras: perhaps these sutras are the same as the Vanaprastha and Bhikshu Sutras quoted by Panini (IV, 3, 110) and, apparently, intended for Brahman mendicant monks, and not for Buddhists. Here again we have to admit the sad truth that we have only pitiful fragments from the old pre-Buddhist literature, and these fragments in some cases are only simple reproductions of lost originals, such as, for example, the Sankhya Sutras. We now know that such sutras could be reproduced at any time and we must not forget that even at the present time, with the general decline in the study of Sanskrit, there are still scholars in India who can imitate Kalidasa, not to mention such poems, like Mahabharata and Ramayana; - and, moreover, so successfully that few scientists can point out the difference between the original and the imitation. I recently received a Sanskrit treatise (sutras with commentaries) by a still living Indian scholar - a treatise which may have misled many of the European Sanskrit scholars. If this is possible now, if it was possible, as in the case of the Kapila Sutras, in the fourteenth century, then why could not the same thing happen during the revival period in India and even earlier? In any case, we can be grateful for what has been preserved, and in such a wonderful, in our opinion, way; but we must not imagine that we have everything and that what we have has come down to us in its original form
SOURCES
I must mention here at least some of the most important works from which students of philosophy, and especially those who do not know the Sanskrit language, can obtain information about the six recognized systems of Indian philosophy. The titles of the most important of the original Sanskrit texts are to be found in Colebrooke's Miscellaneous Essays (Vol. 11) and in the catalogs (published thereafter) of various collections of Sanskrit manuscripts in Europe and India.
About the philosophy of Vedanta Badarayana is very useful book(English translation of the text of the sutras and commentary of Shankara) Thibault. – SBE., vol. 34 and 38. From German books, we can recommend the translation (of the same work) by Deyssen (1887); his “Vedanta System” (1883).
On the Samkhya system we have sutras translated by Ballantyne in 1862 - 1865; Aphorisms of Samkhya - philosophy of Kapila, with explanatory extracts from commentaries (1852, 1865, 1885). In Germany there is the Samkhya-pravacana-bhasya (Vij-nanabhikshu's commentary on the Samkhya sutras), a translation by Garbe (1889), as well as Aniruddha's commentary and the original parts of Mahadeva's commentary on the Samkhya sutras (Garbe, 1892); “Moonlight of Samkhya Truth” (Sankhya-tattva-kaumudi) by Vacaspatimistra (translation by R. Garbe, 1892) is also a very useful book; Ishvarakrishna's Samkhya-karika, translated from the Sanskrit by Colebrooke, and Gaudapada's bhasya (commentary), translated with explanation from Wilson's original commentary (Oxford, 1837), are also suitable for reference. In addition, the works of John Davis (Hindu Philosophy. Samkhya Karika of Isuarakrishna, 1881), Richard Garbe (Samkhya-Philosophie nach den Quellen, 1894) are useful.
From the Purva Mimamsa or simply Mimamsa, dealing mainly with the essence and authority of the Vedas and specially with sacrificial and other duties, we have an edition of the original sutras with commentary by Shabaras-vami; but there is no book in English from which this system can be studied, except Professor Thibault's translation of the Arthasangraha of Laugaksha Bhaskara, a short extract of this philosophy, printed in the Benares Sanskrit series, No. 4.
The Vaisesika philosophical system can be studied from the English translation of its sutras by Gough in Benares (1873); from the German translation by Roer (Zeitschrift der Deut. Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft, vols. 21 and 22) and from my articles in the same Orientalist journal (1849).
The Nyaya Sutras of Gotama were translated, with the exception of the last book, by Ballantyne (Allahabad, 1850 - 1857).
The Yoga Sutras are available in the English translation of Rajendralal Mitra in the Bibliotheca Indica (Nos. 462, 478, 482, 491 and 492).
DATES OF PHILOSOPHICAL SUTRAS
If we take into account the state of philosophical thinking in India, as it is depicted in the Brahmanas and Upanishads and then in the canonical books of the Buddhists, we will not be surprised that until now all attempts to determine the dates of the six recognized philosophical systems and even their mutual relations have been unsuccessful. It is true that Buddhism and Jainism are also philosophical systems and that it has been possible to determine their dates. But if we know anything about their time and their historical development, it is mainly due to the social and political significance which they acquired in the fifth, fourth and third centuries BC. e., and not at all by their philosophical position. We also know that there were many teachers who were contemporaries of the Buddha, but they left no traces in the literature of India.
We should not forget that although the time of compilation of the Buddhist canon can be determined, the dates of many of the texts that we have and which are recognized as canonical are far from certain.
In Buddhist chronicles, other teachers are mentioned next to Gautama, the prince of the Shakya clan, Gnatiputra (the founder of Jainism), Purana Kashyapa, Pakuda Kachchayana, Ajita Keshakambali, Samjaya Vairatti-putpa, Gozali-putra, Maskarin. And only one of them, Gnatiputra, the nirgrantha (gymnosophist), is known to history, since the society founded by him, like the brotherhood founded by the Buddha, developed into a significant sect of Jains. Another teacher, Gozali with a bamboo stick, who was originally an Ajivak and then a follower of Mahavira, also became the founder of a special sect, which has now disappeared. Gnatiputra (Natiputra) was older than Buddha.
Although it seems probable that the founders of the six systems of philosophy, but not the authors of the sutras which we have, lived during the same period of religious and philosophical ferment in which the teachings of the Buddha first spread into India, it is not at all true that Buddhism presupposes the existence of any from these systems in their literary form. This is due to the ambiguity of the quotations, which are rarely given verbatim. In India, during the mnemonic period of literature, the content of a book could change significantly, although the title remained the same. Even if in later times Bhartrihari (died 650 AD) referred to the Mimamsa, Samkhya and Vaisesika darshanas, we have no right to conclude that he knew these darshanas as we know them, although he may have known these philosophy after they had received systematic form. Likewise, when he quotes the Nayayas, it does not mean that he knew our Gotama Sutras, and we have no right to say that these sutras existed at that time. This is possible, but not certain. Therefore, we should not particularly trust quotations, or, better yet, allusions to other philosophical systems.
SANKHYA SUTRAS
The Sankhya Sutras, as we know them, are very sparse in their references. They obviously refer to Vaisesika and Nyaya when they examine the six categories of the first (V, 85) and the sixteen Padarthas of the second (V, 86). When they speak of anu (atoms), we know that the Vaisheshika philosophy is meant, and once Vaisheshika is directly called by this name (1, 25). Very often there is mention of shruti (revelation), which Samkhya seems to neglect: once there is mention of smriti (tradition, V, 123); Vamadeva, whose name appears in both the sruti and smriti, is mentioned as a person who has achieved spiritual freedom. But among the philosophers we find mention only of Sanandana Acharya (VI, 69) and Panchashikha (V, 32; VI, 68); teachers (acaryas) as a general name include Kapila himself as well as others.
VEDANTA SUTRAS
There are more references in the Vedanta Sutras, but they will not help us much for chronological purposes.
Badarayana more or less clearly points to the Buddhists, the Jains (gianas), the pasupatas and the pankaratras, and tries to refute all of them. But he, however, never refers to any literary works; even when he refers to other philosophies, he seems to deliberately avoid mentioning the recognized names of their authors and even their technical terms. But it is still obvious that, when composing his sutras, he had in mind Purva Mimamsa, Yoga, Samkhya and Vaisesika; of the Mimamsa authorities he refers directly to Jaimini, Badari, Udulomi, Asmarathya, Kasakritsya, Karsnajini and Atreya, as well as to Badarayana. Therefore, we will not be far from the truth if we attribute the formation of six philosophical systems to the period from Buddha (5th century) to Ashoka (3rd century), although we admit, especially with regard to Vedanta, Samkhya and Yoga, a long preliminary development, ascending through the Upanishads and Brahmins to the hymns of the Rig Veda.
It is also difficult to determine the relative position of philosophical systems, since they, as I have already explained, mutually refer to each other. As to the relation of Buddhism to the six orthodox systems, all we can say about it, it seems to me, is that schools of philosophy which have transmitted teachings very similar to the six classical or orthodox systems are presupposed by the Buddhist suttas. But this is not at all what some scholars believe, who claim that the Buddha or his disciples directly borrowed from the sutras. We do not know anything from Samkhya literature before the Samkhya-karika, dating back to the 6th century. n e. Even if we admit that the Tattva-samasa is an older work, then how, without parallel dates, can we prove the actual borrowings on the part of the Buddha and his disciples in that old time?
In the Upanishads and Brahmanas, despite the general mood of all of them, there is a significant lack of system and diversity of opinions advocated by different teachers and different schools. Even in the hymns we find great independence and individuality of thought, sometimes apparently reaching the point of open skepticism and atheism.
We must remember all this if we wish to get a correct idea of the historical origin and growth of the six philosophical systems of India, as we are accustomed to call them. We have already seen that it was not only the Brahmins who participated in philosophical reasoning, and that the Kshatriyas also played a very active and prominent role in the development of such basic philosophical concepts as the concept of Atman, or self.
From this fluctuating mass of philosophical and religious thoughts, which constituted the common property in India, real philosophical systems slowly emerged. Although we do not know in what form this took place, it is quite obvious that those philosophical textbooks in the form of sutras that we have could not have been written at a time when writing was used for any practical purpose other than inscriptions on monuments and coins, was not yet known in India and, in any case, was not used, as far as we know, for literary purposes.
MNEMONIC LITERATURE
It is now generally accepted, I believe, that when writing becomes widespread, it is almost impossible that there should not be allusions to it in poetic and prosaic folk writings. Even as late as the age of Shankara, written letters were called unreal (anrita) in comparison with the sounds they represented (Ved.-sutras, II, 1, 14). There is no mention of writing in the hymns, Brahmanas and Upanishads, and there are very few allusions to it in the sutras. The historical value of these allusions to writing found in Buddhist literature depends, of course, on the date we can determine, not of the original authors, but of the authors of our texts. We must never forget that in India for many centuries there existed a purely mnemonic literature, preserved until the period of the sutras and transmitted from generation to generation according to a system fully described in the Pratisankyas. Why would this developed system be needed if manuscripts already existed at that time?
When mnemonic literature - tradition (smriti) - was first written down, it was probably in a form similar to that of the sutras. At the same time, the dissatisfaction and clumsiness of the sutra style is understandable. Letters at that time were still monumental, since in India, monumental writing preceded literary writing and the assimilation of the alphabet. Written material in India was rare and the number of people who could read was very small. And at the same time there was an old mnemonic literature, which had a certain time-honored character and formed part of the ancient educational system, which satisfied all needs and which could not be easily replaced. Naturally, a significant part of such mnemonic literature is lost if it is not recorded in a timely manner. Often the name is preserved, experienced, but the content itself is completely changed. Therefore, when we find mention of Samkhya in Buddhist texts, for example in the Visuddimagga (Chapter XVII), it is impossible to even say whether at that time there was at least one work on Samkhya philosophy in the form of sutras. It is obvious, in any case, that there could not have been our Samkhya-sutras, and even the Samkhya-karikas, which apparently replaced the ancient sutras at the beginning of the sixth century, while our sutras belong to the fourteenth.
It is possible, if not to prove, at least to make probable the position here recognized as the teaching of the Buddha as following the early development of philosophical ideas in their systematic and more or less technical form, by referring to the name of his mother - whether this name was real or given to her by tradition. She was called Maya or Mayadevi. Considering that for the Buddha the world was maya (illusion), it seems more likely that this name was given to his mother ancient tradition and that it was not given without a purpose. And if this is so, then it could only be after avidya (ignorance) in Vedanta and prakriti in Samkhya philosophy were replaced by the concept of maya. It is known that the word Maya does not appear in the old classical Upanishads; It is also remarkable that it is found in later Upanishads, more or less apocryphal. For example, in Svetashvatara (I, 10) we read: “Mayam tu Prakrtim vidyat” (Let him know that prakriti is maya or maya - prakriti). This seems to refer to the Samkhya system, in which prakriti plays the role of maya and blinds the purusha (spirit) until he turns away from it and it ceases to exist, at least for him. But in Samkhya or Vedanta Maya in its technical meaning undoubtedly belongs to the secondary period and therefore it can be argued that Maya as the name of the mother of Buddha could not find a place in the Buddhist legend in the first period of Indian philosophy, represented by the ancient Upanishads and even in these sutras two outstanding schools.
Undoubtedly, there were many philosophical mnemonic products both after the period of which the old Upanishads were representatives and before the systematic establishment of the philosophical sutras; but all this philosophical production was lost forever for us. We see this clearly in relation to the philosophy of Brihaspati.
PHILOSOPHY OF BRIHASPATI
Brihaspati is undoubtedly a very obscure figure historically. He was called the author of two Vedic hymns (X, 71 and X, 72) and distinguished between Brihaspati Angirasa and Brihaspati Laukya (Laukayatika?). His name is known in the same way as the name of one of the Vedas gods. In the Rig Veda (VIII, 96, 15) we read that Indra and his companion or ally Brihaspati defeated the godless people (adevihvisah). Then he was called as the author of the book of laws, which was decidedly new and has survived to our time. Moreover, Brihaspati is the name of the planet Jupiter and the teacher (purohita) of the gods, so Brihaspati-purohita became the recognized name of Indra, who has Brihaspati as his purohita. that is, the chief priest and assistant. Therefore it seems strange that the same name, the name of the teacher of the gods, is given to the representative of the most unorthodox, atheistic and sensualistic philosophical system of India. Perhaps this can be explained by reference to the Drachmanas and the Upanishads, in which Brihaspati is depicted teaching the demons his harmful doctrines, not for their benefit, but for their destruction. Thus in the Maitrayani Upanishad we read: “Brihaspati, having transformed or assumed the form of Shukra, teaches this false knowledge for the safety of Indra and for the destruction of the asuras (demons). With the help of this knowledge, they proved that good is evil and evil is good, and they said that this new law, overthrowing the Vedas and other sacred books, should be studied (by asuras, demons). For this to happen, they said, let not man (but only demons) study this false knowledge, for it is harmful; it is, so to speak, sterile. His reward lasts only as long as the pleasure lasts, like that of a person who has lost his position (caste). Let him not be tempted by this false doctrine, for it is said:
1. These two knowledges are very divergent and opposite; one known as false knowledge, the other as knowledge. I (Yama) believe that Nachiketa has a desire for knowledge and many pleasures do not tempt him.
2. He who knows both imperfect knowledge (rites) and perfect knowledge (knowledge of himself) conquers death through imperfect knowledge and achieves immortality through perfect knowledge.
3. Those who clothe themselves with imperfect knowledge imagine that they alone are wise and learned; they wander around and around, deceived, like a blind man led by other blind people” (7, 9).
“Gods and demons, wanting to know me (themselves), came to Brahman (to their father Brihaspati). Bowing before him, they said: “Oh, blessed one, we want to know, tell us!” Having considered the matter, he thought that these demons believe that the atman is different (from themselves) and that therefore they are taught a completely different self. These erring (deceived) demons rely on this self, cling to it, destroying the true boat of salvation and praising untruth. They consider the untrue to be the truth, like being deceived by a magician. In reality, what is said in the Vedas is the truth. The wise rely on what is said in the Vedas. Therefore, let the Brahman not study what is not in the Vedas, or the result will be the same (that is, like the demons).
This place is curious in many ways. First of all, there is a clear reference from one Upanishad to another, namely to Chandogya, in which this episode of Brihaspati giving false teaching to demons is described in more detail. Secondly, we see a change that was obviously made intentionally. In the Chandogya Upanishad, Prajapati himself gives the asuras false knowledge of the atman, and in the Maitrayana Upanishad, Brihaspati takes his place. It is quite probable that in the later Upanishad Brihaspati was introduced instead of Prajapati, because they were aware of the impropriety of the highest deity deceiving anyone, even demons. In Chandogya, demons who believed in anyata (difference, dissimilarity) of the atman, that is, in the possibility that the atman resides in some place other than themselves, look for it in the reflection of a face in the pupil of the eyes, in a mirror or water. All this, however, refers to the visible body. Then Prajapati says that the atman is that which moves, full of pleasures, in sleep, and since this too will only be an individual person, he finally explains that the atman is that which remains in deep sleep, without, however, losing its identity.
If already in the Upanishads Brihaspati is introduced for the purpose of teaching false rather than orthodox opinions, then we may perhaps understand why his name is associated with sensualistic propositions and why he is ultimately made, albeit unjustifiably, responsible for these propositions. That these principles existed in ancient times is proved by certain hymns in which many years ago I indicated curious traces of awakening skepticism. In later Sanskrit, barhaspati (follower of Brihaspati) meant an infidel in general. Among the works mentioned in Lalitavistara as being studied by the Buddha, Barhaspatya is indicated, but it is not clear whether this work was written in sutras or in meter. Moreover, it is known that Lalitavistara is too fragile a reed for a historian to rely on. But if we can trust Bhaskara's interpretation of the Brahma Sutras, then he seems to have known even at this later time certain sutras attributed to Brihaspati, which expounded the teachings of the Charvakas, that is, the unbelievers. But even if such sutras existed, we are unable to determine their date and say whether they were preceding or subsequent to other philosophical sutras. Panini knew sutras, now lost, and some of them can undoubtedly be traced back to the time of the Buddha. He, citing the Bhikshu-sutras and Nata-sutras (IV, 3, 110), also mentions that the author of the former is Parasarya, and the latter - Silalin. Since Parasarya is the name of Vyasa, the son of Parashara, it was believed that Panini, by the name Bhikshu-sutra, means the Brahma-sutras attributed to Vyasa. This would place their date around the fifth century BC. e. and this is accepted by all who wish to attribute the greatest possible antiquity to the philosophical literature of India. But Parasarya would hardly have been chosen as the name for Vyasa; and although we have no hesitation in assigning the teachings of the Vedanta a place in the fifth century B.C. e. and even before, we cannot give the same place to the sutras on the basis of such insufficient evidence.
When we meet elsewhere with the heretical teachings of Brihaspati, they are expressed in verse, so that they are taken from the karikas rather than from the sutras. They are especially interesting for us, since they prove that India, which is generally considered the birthplace of spiritualism and idealism, was by no means deprived of sensualist philosophers. Although it is difficult to say how old such theories were in India, it is certain that wherever we find consistent treatises on philosophy, sensualistic teachings also appear.
Of course, the Brahmins also called the teachings of the Buddha skeptical and atheistic; Charvaka, as well as nastika, are names often given to Buddhists. But the teachings of Brihaspati, as far as we know them, went much further than Buddhism and, one might say, were hostile to any religious feeling, while the teachings of the Buddha were both religious and philosophical, although in India it is quite difficult to separate the philosophical from the religious.
Among the followers of Brihaspati there are some provisions that seem to indicate the existence of other philosophical schools nearby. The Barkhaspatyas speak as they usually speak inter pares; they are different from others, just as others are different from them. Traces of opposition to the Vedic religion (Kautsa) are found in the hymns, in the Brahmanas and in the sutras, and to ignore them would give us a completely false idea of the religious and philosophical battles in ancient India. From the point of view of the Brahmins - and we know of no representatives of the other point of view - the opposition represented by Brihaspati and others may seem insignificant, but the very name given to these heretics seems to indicate that their teachings were very widespread ( localists). They were given another name (nastika) due to the fact that they denied (said: no) everything except the testimony of the senses, and especially denied the testimony of the Vedas, which the Vedantins called pratzksha, that is, self-evident, like sensory perceptions.
Nastika - a name that does not apply to simple heretics, but only to complete nihilists - are interesting to us from a historical point of view, since, arguing against other philosophies, they ipso facto, thereby prove the existence of orthodox philosophical systems before their time. The established schools of Indian philosophy could endure much; they were tolerant, as we will see, even of obvious atheism like the atheism of the Samkhya. But they felt hatred and contempt for the nastikas, and it is for this reason and because of the feeling of strong disgust they arouse that we cannot, it seems to me, go through in complete silence their philosophical system, which existed next to the six Vedic, or orthodox, systems.
Madhava, in his Sarvadarshana-sangraha (extractions from all philosophical systems), begins with an account of the Nastika (or Charvaka) system. He considers this system inferior to all, and yet finds it impossible to ignore it in enumerating the philosophical forces of India. Charvaka is given by him as the name of a Rakshasa, and this Rakshasa is recognized as the historical figure to whom Brihaspati (Vachaspati) transmitted his teachings. The word charvaka has an obvious connection with the word charva, and Balasastrin, in the preface to his edition of Kashiki, gives it as a synonym for Buddha. He is portrayed as the teacher of the lokayata, that is, the world system, if only this word originally had such a meaning. A brief account of this system is given in the Prabodhachandrodaya (27, 18) in the following words: in which wealth and pleasure constitute the ideal of man, in which the elements think, the other world is denied, and death is the end of everything. The word lokayapsh is found in Panini's Gana Ukthadi. It should be noted, however, that Hemacandra distinguishes varhaspatya (or nastika) from charvakas (or lokayats). although he does not indicate in what particular points they differ. Buddhists use the word lokayata to denote philosophy in general. The assertion that the Lokayatics recognized only one promana, that is, one source of knowledge, namely sensory perception, clearly indicates that other philosophical systems already existed then. We will see that the Vaisheshika recognizes two sources of knowledge: perception (pratyaksha) and inference (anumana); sankhya – three, adding to the previous two a reliable statement (aptavachya); nyaya – four, adding comparison (upamana); two mimansas are six, adding supposition, presumption (arthapatti) and negation (abhava). We will talk about all this further. Even such ideas as the idea of four or five elements, which seems so natural to us, required some time to develop, as we see in the history of the Greek stoyceia, and yet this idea was apparently quite familiar to the Charvakas. Other systems recognized five elements: earth, water, fire, air and ether; and they recognized only four, releasing the ether, probably because it is invisible. In the Upanishads we find traces of an even more ancient triad of elements. All this points to philosophical activity among the Hindus from ancient times and portrays to us these Charvakas rather as deniers of what was more or less established before them, than as adding their own new ideas to this old property.
The same is true for the soul. In India, not only philosophers, but every Aryan had a word for the soul and had no doubt that a person has something different from visible body. Only the Charvaks denied the soul. They argued that what we call the soul is not a thing in itself, but simply the same body. They claimed that they heard, saw and felt the body, that it remembered and thought, although they saw that this body was rotting and decomposing, as if it had never existed. It is clear that, holding such opinions, they came into conflict with religion even more than with philosophy. We do not know how they explained the development from the flesh of consciousness and mind; we only know that here they resorted to simile, referring to the intoxicating power obtained by mixing individual ingredients that are not intoxicating in themselves, as an analogy for the development of soul and body.
And here we read the following:
“There are four elements:
earth, water, fire and air,
And only these four elements
intelligence is produced
like the intoxicating power of Kinua, etc.,
mixed together.
Since “I’m fat”, “I’m thin” -
these attributes reside in the same subject
And since "fatness", etc., is inherent only in the body,
That alone is the soul, and nothing else.
And phrases like "my body"
have only a metaphorical meaning.
Thus, for them the soul apparently meant the body - endowed with the attribute of reason, and therefore was supposed to be destroyed along with the body. Holding this opinion, they, of course, had to see the highest goal of man in sensual pleasures and recognized suffering simply as an inevitable concomitant of pleasure.
This verse is quoted:
"The pleasure that occurs in a person
from contact with sense objects, Should not be valued as accompanied by suffering - this is the warning of fools: The fruits are rich in delicious grains - What person, realizing his true interest, will reject them because they are covered with husks and dust?
From all this we see that the Carvaka system - although its basic philosophical principles were developed - was more practical in its properties than metaphysical, an outspoken doctrine of utilitarianism and crude hedonism. It is a pity that all the original books of these materialist philosophers are lost, since they probably would have allowed us to look deeper into ancient history Indian philosophy, than we can glimpse with the help of the textbooks of the six darshanas, on which we must mainly rely. The following verses, preserved by Madhava in his Extracts, are almost all that we know of the teachings of Brihaspati and his followers.
“Fire is hot, water is cold and air feels cold.
How such a difference is created we do not know.
that's why it has to happen
from their own nature (svabhava)."
Brihaspati himself is credited with the following invective:
“There is no heaven, no liberation, and certainly no in the other world; There are no acts of ashrams (stages of life) or castes that produce reward,
Agnahotra, three Vedas, three rods (which were carried by ascetics) and smearing oneself with ashes - All this is a way of life designed by the creator for people lacking intelligence and courage. If the victim killed during jyotishtom goes to heaven, then why not his father, killed there by the sacrificer, also go there? If the sacrifice of sraddha gives pleasure to the dead beings, Then giving viaticum to people wandering here on earth would be useless. If those who are in heaven take pleasure in offerings. Then why not give food to people here while they are up there? Let a person be happy while he lives; and after borrowing money, let him drink ghee. How can the body return when it has become dust? If the one who leaves the body goes to another world, then why does he not return again, attracted by the love of his relatives? Therefore, funeral rites are prescribed by the Brahmins As a means of life; nothing else is known to anyone. The three compilers of the Vedas were fools, rogues and demons. The words of the pandits are as incomprehensible as jarbhari, turphari. An indecent act (sacrificing a horse) is performed by the queen, Proclaimed to be rogues, and also other things. Eating meat also prescribed by the demons."
These are, of course, strong expressions—as strong as any used by materialists, ancient or modern. It is good that we know how old and how widespread this materialism is, because otherwise we would hardly understand the attempts made by the other side to counteract it by establishing the true sources or measure of knowledge (pramanas) and other fundamental truths recognized as essential to religion , and for philosophy. The concept of orthodoxy in India, however, is very different from the same concept in other countries. In India we find philosophers who denied the existence of a personal god (Ishvara), and yet were tolerated as orthodox so long as they accepted the authority of the Vedas. It was this denial of the authority of the Vedas that immediately made Buddha a heretic in the eyes of the Brahmans and forced him to found new religion or brotherhood, while the followers of the Samkhya, not very different from him in many important points, remained safe under the protection of orthodoxy. Some of the charges brought against the Brahmanas by the Barhaspatyas are the same as those brought against them by the followers of the Buddha. Therefore, considering that on the vital question of the authority of the Vedas the Samkhya agrees, although inconsistently, with orthodox Brahmanism and differs from Buddhism, it would be much easier to prove that the Buddha borrowed his ideas from Brihaspati, and not from Kapila, the supposed founder of the Samkhya . If we are right in our opinion of the inorganic and rich development of philosophical ideas in ancient India, then the idea of borrowing, so natural to us, seems completely out of place in India. A chaotic mass of conjectures as to the truth was in the air, and there was no controlling authority, and not even, so far as we know, a binding public opinion that could bring this chaos into any order. Therefore we have just as little right to assert that Buddha
Borrowed from Kapila, as in the statement that Kapila borrowed from the Buddha. No one will argue that the Hindus borrowed the idea of shipbuilding from the Phoenicians or the construction of stupas (stupas) from the Egyptians. In India we are in a world different from that to which we are accustomed in Greece, in Rome or in modern Europe, and we need not immediately form the conclusion that since the same opinions are found in Buddhism and in the philosophy of Kapila (in Samkhya), then the first borrowed from the second or, as some believe, the second from the first.
Although we can easily imagine what the general spirit of the philosophy of the ancient Indian heretics was - whether they were called Charvakas (Barhaspatyas), we, unfortunately, know less about their teachings than about the teachings of other philosophical schools. These are for us only names, like the names of Yajnavalkya, Raikva and other ancient leaders of Indian thought who are mentioned in the Upanishads and to whom famous statements are attributed. We know some of the conclusions they reached, but we know almost nothing about the processes by which they arrived at them. From these statements we only learn that there must have been a considerable activity of philosophical thinking in India long before the time when an attempt was made to divide that thinking into six specific philosophical systems or to write down these systems. Even when they call us famous people, like Jaimini, Kapila and others as the authors of famous systems of philosophy, we should not consider them the original creators of philosophy in the sense that Plato and Aristotle were such.
GENERAL PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAS
It should be especially vigorously insisted that in India there was a large general fund of philosophical thinking, which, like language, did not belong to anyone in particular, but was like the air that every living and thinking person breathed. Only in this way can we account for the fact that we find certain ideas in all or almost all systems of Indian philosophy - ideas which seem to be recognized by all philosophers as proven and which do not belong in particular to any one school.
1. Metempsychosis-samsara
The best known of these ideas, which belongs more to all India than to any of its philosophers, is that which is known as metempsychosis. This word is Greek, like metensomatosis, but has no literary authority in Greece. In purpose it corresponds to the Sanskrit word samsara and is translated in German as Seelenwanderung (transmigration of souls). For a Hindu, the idea that the souls of people after their death move into the bodies of animals or even plants is so obvious that it cannot even be questioned. Among prominent writers (both ancient and modern) we never find attempts to prove or disprove this idea. Already in the period of the Upanishads we read about human souls reborn in the bodies of animals and plants. In Greece, a similar opinion was defended by Empedocles; and now there is still much dispute about whether he borrowed this idea from the Egyptians, as is commonly believed, or whether Pythagoras and his teacher Pherekides learned it in India. It seems to me that such an opinion is so natural that it could arise quite independently among different peoples. From Aryan races the Italian, Celtic, and Hyperborean or Scythian tribes maintained a belief in metempsychosis; traces of this belief in Lately open even among the uncivilized inhabitants of America, Africa and East Asia. In India, undoubtedly, this belief developed spontaneously, and if this was so in India, why should it not be so in other countries, especially among peoples belonging to the same linguistic race? It must be remembered, however, that some systems, especially the Samkhya philosophy, do not recognize what we usually understand as the “transmigration of the soul.” If we translate the word purusha of Samkhya philosophy with the word “soul” instead of I, then it is not the purusha that transmigrates, but the sukshmasharira (the subtle, invisible body). The Self always remains inviolable, a simple contemplator, and its highest goal is to recognize that it is higher and separate from everything that comes from prakriti (nature).
2. Immortality of the soul
The immortality of the soul is an idea that was also the common property of all Indian philosophers. This idea was considered so proven that we would look in vain for any arguments in its favor. Death for the Hindu was so limited to the body decaying before our eyes that such an expression as “atmano mritatvam” (immortality of the self) is almost a tautology in Sanskrit. There is no doubt that the followers of Briha-spati denied the future life, but all other schools rather fear the future life, prolonged metempsychosis, than doubt it; As for the final destruction of the true self, this seems to a Hindu to be a self-contradiction. Some scientists are so surprised by such an unshakable belief in the future and eternal life among the people of India that they try to trace it back to the belief, supposedly common to all savages, who believe that after death a person leaves his spirit on earth, which can take the form of the body of an animal or even tree. This is a simple fantasy, and although, of course, it is impossible to refute it, it does not follow from this that it has the right to our consideration. And besides, why would the Aryans begin to learn from savages, when at one time they themselves were also savages and there was no need for them to forget the so-called wisdom of the savage, just as there was no need to forget the sutras from which they are believed to have learned about this belief.
3. Pessimism
All Indian philosophers are accused of pessimism; in some cases such an accusation may be valid, but not in all. A people who borrowed their name for God from a word that essentially means only existing, real (sat), could hardly recognize something drier as something that should not have existed. Indian philosophers did not dwell forever on the misfortune of life. They don't always whine and protest against life as being worthless. Their pessimism is of a different kind. They simply claim that they received their first incentive for philosophical reflection from the fact that there is suffering in the world. Obviously, they believe that in a perfect world suffering does not occur, that it is some kind of anomaly, in any case something that should be explained and, if possible, eliminated. Suffering, of course, appears to be an imperfection, and as such it can beg the question of why it exists and how it can be destroyed. And this is not the mood that we are used to calling pessimism; In Indian philosophy we do not find cries against divine injustice; it in no way encourages suicide. Yes, according to the Hindus, it would be useless, since the same worries and the same questions confront us in another life. Considering that the aim of Indian philosophy is to eliminate the suffering produced by ignorance and to achieve the highest happiness given by knowledge, we would be justified in calling this philosophy eudaimonic rather than pessimistic.
It is interesting, at any rate, to note the unanimity with which the major philosophical systems in India, and also some of her religious systems, start from the idea that the world is full of suffering and that this suffering must be explained and eliminated. This seems to have been one of the main impulses of philosophical thinking in India, if not the main impulse. To begin with Jaimini, we cannot expect real philosophy from his Purva Mimamsa, which deals mainly with ritual matters, such as sacrifices, etc. But although these sacrifices are depicted as a means to a certain kind of bliss and as a means of reducing or alleviating ordinary sorrows life, they do not provide the highest bliss that all other philosophers strive for. Uttara Mimamsa and all other philosophies occupy a higher position. Badarayana teaches that the cause of all evil is avidya (ignorance) and that the goal of his philosophy is to eliminate this ignorance through knowledge (vidya) and thus reach the highest knowledge of Brahman, which is the highest bliss (Tait.-up., II, 11 ). The Samkhya philosophy, at least as we know it from the karikas and sutras, begins directly with the recognition of the existence of three kinds of suffering and recognizes as its highest goal the complete cessation of all suffering; and the philosophy of yoga, having shown the path to contemplation and self-concentration (samadhi), claims that this is the best means for avoiding all earthly disturbances (II, 2) and for ultimately achieving kaivalya (perfect freedom). Vaisesika promises his followers knowledge of the truth and through this the final cessation of suffering; even Gotama's philosophy of logic presents in its first sutra complete bliss (apavarga) as the highest reward, which is achieved by the complete destruction of all suffering through logic. That the religion of the Buddha has the same origin in a clear understanding of human suffering and its cause and the same goal - the destruction of duhkha (suffering) - is too well known so that it needs no further explanation; but it should be remembered that other systems also give the same name to the state they strive for - nirvana or dukhkhanta (the end of dukhkha - suffering).
Therefore, Indian philosophy, which claims to be able to destroy suffering, can hardly be called pessimistic in the usual sense of the word. Even physical suffering, although it cannot be eliminated, ceases to affect the soul when the self is fully aware of its alienation from the body, and all mental suffering arising from worldly attachments disappears when we are freed from the desires that cause these attachments. Since the cause of all suffering is in ourselves (in our deeds and thoughts), in this or a previous life, then any protest against divine injustice immediately falls silent. We are what we ourselves have made, we suffer from what we have done, we reap what we have sown, and sowing good, although without any hope of a rich harvest, is recognized as the main goal of the philosopher here on earth.
Besides the conviction that all suffering can be eliminated by penetration into its nature and its origin, there are other ideas that we find in that rich treasury of ideas that opens up in India for every thinking person. These general ideas have, of course, had different expressions in separate systems, but this need not disturb us, and with some reflection we discover their common source. Thus, when we search for the causes of suffering, all the philosophical systems of India give us the same answer, although under different names. Vedanta speaks of ignorance (avidya); sankhya – about aviveka (non-discrimination); Nyaya is about mithyajnana (complex knowledge), and all these various deviations from knowledge are generally depicted as bandha - bonds broken through true knowledge given by various philosophical systems.
The next idea, apparently firmly rooted in the soul of the Hindu and therefore finding expression in all philosophical systems, is the belief in karma, deed, the continuous activity of thought, word and deed in all ages. “All deeds, good and evil, must and do bear fruit” - this is a position that not a single Hindu, neither modern nor those who lived thousands of years before us, doubted.
The same eternity that is attributed to deeds and their consequences is also attributed to the soul, with the difference that deeds cease to act when real freedom is achieved, but the soul remains even after the achievement of freedom, or final bliss. The idea of a soul ever ending was so foreign to the Hindu mind that the need for the proofs of immortality so common in European philosophy was apparently not felt. Knowing the meaning of the word to be (being), the idea that being could become non-being seemed simply impossible to the Hindu mind. If being meant samsara, or the world, no matter how long it existed, then the Hindu philosophers never recognized it as real. He never existed, does not exist and will not exist. Time, however long it may be, is nothing to the Hindu philosopher. Counting a thousand years as one day did not satisfy him. He imagined the duration of time through more daring similes, such as those of a man running his silk scarf along the chain of the Himalayan mountains once every thousand years. Over time, he will completely destroy (erase) these mountains; in this way the world, or samsara, of course, ends, but even then eternity and the real remain distant from each other. In order to make it easier to understand this eternity, the popular idea of prolaya (destruction or absorption) of the entire world was invented. Based on the teachings of Vedanta, at the end of each kalpa, the pralaya (destruction) of the universe occurs, and then Brahman is reduced to its causal condition (karanavastha), containing both soul and matter in an undeveloped state (avyakta). At the end of such a pair, Brahman creates or emits from itself a new world, matter again becomes visible, souls become active again and are reincarnated, albeit with higher enlightenment (vikasha) in accordance with their previous merits or sins. Thus, Brahman receives his new karyavastha, that is, an active state that continues until the next kalpa. But all this applies only to the changeable and unreal world. This is the world of karma, a temporary product of ignorance (avidya) or maya, this is not the real reality. In Samkhya philosophy, these prolayas occur when the three gunas of prakriti (matter) are in balance, while creation is the result of an imbalance between them. That which is not affected by the cosmic illusion, or at least only temporarily, and which at any moment can again acquire its self-knowledge, that is, its self-existence and freedom from all conditions and bonds, is truly eternal.
According to the Vaisesika school of philosophy, this process of creation and decomposition depends on atoms. If they separate, decomposition (pralaya) occurs; if movement appears in them and they connect, what we call creation occurs.
The idea of the world being absorbed at the end of the kalpa(s) and appearing again in the next kalpa is not found in the old Upanishads; even the very concept of samsara is not found in them, therefore Professor Garbe is inclined to consider the idea of prolaya to be newer, peculiar only to the philosophy of samkhya and borrowed from it by other systems. It is possible that this is so, but in the Bhagavad Gita (IX, 7) the idea of pralayas (absorptions) and kalpas (periods), their end and beginning (kalpakshaya and kalpadau) is already quite familiar to poets. The nature of pralaya is so different for different poets and philosophers that it is much more likely that they all borrowed this idea from one common source, that is, from the folk faith of the people among whom they grew up, from whom they learned the language, and with it they learned the materials of their thinking. than that they invented the same theory in a form slightly modified by each.
5. The infallibility of the Vedas
One more common element, which is assumed by all Indian philosophy, can be pointed out - the recognition of the highest authority and character of the revelation attributed to the Vedas. Such an idea was, of course, striking in antiquity, although it seems quite familiar to us today. It is believed that the Samkhya philosophy originally did not imply belief in the revealed properties of the Vedas, but here, of course, shruti is spoken of (Sutra, I, 5). As far as we know the Samkhya, it recognizes the authority of the Vedas, calling them shabda and referring to them on even unimportant matters. It should be noted that the difference between sruti and s.chrshpi (revelation and tradition), so familiar in the later stages of the development of philosophy, is not yet found in the old Upanishads.
6. Three Gunas
The theory of the three gunas, recognized as the original property of Samkhya philosophy in its non-scientific form, also seems to have been quite familiar to most Hindu philosophers. The impulse to everything in nature, the cause of all life and all diversity, is attributed to the three gunas. Guna denotes property; but we are expressly warned not to understand this word in philosophy in its usual sense of property, but rather in the sense of substance, so that the gunas are in fact the constituent elements of nature. In more general sense they are nothing more than thesis, antithesis and something in between - for example, cold, hot and neither cold nor hot; good, evil, and neither good nor evil; light, dark, neither light nor dark, etc. - in all parts of physical and moral nature. The tension of these properties (the struggle between them) produces activity and struggle; and balance leads to temporary or final peace. This mutual tension is sometimes represented as an inequality produced by the predominance of one of the three gunas; for example, in the Maitrayana Upanishads (V, 2) we read: “This world in the beginning was tamas (darkness). This tamas stood in the Supreme. Moved by the Supreme, he became unequal. In this form he had rajas (darkness). Rajas, moved, also became unequal, and this form is sattva (kindness, goodness). Sattva, moved, dispersed as a race (essence).” Here, obviously, we have the recognized names of the three gunas; in the Maitrayana Upanishads the influence of Samkhya is noticeable, and therefore it can be argued that its testimony is not of particular importance in proving the general acceptance of the theory of the gunas; in any case, they have not greater value than the testimony of the later Upanishads or the Bhagavad Gita, where the three gunas are fully recognized.
Chapter Three
SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
Development of philosophical ideas
Thus, we became acquainted with the important fact that all these ideas - metaphysical, cosmological and other - appeared in India in great abundance, without any system and represented real chaos.
We should not assume that these ideas follow one another in chronological order. And here a more reliable clue would not be Nacheinander, A Nebeneinander.* It must be remembered that this ancient philosophy existed for a long time without being recorded in written literature, that there was no control, no authority, no public opinion to protect it. Each settlement (ashram) was a separate world; often there were no simple means of communication, rivers or roads. It is surprising that, despite all these conditions, we still find so much unity in numerous conjectures regarding the truth, we owe this, as they say, parampara, that is, an unbroken chain of people who passed on the tradition from generation to generation and finally collected everything that could be saved. It would be a mistake to think that there has been a continuous development in the different meanings taken by such significant terms as prajapati, brahmana or even atman. It would be much more consistent with what we know about the intellectual life of India from the Brahmanas and the Upanishads, to admit the existence of a large number of intellectual centers scattered throughout the country, in which there were influential advocates of one or another view. Then we will better understand how Brahman, denoting at first that which opens and grows, received the meaning of speech and prayer, as well as the meaning of creative power and the creator, and why atman meant not only breath, but also life, spirit, soul, essence, or what I dare to translate as Self, Self (Self, das Selbst), I all things.
* Not sequence, but simultaneity. ¶ Note ed.
But if in the period of the Brahmanas and Upanishads we have to make our way among religious and philosophical ideas, as through an impenetrable thicket of creeping plants, then as we approach the next period, characterized by persistent attempts at clear and systematic thinking, the path becomes easier. We should not think that here too we will already find correct historical development in various philosophical systems. The sutras, or aphorisms, representing fragments of six systems of philosophy, completely separate from one another, cannot be considered the first attempts at systematic exposition; they represent rather a summation of what has developed over many generations of isolated thinkers.
Prasthana-bheda
What the Brahmins themselves thought about this philosophical literature we can learn even from such new works as the Prasthana-bheda, from which I gave several extracts in the introduction to several of my articles on one of the systems of Indian philosophy back in 1852 in the Journal of the German Orientalist Society . It must be said that the honor of opening this treatise by Madhusudana Sarasvati and indicating its significance belongs to Colebrook himself. I myself became acquainted with him through my old friend Dr. Triten, who prepared a critical edition of the treatise, but did not have time to publish it due to illness and death. It was previously printed by Professor Weber in his Indische Studien of 1849, and I believe it will not be unprofitable to make some extracts from it here.*
“Nyaya,” he writes, “is the logic*** taught by Gotama**** in his five adhyayah(lessons). Its object is knowledge of the nature of sixty padarth through name, definition and research."
* New translation Prasthanabheda printed by Prof. Deysen in the introduction to his General History of Philosophy, vol. I, p. 44, 1894.
** Nyaya comes from ni (to) and i (to go). The fourth term of the syllogism is called fallen(lead to) or "induction". Ballantyne translates nyaya How method.
*** Anvikshiki as an old name for philosophy, and especially logic, is also found in the Dharmashastra of Gautama (II, 3). Sometimes it is used as a synonym for mimansa, in which case it is much broader than the term “logic”.
**** Since the manuscripts write either Gotama or Gautama, I reserve the first name for the philosopher, and the second for the Buddha.
These padarthi very important or essential parts of Nyaya philosophy; but it turned out to be completely inappropriate to translate the word padartha in a word category. It is not clear why such things as doubt, example, dispute, etc., can be called categories (praedicabilia); and it is not surprising that Ritter and others spoke of Nyaya with disdain, since such things were presented to them as categories of Indian logic.
"There is also the Vaisesika philosophy taught in Canada. Its purpose is to establish, by means of similarities and differences*, the six padartha, namely:
- dravya substance;
- guna property;
- karma activities;
- samanya common to several objects. Higher samanya There is satta, or being;
- visesha different or special, inherent in eternal atoms, etc.
- samavaya inseparable connection, as between cause and effect, parts and the whole, etc. To this we can add
- abhava denial.
This philosophy is also called nyaya."
* Barthelemy S. Hilaire, in his work on Indian logic, remarks: "But the Vaisesika philosopher does not attempt to distinguish the categories by enumerating their properties, as the Stagirite does. He does not indicate their relations and their differences, as Aristotle does." But that's exactly what he does. See Sutras, I, 8 ff.
These padarthi Vaisesikas, at least the first five, may indeed be called categories, for they represent everything that can serve as a predicate of the objects of our experience or, from the Indian point of view, everything that can be a predicate of the highest meaning (artha) of words (pada) . That's why padartha, literally meaning "word", used in Sanskrit in the sense of things in general or objects. Translate this word as "category" when applied to five padartham Canada is acceptable, but such a translation is questionable when applied to the sixth and seventh padartham Vaisesika, would be completely inappropriate in relation to the padarthas of Gotama. Real categories in Gotama's system would find a place among pramey, meaning not so much what is to be proven or established, but rather what constitutes the object of our knowledge. Madhusudana continues:
"Mimamsa is also twofold, namely karma-mimamsa(philosophy of action) and sariraka mimansa(philosophy of the embodied spirit). Karma Mimamsa is expounded by the Venerable Jaimini in twelve chapters."
The object of these twelve chapters is stated briefly and so obscurely that it can hardly be understood without reference to the original sutras. Dharma, the object of this philosophy consists, as it is clear from the explanations, of acts of duty, chiefly sacrificial. Chapters two, three and four treat differences and changes dharma, about its parts (or additional members, in contrast to the main act) and about the main goal of each sacrificial act. In the seventh chapter, and more fully in the eighth, indirect rules are treated. The ninth chapter treats inferrible changes, adapting to any change or imitation of known sacrificial acts, recognized as typical or exemplary; and the tenth chapter talks about exceptions. In the eleventh chapter, incidental action is considered, and in the twelfth, the coordinated effect, that is, the cooperation of several acts to obtain one result, is the subject of the eleventh chapter, and in the twelfth, the accidental effect of an act performed with a different purpose is dealt with.
"There is also a four-chapter Sankarshana-kanda composed by Jaimini, which is known as Devatakanda and belongs to karma mimanse, since it teaches an action called upasana or worship.
Then follows sariraka mimansa, consisting of four chapters. Its subject is the clarification of the unity of Brahman and Atman ( I) and a statement of the rules that teach the study of this unity through the study of the Vedas, "etc. This is really a much more philosophical system than purva-mimamsa, had various names: uttara-mimamsa, brahma-mimamsa, Vedanta, etc.
In the first chapter it is pointed out that all passages of the Vedanta agree, directly or indirectly, to the inner, inseparable, having no second (i.e., single) Brahman. The first section examines those passages of the Vedas in which there are clear indications of Brahman; in the second places where there are vague indications and refer to Brahman, since he is the object of worship; in the third places where there are dark indications of Brahman and for the most part refer to him, since he is a subject of knowledge. Thus ends the examination of the Vedanta texts, and in the fourth section such words as avyakta, aja and others, concerning which it may be doubted whether they refer to the ideas accepted and sanctioned by the Sankhya philosophers, which are pradhana, prakriti, which are generally although completely incorrectly translated: nature, as independent of Brahman or Purusha.
Having thus established the agreement of all the texts of the Vedanta regarding the one, without a second Brahman, Vyasa (or Badarayan), fearing resistance through the arguments put forward by the recognized Smritis and various other systems, proceeds to refute them and tries to establish in the second chapter the incontestability of his arguments. In the first section he answers the objections regarding the agreement of the Vedanta passages on Brahman made by the Smriti Samkhya Yogis, Kanada and the followers of the Samkhya, since every study must consist of two parts: from establishing one’s own teaching and from refuting the teaching of opponents. In the third section (first part), the contradictions between the passages of the Vedas related to the creation of elements and other objects are eliminated, and in the second part, the contradictions related to individual souls are eliminated. The fourth section deals with all the apparent contradictions between the passages of the Vedas relating to the senses and to the objects of the senses.
In the third chapter, the author studies the means of salvation. In the first section, having considered the transition to another world and the return from it (transmigration of souls), dispassion is considered. The second section explains the meaning of the word You and after meaning of the word That. In the third section, a collection of words is given, which, if not representing a complete tautology, then all relate to the qualityless Brahman, which is referred to in various shakhah, or branches of the Veda, and at the same time the question is discussed whether certain attributes attributed by others can be accepted in their totality shakhas in their doctrine of Brahman having or not having qualities. The fourth section examines the means of obtaining knowledge about the qualityless Brahman - both external means, such as sacrifice and observance of the four principles in life, and internal means - tranquility, self-government and contemplation.
In the fourth chapter there is a study of the special reward or fruits of knowledge of having or not having the qualities of Brahman. The first section describes the salvation of a person in this life, freed from the influence of good or evil deeds and comprehended the qualityless Brahman through constant study of the Vedas, etc. The second section examines the method of departure to another world for a dying person. In the third the further (northern) path of a person who died with full knowledge of not having the qualities of Brahman. The fourth section first describes the achievement of disembodied loneliness of a person who has cognized Brahman, which does not have qualities, and then the arrival in the world of Brahman, promised to everyone who has cognized Brahman, which has qualities (that is, lower).
This teaching (Vedanta), undoubtedly, is the most important of all teachings, all others are only additions to it, and therefore only Vedanta is revered by all who yearn for liberation, and this is in accordance with the interpretation of the venerable Shankara - this is the secret."
Thus we see that Madhusudana considered the Vedanta philosophy, as interpreted by Shankara, if not as the only true one, then as the best of all philosophies. He made an important distinction between the four systems: Nyaya, Vaisheshika, Purva and Uttara Mimamsa on the one hand, and Yoga and Samkhya on the other. It is curious that little attention has been paid to this difference until now. According to Madhusudana, the philosophies of Gotama and Canada are simply smriti or dharmashastras, like the laws of Manu, even like Vyasa's Mahabharata (see Dalman. Mahabharata as an epic and legal document, 1896) or Valmiki's Ramayana. Of course, these systems of philosophy cannot be called smriti in the usual sense dharmashastras; but since they are smriti(legend), not shruti(revelation), then we can say that they teach dharma, if not in the legal, then in the moral meaning of this word. In any case, it is clear that Samkhya and Yoga were considered to belong to a class different from that to which belonged the two Mimamsa and even Nyaya and Vaisheshika, as well as other recognized branches of knowledge, which in their totality were considered eighteen branches tryi(that is, Vedas). Although it is not easy to understand the real reason for this difference, it should not be overlooked.
"Sankhya," continued Madhusudana, "was expounded by the Venerable Kapila in six adhyayah. The first of these deals with the subjects to be discussed; in the second consequences or products pradhans, primordial matter; in the third alienation from sensory objects; in the fourth there are stories about impassive people, like Pingala (IV, 11), etc.; in the fifth opposing opinions are refuted; The sixth section provides a general summary. The main task of Samkhya philosophy is to teach the difference between prakriti And purushas.
This is followed by the yoga philosophy taught by the venerable Patanjali, which is divided into four parts. In the first part, contemplation that stops activity and distraction of the spirit are considered, and as a means to this, constant exercise and renunciation of passions; the second discusses eight auxiliary means that produce deep contemplation even in people whose thoughts are distracted, which are: restraint, observation, body position, regulation of breathing, piety, contemplation and reflection (meditation); the third part talks about supernatural forces; in the fourth about solitude, loneliness. The main task of this philosophy is to achieve concentration (concentration) by stopping all random thoughts."
This is followed by a brief report on the systems pashupatas And Pancharatras and then repeating everything that is most interesting. Here Madhusudana says:
"After understanding the various systems, it is clear that there are only three roads:
- Arambha-vada, theory of connection of atoms.
- Parinama water, evolution theory.
- Vivarta-vada, theory of illusion.
The first theory states that atoms (anu) of four kinds (atoms of earth, water, fire and air), successively connecting with each other, etc., created the world, the highest point of which was the egg of Brahman.
This first theory, that of the Tarkikas (Nyaya and Vaisheshika) and the followers of Mimamsa, teaches that an effect that did not exist (the world) is produced by the activity of causes that do exist.
The second theory, the theory of the Samkhyaikas, Patanjala Yogis and Pashupatas, says that only pradhana, sometimes called prakriti or primordial matter, consisting of gunas: sattva(good) rajas(moderate) and tamas(evil), developed through stages mahata(perceived) and Ahankaras(subjectivity) into the form of the world, subjective and objective. From this point of view, the caused world existed before real world, albeit in a subtle (invisible) form, and became obvious (manifested) due to the influence of the cause.
The third theory, that of the Brahmavadins (Vedanta), states that the self-luminous and perfectly blissful Brahman, having no second, arose by mistake, due to its own power of Maya, as the world, while the Vaishnavas (Ramanuja, etc.) claim that the world is the actual and true development of Brahman.
But in reality everything muni, those who expounded these theories agree in their desire to prove the existence of one supreme Lord, without a second, leading to the theory of illusion (vivarta). These muni cannot be mistaken, since they are omniscient, and the various views were proposed by them only to eliminate nihilistic theories, and because they feared that people, with their inclination towards worldly objects, could not immediately recognize the true purpose of man. But everything will be fine if we understand that people, not understanding the true purpose of these munis, imagine that they propose something contrary to the Vedas and, accepting their opinions, become their followers on their various paths."
Much of what is here translated from Prasthanabheda Madhusudana, although it represents only a general overview, is not clear, but then when we consider each of the six philosophical systems separately in itself, it will become intelligible; It is also not entirely certain that Madhusudana’s view of the development of Indian philosophy is correct. But in any case, he proves a certain freedom of thought, which we meet from time to time in other writers (for example, in Vijnanabhikshu), who are also inclined to the idea that behind the differences between Vedanta, Samkhya and Nyaya lies the same truth, although expressed in different ways and that there may be many philosophies, the truth is one.
However much we may marvel at the insight of Madhusudana and others, it is our duty as historians of philosophy to study the various ways in which different philosophers, by the light of revelation or by the light of their unfettered reason, have endeavored to discover the truth. The very multiplicity and diversity of these paths constitutes the main interest of the history of philosophy, and the fact that these six different philosophical systems have hitherto maintained their position among the large number of philosophical theories proposed by the thinkers of India indicates that we must first appreciate their characteristic features earlier, than to try, together with Madhusudana, to exclude their distinctive features.
These philosophers are as follows:
- Badarayana, also called Vyasa Dvapayana or Krishna Dwapayana, is the supposed author of the Brahma Sutras, also called the Uttara Mimamsa Sutras or Vyasa Sutras.
- Jaimaini, author of the Purva Mimamsa Sutras.
- Kapila, author of the Sankhya Sutras.
- Patanjali, also called Shesha or Phanin, is the author of the Yoga Sutras.
- Kanada, also called Kanabhuj, Kanabhakshaka or Uluka, author of the Vaisesika Sutras.
- Gotama, also called Akshapada, is the author of the Nyaya Sutras.
It is clear that the philosophers to whom the sutras are attributed cannot be considered the first to create Indian philosophy. These sutras often make reference to other philosophers who must have existed before the time when the sutras received their final form. The fact that some of the sutras cite and refute the opinions of others cannot be explained without recognizing that different schools of philosophy developed side by side during the period preceding their final elaboration. Unfortunately, in such references we do not always find even the title of the book or the name of its author, and even less often a literal reproduction of the opinion of this author, his ipsissima verba. When they refer to things like purusha And prakriti, we know that they refer to Samkhya; when they talk about anu, atoms, we know that these remarks indicate Vaisesika. But it does not at all follow from this that they refer to the Sankhya or Vaisheshika sutras exactly in the form in which we know them. Some of the sutras have been proven to be so new that ancient philosophers could not quote them. For example, Gall proved that our Sankhya Sutras are not older than 1380 AD. and perhaps even belong to a later time. Astonishing as such a discovery may be, nothing can, of course, be objected to Gall's arguments or to the evidence with which Professor Garbe* supported his discovery. If so, these Sutras should be considered simply as a retranslation (rifaccimento), a reconstruction replacing older sutras, which were probably already in the sixth century AD. were supplanted by the popular Samkhya Karikas and then forgotten. Such a late date for our Sankhya Sutras may seem incredible; but although I continue to hold the opinion that the style of the sutras arose at a period when writing for literary purposes was still in its infancy, we know that even at the present time there are scholars (pandits) who find no difficulty in imitating this ancient style sutra The sutra period, dating back to the reign of Ashoka in the third century and to his council in 242 BC, includes not only the famous sutras of Panini, but is defined as the period of greatest philosophical activity in India, apparently caused by a great shock , produced by the emergence of the Buddhist school of philosophy and subsequently the Buddhist religion.
* Garbe. Samkhya Philosophy, p. 71.
It is a very significant fact that of the technical names of the six systems of philosophy, only two are found in the classical Upanishads, namely, Samkhya and Yoga or Samkhya Yoga. Vedanta is not found except in Svetashvatara, Mundaka and some later Upanishads.* Word Mimamsa occurs in the general meaning of the study. Nyaya and Vaisheshika are completely absent; we don't come across any words like hetuvidya or anvikshiki, nor the names of the supposed creators of the six systems, with the exception of the names of the founders of the two mimansas, Badarayana and Jaimini. The names of Patanjali and Kanada are completely absent, and the names of Kapila and Gotama, although found, seem to refer to completely different personalities.
* An interesting distinction is made in the commentary to the Gautama Sutras (XIX, 12) where it is said that “those parts of the Aranyakas which are not Upanishads are called Vedantas.”
Six systems of philosophy
It cannot be supposed that the men whose names are mentioned as the authors of these six philosophical systems were anything other than the mere last publishers or editors of the sutras as we know them. If the third century B.C. seems to us to be too late a date for the introduction of writing in India for literary purposes, we must remember that even inscriptions older than those of Ashoka have not been found; and there is a big difference between inscriptions and literary works. Southern Buddhists claim that their sacred canon was not written down earlier than the first century BC, although they are known to have maintained close relations with their northern co-religionists who were familiar with the script.* Therefore, throughout this time, from 477 to 77 BC AD, various theories of the world, originating from Vedanta, Samkhya or Yoga, even theories of Buddhist origin, could appear and be preserved in mnemonic form, in various ashrams. It is not surprising that a significant part of such literature, as transmitted only from memory, is irretrievably lost, and therefore we should not look at what was left to us in the ancients darshanah, as the complete result of the philosophical activity of all India for so many centuries. We can only affirm that philosophy in India arose during the period of the Brahmanas and Upanishads, even during the period of some of the Vedic hymns, that the existence of the Upanishads although not necessary in the form in which we know them is recognized by the Buddhist canon and, finally, the name the suttas as a constituent part of this canon must be later than the name of the more ancient Brahmanical sutras, since during this time the meaning changed again; it no longer meant short sayings stored from memory, but real speeches. Maybe the original word since morning denoted the text explained in the sermon, and only then long Buddhist sermons began to be called as a result suttami.
* They say, sacred tree Bo in the city of Anuradhapura in Ceylon grew from a branch of a tree growing in Buddha Jaya.
Brihaspati Sutras
That some of the philosophical sutras have been lost is shown by the example of the Brihaspati Sutras. It is argued that these sutras expounded the completely materialistic or sensualistic teachings of the Lokayatikas or Charvakas, denying everything except what is given by the senses. Bhaskaracharya refers to them in the Brahma Sutras (III, 3, 53) * and gives us extracts from them, so that they probably still existed at that time, although their records have not yet been found in India. The same can be said about sutras such as the Vaikhanasa Sutras; perhaps these sutras are the same as the Vanaprastha and Bhikshu sutras quoted by Panini (IV, 3, 110) and, apparently, intended for Brahman mendicant monks, and not for Buddhist ones. Here again we have to admit the sad truth that we have only pitiful fragments from the old pre-Buddhist literature, and these fragments in some cases are only simple reproductions of lost originals, such as, for example, the Sankhya Sutras. We now know that such sutras could be reproduced at any time and we must not forget that even at the present time, with the general decline in the study of Sanskrit, there are experts in India who can imitate Kalidasa, not to mention such poems as the Mahabharata and Ramayana ; and, moreover, so successfully that few scientists can point out the difference between the original and the imitation. Recently I received a Sanskrit treatise (sutras with commentaries) the work of a living Indian scholar, a treatise which may have misled many of the European Sanskrit scholars.*** If it is possible now, if it was possible, as in the case of the Kapila Sutras, in the fourteenth century, then why couldn’t the same thing happen during the revival in India and even earlier? In any case, we can be grateful for what has been preserved, and in such a wonderful, in our opinion, way; but we must not imagine that we have everything and that what we have has come down to us in its original form.
* Colebrook. ME, I, p. 429.
** Taranatha-tarkavacaspati identifies them with the Vedanta-sutras; see Siddhanta-kaumudi, vol. I, p. 592.
*** This treatise by Chandrakanta Tarkalankara (Katantrachchhanda-prakriya 1896) includes additional sutras to the Katantra on Vedic grammar. He does not hide the fact that “sutram vrittish kobhayam api mayaiva vyarachi”, i.e. "The sutra and commentary were compiled by me."
Sources
I must mention here at least some of the most important works from which students of philosophy, and especially those who do not know the Sanskrit language, can obtain information about the six recognized systems of Indian philosophy. The titles of the most important of the original Sanskrit texts are to be found in Colebrooke's Miscellaneous Essays (Vol. II, pp. 239ff.) and in the catalogs (published thereafter) of various collections of Sanskrit manuscripts in Europe and India.
A very useful book on the philosophy of Vedanta by Badarayana (English translation of the text of the sutras and commentary by Shankara) Thibault. SBE., vol. 34 and 38.
On the Samkhya system we have the sutras translated by Ballantyne in 1882-1885; Aphorisms of Samkhya philosophy of Kapila, with explanatory extracts from commentaries (1852, 1865, 1885).
In Germany there is the Samkhya-pravacana-bhasya (Vijnanabhikshu's commentary on the Samkhya sutras) translated by Richard Garbe (1889), as well as Aniruddha's commentary and the original parts of the Vedantist Mahadeva's commentary on the Samkhya sutras (Garbe, 1892); “Moonlight of Samkhya Truth” (Sankhya-tattva-kaumudi) by Vacaspatimisra (translation by R. Garbe, 1892) is also a very useful book.
The Samkhya-karika of Ishvarakrishna, translated from the Sanskrit by Colebrooke, and the bhashya or commentary of Gaudapada, translated with the original commentary by Wilson (Oxford, 1837), still have their meaning. Other useful works include John Davis's Indian Philosophy (1881) and Richard Garbe's Samkhya Philosophy (1894).
From the Purva Mimamsa or simply Mimamsa, dealing chiefly with the essence and authority of the Vedas and specially with sacrificial and other duties, we have an edition of the original sutras with commentary by Shabaraswami; but there is no book in English from which this system could be studied, with the exception of the one translated by Prof. The Thibo Arthasangraha of Laugaksha Bhaskara, a short extract of this philosophy, printed in Benares Sanskrit Series, No. 4.
The Vaisesika philosophical system can be studied from Gau's English translation of its sutras (Benares, 1873), from Roer's German translation (Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, vols. 21 and 22) and from some of my articles in the Journal of the German Oriental Society (1849 ).
The Nyaya Sutras of Gotama were translated, with the exception of the last book, by Ballantyne (Allahabad, 1850-1857).
The Yoga Sutras are available in the English translation of Rajendralal Mitra in the Bibliotheca Indica (Nos. 462, 478, 482, 491 and 492).
Dating of philosophical sutras
If we take into account the state of philosophical thinking in India, as it is depicted in the Brahmanas and Upanishads and then in the canonical books of the Buddhists, we will not be surprised that so far all attempts to determine the dates of the six recognized philosophical systems and even their mutual relations have been unsuccessful. It is true that Buddhism and Jainism are also philosophical systems and that it has been possible to determine their dates. But if we know something about their time and their historical development, this is due mainly to the social and political significance that they acquired in the fifth, fourth and third centuries BC, and not at all to their philosophical position. We also know that there were many teachers who were contemporaries of the Buddha, but they left no traces in the literature of India.
We should not forget that although the time of compilation of the Buddhist canon can be determined, the dates of many of the texts that we have and which are recognized as canonical are far from certain.
In Buddhist chronicles, other teachers are mentioned next to Gautama, the prince of the Shakya clan, Jnatiputra (the founder of Jainism), Purana Kashyapa, Pakuda Katyayana, Ajita Keshakambali, Sanjaya Vairatti-putpa, Goshaliputra, Maskarin. And only one of them, Jnatiputra, the nirgrantha (gymnosophist), is known to history, since the society founded by him, like the brotherhood founded by the Buddha, developed into a significant sect of Jains. Another teacher, Goshali with a bamboo stick, who was originally an ajivak and then a follower of Mahavira, also became the founder of a special sect, which has now disappeared.* Jnatiputra (Nataputta) was older than the Buddha.
* Kern. Buddhism. 1 p. 182.
Although it seems probable that the founders of the six systems of philosophy, but not the authors of the sutras which we have, lived during the same period of religious and philosophical ferment in which the teachings of the Buddha first spread into India, it is not at all true that Buddhism presupposes the existence of any from these systems in their literary form. This is due to the ambiguity of quotations, which are rarely given verbatim(verbatim). In India, during the mnemonic period of literature, the content of a book could change significantly, although the title remained the same. Even if in later times Bhartrihari (died 650 AD) referred to the Mimamsa, Samkhya and Vaisheshika darshanas, we have no right to conclude that he knew these darshanas as we know them, although he may have known these philosophies after they have received a systematic form. Likewise, when he quotes the Nayayas, it does not mean that he knew our Gotama Sutras, and we have no right to say that these sutras existed at that time. This is possible, but not certain. Therefore, we should not particularly trust quotations, or, better yet, allusions to other philosophical systems.
Samkhya Sutras
The Sankhya Sutras, as we know them, are very sparse in their references. They obviously refer to Vaisesika and Nyaya when they examine the six categories of the first (V, 85) and the sixteen Padarthas of the second (V, 86). When they talk about any(atomah), we know that the Vaisheshika philosophy is meant, and once Vaisheshika is directly called by this name (1, 25). It is often mentioned about shruti(revelation), which Samkhya seems to neglect: once it is mentioned smriti(legends, V, 123); Vamadeva, whose name is also found in shruti and in smriti, referred to as a person who has achieved spiritual freedom. But among the philosophers we find mention only of Sanandana Acharya (VI, 69) and Panchasikha (V, 32; VI, 68); teachers (acaryas) as a general name include Kapila himself as well as others.
Vedanta Sutras
There are more references in the Vedanta Sutras, but they will not help us much for chronological purposes.
Badarayana more or less clearly points to the Buddhists, Jains, Pasupatas and Pancharatras, and tries to refute all of them. But he, however, never refers to any literary works; even when he refers to other philosophies, he seems to deliberately avoid mentioning the recognized names of their authors and even their technical terms. But it is still obvious that, when composing his sutras, he had in mind Purva Mimamsa, Yoga, Samkhya and Vaisesika; of the Mimamsa authorities he refers directly to Jaimini, Badari, Udulomi, Ashmarathya, Kasakritsna, Karsnajini and Atreya, as well as to Badarayana. Therefore, we will not be far from the truth if we attribute the formation of six philosophical systems to the period from Buddha (5th century) to Ashoka (3rd century), although we admit, especially in relation to Vedanta, Samkhya and Yoga, a long preliminary development, ascending through the Upanishads and Brahmins to the hymns of the Rig Veda.
It is also difficult to determine the relative position* of philosophical systems, since they, as I have already explained, mutually refer to each other. As to the relation of Buddhism to the six orthodox systems, all we can say about it, it seems to me, is that schools of philosophy which have transmitted teachings very similar to the six classical or orthodox systems are presupposed by the Buddhist suttas. But this is not at all what some scholars believe, who claim that the Buddha or his disciples directly borrowed from the sutras. We do not know anything from Samkhya literature before the Samkhya-karika, dating back to the 6th century. AD Even if we admit that the Tattva-samasa is an older work, then how, without parallel dates, can we prove the actual borrowings on the part of the Buddha and his disciples in that old time?
* Bhandarkar. Samkhya Philosophy (1871), p. 3.
In the Upanishads and the Brahmanas, despite the general mood of all of them, there is a significant lack of system and diversity of opinions advocated by different teachers and different schools. Even in the hymns we find great independence and individuality of thought, sometimes apparently reaching the point of open skepticism and atheism.
We must remember all this if we wish to get a correct idea of the historical origin and growth of the six philosophical systems of India, as we are accustomed to call them. We have already seen that not only brahmanas participated in philosophical reasoning and that kshatriyas also played a very active and prominent role in the development of such basic philosophical concepts as the concept of atman, or I.
From this fluctuating mass of philosophical and religious thoughts, which constituted the common property in India, real philosophical systems slowly emerged. Although we do not know in what form this took place, it is quite obvious that those philosophical textbooks in the form of sutras that we have could not have been written at a time when writing was used for any practical purpose other than inscriptions on monuments and coins, was not yet known in India and, in any case, was not used, as far as we know, for literary purposes.
Mnemonic literature
It is now generally admitted, I believe, that when writing becomes widespread, it is almost impossible that there should not be allusions to it in the poetic and prosaic works of the people. Even as late as the age of Shankara, written letters were still called unreal (anrita) in comparison with the sounds they represent (Ved.-sutras, II, 1, 14). There is no mention of writing in the hymns, in the Brahmanas and in the Upanishads, and there are very few allusions to it in the sutras. The historical value of such references to written sources found in Buddhist literature depends, of course, on the date we can determine, not of the original authors, but of the authors of our texts. We must never forget that in India for many centuries there existed a purely mnemonic literature, preserved until the period of the sutras and transmitted from generation to generation according to a system fully described in the Pratishankyas. Why would this developed system be needed if manuscripts already existed at that time?
When the mnemonic literature tradition (smriti) was first written down, it was probably in a form similar to that of the sutras. At the same time, the clumsiness of the sutra style becomes understandable. Letters at that time were still monumental, since in India monumental writing preceded the literary and assimilation of the handwritten alphabet. Written material in India was rare and the number of people who could read was very small. And at the same time there was an old mnemonic literature, which had a certain time-honored character and formed part of the ancient educational system, which satisfied all needs and which could not be easily replaced. Naturally, a significant part of such mnemonic literature is lost if it is not recorded in a timely manner. Often the title is retained, but the content of the work is completely changed. Therefore, when we find mention of Samkhya in Buddhist texts, for example in the Visuddimagga (Chapter XVII), it is impossible to even say whether at that time at least one work of Samkhya philosophy existed in the form of sutras. It is obvious, in any case, that there could not have been our Samkhya-sutras, and even the Samkhya-karikas, which apparently replaced the ancient sutras at the beginning of the sixth century, while our sutras belong to the fourteenth.
It is possible, if not to prove, at least to make probable the position here recognized as the teaching of the Buddha as following the early development of philosophical ideas in their systematic and more or less technical form, by referring to the name of his mother - whether this name was real or given to her by tradition. She was called Maya or Mayadevi. Whereas for Buddha the world was Maya(illusion), it seems more likely that this name was given to his mother by ancient tradition and that it was not given without intention. And if this is so, then it could only be after avidya(ignorance) in Vedanta and prakriti in Samkhya philosophy were replaced by the concept may and. It is known that in the old classical Upanishads the word Mayan does not occur; It is also remarkable that it is found in the later Upanishads, more or less apocryphal. For example, in Svetashvatara (I, 10) we read: "Mayam tu Prakritim vidyat" (Let him know that prakriti There is Mayan or maya prakriti). This seems to refer to the Samkhya system, in which Prakriti plays a role may and and enchants purusha until he turns away from her and she ceases to exist, at least for him. But in Samkhya or Vedanta Mayan in its technical meaning it undoubtedly belongs to the secondary period and therefore it can be argued that Maya as the name of the mother of Buddha could not find a place in the Buddhist legend in the first period of Indian philosophy, represented by the ancient Upanishads and even in the sutras of these two outstanding schools.
Undoubtedly, there were many philosophical mnemonic products both after the period of which the old Upanishads were representatives and before the systematic establishment of the philosophical sutras; but all this philosophical production is forever lost to us. We see this clearly in the case of Brihaspati's philosophy.
Philosophy of Brihaspati
Brihaspati is undoubtedly a very obscure figure historically. He was called the author of two Vedic hymns (X, 71 and X, 72) and distinguished between Brihaspati Angirasa and Brihaspati Laukya (Laukayatika?). His name is also known as the name of one of the Vedas gods. In the Rig Veda (VIII, 96, 15) we read that Indra and his companion or ally Brihaspati defeated the godless people (adevi visha). Then he was called as the author of the book of laws, which was decidedly new and has survived to our time. In addition, Brihaspati is the name of the planet Jupiter and the mentor (purohita) of the gods, so Brihaspati-purohita became the recognized name of Indra, who has Brihaspati as his purohita, that is, the chief priest and assistant. Therefore it seems strange that the same name, the name of the teacher of the gods, is given to the representative of the most unorthodox, atheistic and sensualistic philosophical system of India. Perhaps this can be explained by reference to the Brahmanas and the Upanishads, in which Brihaspati is depicted teaching the demons his harmful doctrines, not for their benefit, but for their destruction. Thus in the Maitrayani Upanishad we read:
"Brihaspati, having transformed or taken the form of Shukra, teaches this false knowledge for the safety of Indra and for the destruction of the asuras (demons). With the help of this knowledge they proved that good is evil and evil is good, and they said that this new law, overthrowing the Vedas and other sacred books, must be studied (by asuras, demons). In order for this to be so, they said, let non-demons not study this false knowledge, for it is harmful; it is, so to speak, fruitless. Its reward lasts only until pleasure lasts like that of a man who has lost his position (caste).Let him not be tempted by this false doctrine, for it is said:
- These two knowledges are very divergent and opposite; one known as false knowledge, the other as knowledge. I (Yama) believe that Nachiketa has a desire for knowledge and many pleasures do not tempt him.*
- He who knows both imperfect knowledge (rites) and perfect knowledge (knowledge of Self) conquers death through imperfect knowledge and achieves immortality through perfect knowledge.**
- Those who clothe themselves in imperfect knowledge imagine that they are the only wise and learned ones; they wander around and around, deceived, like a blind man led by other blind people"*** (7, 9).
"Gods and demons, wanting to know I(Themselves), came to Brahman (to their father Brihaspati).**** Bowing before him, they said: “O blessed one, we wish to know Myself, tell us!” Having examined the matter, he thought that these demons believe that the atman is different (from themselves) and that therefore they are taught something completely different I. These deluded (deceived) demons rely on this I, cling to it, destroying the true boat of salvation and praising untruth. They consider the untrue to be the truth, like those who are deceived by a magician. In reality, the truth is what is said in the Vedas. The wise rely on what is said in the Vedas. Therefore, let a brahman not study what is not in the Vedas, or the result will be the same (that is, like the demons).
* Katha Up., II, 4. ** Vaj. Up., II. *** Cat.-up., II, 5. **** Ch.-up., VIII, 8.
This place is curious in many ways. First of all, there is a clear reference from one Upanishad to another, namely to Chandogya, in which this episode of Brihaspati giving false teaching to demons is described in more detail. Secondly, we see a change that was obviously made intentionally. In the Chandogya Upanishad, Prajapati himself gives the asuras false knowledge of the atman, and in the Maitrayana Upanishad, Brihaspati takes his place. It is quite probable that in the later Upanishad Brihaspati was introduced instead of Prajapati because they were aware of the impropriety of a supreme deity deceiving anyone, even demons. In Chandogya, demons who believed in anyata(otherness) of the atman, that is, the possibility that the atman resides in some other place, different from themselves, they look for it in the reflection of a face in the pupil of the eyes, in a mirror or water. All this, however, refers to the visible body. Then Prajapati says that the atman is that which moves, full of pleasures, in sleep, and since this too will only be an individual person, he finally explains that the atman is that which remains in deep sleep, without, however, losing its identity.
If already in the Upanishads Brihaspati is introduced for the purpose of teaching false rather than orthodox opinions, then we may perhaps understand why his name is associated with sensualistic propositions and why he is ultimately made, albeit unjustifiably, responsible for these propositions. That these principles existed in ancient times is proved by certain hymns in which many years ago I indicated curious traces of awakening skepticism. In later Sanskrit, barhaspati (follower of Brihaspati) meant an infidel in general. Among the works mentioned in Lalitavistara as being studied by the Buddha, Barhaspatya is indicated, but it is not clear whether this work was written in sutras or in meter. Moreover, it is known that Lalitavistara is too fragile a reed for a historian to rely on. But if we can trust Bhaskara's interpretation of the Brahma Sutras, then he seems to have known even at this later time certain sutras attributed to Brihaspati, * in which the teachings of the Charvakas, that is, the unbelievers, were expounded. But even if such sutras existed, we are unable to determine their date and say whether they were preceding or subsequent to other philosophical sutras. Panini knew sutras, now lost, and some of them can undoubtedly be traced back to the time of the Buddha. He, citing the Bhikshu-sutras and Nata-sutras (IV, 3, 110), also mentions that the author of the former is Parasarya, and the latter - Shilalin. Since Parasarya is the name of Vyasa, the son of Parashara, it was believed that Panini, by the name Bhikshu-sutra, means the Brahma-sutras** attributed to Vyasa. This would place their date around the fifth century BC. and this is accepted by all who wish to attribute the greatest possible antiquity to the philosophical literature of India. But Parasarya would hardly have been chosen as the name for Vyasa; and although we have no hesitation in assigning the teachings of the Vedanta a place in the fifth century B.C. and even before, we cannot give the same place to the sutras on the basis of such insufficient evidence.
* Colebrook. ME, II, p. 429. ** See ibid., p. 113.
When we meet elsewhere with the heretical teachings of Brihaspati, they are expressed in verse, so that they are taken from the karikas rather than from the sutras. They are especially interesting for us, since they prove that India, which is generally considered the birthplace of spiritualism and idealism, was by no means deprived of sensualist philosophers. Although it is difficult to say how old such theories were in India, it is certain that wherever we find consistent treatises on philosophy, sensualistic teachings also appear.
Of course, the Brahmins also called the teachings of the Buddha skeptical and atheistic; carvaka, and also nastika names often given to Buddhists. But the teachings of Brihaspati, as far as we know them, went much further than Buddhism and, one might say, were hostile to any religious feeling, while the teachings of the Buddha were both religious and philosophical, although in India it is quite difficult to separate the philosophical from the religious.
Among the followers of Brihaspati there are some provisions that seem to indicate the existence of other philosophical schools nearby. Barkhaspatya speaks as if they were inter pares(among equals); they do not agree with others, just as others do not agree with them. Traces of opposition to the Vedic religion (Kautsa) are found in the hymns, in the Brahmanas and in the sutras, and to ignore them would give us a completely false idea of the religious and philosophical battles in ancient India. From the point of view of the Brahmins - and we know of no representatives of the other point of view - the opposition represented by Brihaspati and others may seem insignificant, but the very name given to these heretics (Lokayatikas) seems to indicate that their teachings had wide recognition in the world. Another name (nastika) was given to them due to the fact that they denied, said “no” to everything except the evidence of the senses, and especially denied the evidence of the Vedas, which, funny enough, the Vedantins themselves called pratyaksha, that is, self-evident, like sensory perceptions.
These nastics a name that does not apply to simple heretics, but only to complete nihilists are interesting for us from a historical point of view, since, arguing against other philosophies, they ipso facto, thereby proving the existence of orthodox philosophical systems before their time. The established schools of Indian philosophy could endure much; they were tolerant, as we will see, even of obvious atheism like the atheism of the Samkhya. But they hated and despised the nastikas, and it is precisely for this reason and because of the feeling of strong disgust aroused by them that we cannot, it seems to me, go through in complete silence their philosophical system, which existed side by side with the six Vedic, or orthodox, systems.
Madhava begins his Sarvadarshana-sangraha (Summary of all philosophical systems) with an exposition of the nastika or carvaka system. He considers this system inferior to all, and yet finds it impossible to ignore it in enumerating the philosophical forces of India. Charvaka is interpreted by him as the name Rakshasa, and this Rakshasa is recognized as a historical figure to whom Brihaspati (Vachaspati) transmitted his teachings. Word carvaka has an obvious connection with the word charva, and Balashastrin, in the preface to his edition of Kashiki, treats it as a synonym for Buddha. He is depicted as the teacher of the lokayata, that is, the system existing in the world, if only this word originally had such a meaning. A summary of this system is given in the Prabodhachandrodaya (27, 18) in the following words:
"System lokayats, in which the feelings are recognized as the only authority, in which the elements are earth, water, fire and air (but not akasha, ether), in which wealth and pleasure constitute the ideal of man, in which the elements think, the other world is denied and death is the end of everything."
Word lokayata already found in Gana Ukthadi Panini. It should be noted, however, that Gemacandra distinguishes velvet bed or nastika from Charvakas or lokayats, although it does not indicate in what particular points they differ. Buddhists use the word lokayata for philosophy in general. The assertion that the Lokayatics recognized only one pramana, that is, one source of knowledge, namely sensory perception, clearly indicates that other philosophical systems existed even then. We will see that Vaisesika recognizes two sources of knowledge: perception (pratyaksha) and inference (anumana); Samkhya three, adding to the previous two a reliable statement (aptavakya); nyaya four, adding comparison (upamana); both mimams are six, adding supposition (arthapatti) and negation (abhava). We will talk about all this further. Even such ideas as the idea of four or five elements, which seems so natural to us, required some time to develop, as we see in the history of the Greek stoyceia, and yet this idea was apparently quite familiar to the Charvakas. Other systems recognized five elements: earth, water, fire, air and ether; and they recognized only four, releasing the ether, probably because it is invisible. In the Upanishads we find traces of an even more ancient triad of elements. All this points to philosophical activity among the Hindus from ancient times and portrays to us these Charvakas rather as deniers of what was more or less established before them, than as adding their own new ideas to this old property.
The same is true for the soul. In India, not only philosophers, but also every Aryan had a word for the soul and had no doubt that a person has something different from the visible body. Only the Charvaks denied the soul. They argued that what we call the soul is not a thing in itself, but simply the same body. They claimed that they heard, saw and felt the body, that it remembered and thought, although they saw that this body was rotting and decomposing, as if it had never existed. It is clear that, holding such opinions, they came into conflict with religion even more than with philosophy. We do not know how they explained the development of consciousness and mind from the flesh; we only know that here they resorted to simile, referring to the intoxicating power obtained by mixing individual ingredients that are not intoxicating in themselves, as an analogy for the development of soul and body.
And here we read the following:
"There are four elements: earth, water, fire and air,
And it is only by these four elements that intelligence is produced,
Like intoxicating power from Kinua etc mixed together.
Since in "I am fat", "I am thin" these attributes reside in one subject
And since "fat content", etc. inherent only in the body, it alone is the soul, and nothing else.
And expressions like “my body” have only a metaphorical meaning.”
Thus, for them, the soul apparently meant a body possessing the attribute of reason, and was therefore supposed to be destroyed along with the body. Holding this opinion, they, of course, had to see the highest goal of man in sensual pleasures and recognized suffering as simply an inevitable companion to pleasure.
Let us quote this verse:
"The pleasure given to a person by contact with sensory objects
It must be rejected, for it is accompanied by suffering - such is the warning of fools;
Rice grains have a tender white core
What person in his right mind would reject them because they are covered with husks and dust?
* See Sarvadarshana-sangraha translated by Cowal and Gogue, p. 4.
From all this we see that the Charvaka system, although its basic philosophical principles were developed, was more practical in its properties than metaphysical, an outspoken doctrine of utilitarianism and crude hedonism. It is a great pity that all the original books of these materialist philosophers have been lost, since they would probably have allowed us to look deeper into the ancient history of Indian philosophy than we can with the help of the textbooks of the six darshan, on which we have chiefly to rely. The following verses preserved by Madhava in his Summary, this is almost all that we know about the teachings of Brihaspati and his followers.
“Fire is hot, water is cold, and the air feels cool.
Who created this difference? (We do not know), so it must come from their own nature (svabhava)."
The following diatribe is attributed to Brihaspati himself:
"There is no heaven, no liberation, and certainly no I in another world
Neither compliance ashrams(stages of life), nor caste distinctions will entail any retribution,
Agnihotra, three Vedas, three staves (which were carried by ascetics) and smearing oneself with ashes
This is the destiny of life prepared by their creator * for those who are devoid of intelligence and courage.
If the victim is killed during jyotishtoms, ascends to heaven
Why shouldn't the donor kill his own father?
If the offering is sraddha brings pleasure to those who have died,
It would make no sense to provide provisions to those who walk this earth.
If those in heaven take pleasure in offerings,
Why give food to those who cannot yet rise above the roof?
While you are alive, live happily; borrow money and then drink ghee,
Can a body return after it has turned to dust?
If the one who leaves the body goes to another world,
Why doesn’t he return, heeding the love of his loved ones?
Therefore the Brahmins prescribe funeral rites for the dead
In order to provide oneself with the means to live; other reasons are unknown to anyone.
The Vedas have three creators: jesters, rogues and demons.
The speeches of the pandits (in terms of intelligibility) are similar jarphari turphari("mumbo jumbo").
That the queen (during the horse sacrifice) should perform an indecent act,
It was, like everything else, proclaimed to be rogues.
Likewise, the demons have prescribed the eating of flesh."
* Dhatri(creator) is used here ironically instead of swabhavas(nature).
These are, of course, strong expressions, as strong as any used by materialists, ancient or modern. It is good that we know how old and how widespread this materialism is, because otherwise we would hardly understand the attempts made by the other side to counteract it by establishing the true sources or measure of knowledge (pramanas) and other fundamental truths recognized as essential to religion , and for philosophy. The concept of orthodoxy in India, however, is very different from the same concept in other countries. In India we find philosophers who denied the existence of a personal god (Ishvara), and yet were tolerated as orthodox so long as they accepted the authority of the Vedas. It was this denial of the authority of the Vedas that immediately made the Buddha a heretic in the eyes of the Brahmans and forced him to found a new religion or brotherhood, while the followers of the Samkhya, not very different from him in many important points, remained safe under the protection of orthodoxy. Some of the charges brought against the Brahmanas by the Barhaspatyas are the same as those brought against them by the followers of the Buddha. Therefore, considering that on the vital question of the authority of the Vedas the Samkhya agrees, although inconsistently, with orthodox Brahmanism and differs from Buddhism, it would be much easier to prove that the Buddha borrowed his ideas from Brihaspati, and not from Kapila, the supposed founder of the Samkhya . If we are right in our opinion of the inorganic and rich development of philosophical ideas in ancient India, then the idea of borrowing, so natural to us, seems completely out of place in India. A chaotic mass of conjectures as to the truth was in the air, and there was no controlling authority, and not even, so far as we know, a binding public opinion that could bring this chaos into any order. Therefore we have as little right to assert that Buddha borrowed from Kapila as to assert that Kapila borrowed from Buddha. No one will argue that the Hindus borrowed the idea of shipbuilding from the Phoenicians or the construction of stupas (stupas) from the Egyptians. In India we are in a world different from that to which we are accustomed in Greece, in Rome or in modern Europe, and we need not immediately form the conclusion that since the same opinions are found in Buddhism and in the philosophy of Kapila (in Samkhya), then the first borrowed from the second or, as some believe, the second from the first.
Although we can easily imagine what the general spirit of the philosophy of the ancient Indian heretics was, whether they were called Charvakas (Barhaspatyas), we, unfortunately, know less about their teachings than about the teachings of other philosophical schools. These are for us only names, like Yajnavalkya, Raikva and other ancient leaders of Indian thought who are mentioned in the Upanishads and to whom famous statements are attributed. We know some of the conclusions they came to, but we know almost nothing about the paths by which they arrived at them. From these statements we only learn that there must have been a considerable activity of philosophical thinking in India long before the time when an attempt was made to divide that thinking into six specific philosophical systems or to write down these systems. Even when famous persons like Jaimini, Kapila and others are mentioned to us as the authors of famous systems of philosophy, we should not consider them the original creators of philosophy in the sense in which Plato and Aristotle were such.
Are common philosophical ideas
It should be especially vigorously insisted that in India there was a large general fund of philosophical thinking, which, like language, did not belong to anyone in particular, but was like the air that every living and thinking person breathed. Only in this way can we explain the fact that we find certain ideas in all or almost all systems of Indian philosophy - ideas which seem to be recognized by all philosophers as proven and which do not belong in particular to any one school.
1. Metempsychosis, samsara
The best known of these ideas, which belongs rather to all India than to any of its philosophers, is that which is known as metempsychosis. This word is Greek, like metensomatosis, but having no literary authority in Greece. In meaning it corresponds to the Sanskrit word samsara and translated into German Seelenwanderung(reincarnation). For a Hindu, the idea that the souls of people after their death move into the bodies of animals or even plants is so obvious that it cannot even be questioned. Among prominent writers (both ancient and modern) we never find attempts to prove or disprove this idea. Already in the period of the Upanishads we read about human souls being reborn in the bodies of animals and plants. In Greece, a similar opinion was defended by Empedocles; and now there is still much dispute about whether he borrowed this idea from the Egyptians, as is commonly believed, or whether Pythagoras and his teacher Pherekides learned it in India. It seems to me that such an opinion is so natural that it could arise quite independently among different peoples. Of the Aryan races, the Italian, Celtic and Hyperborean or Scythian tribes maintained the belief in metempsychosis; traces of this belief have recently been discovered even among the uncivilized inhabitants of America, Africa and East Asia. In India, undoubtedly, this belief developed spontaneously, and if this was so in India, why should it not be so in other countries, especially among peoples belonging to the same linguistic race? It must be remembered, however, that some systems, especially the Samkhya philosophy, do not recognize what we usually understand as the “transmigration of the soul.” If we translate the word purusha Samkhya philosophy with the word "soul" instead of I, then he doesn’t resettle purusha, A sukshmasharira(subtle, invisible body). I remains always inviolable, a simple contemplator, and its highest goal is to recognize that it is higher and separate from everything that comes from prakriti or nature.
2. Immortality of the soul
The immortality of the soul is an idea that was also the common property of all Indian philosophers. This idea was considered so proven that we would look in vain for any arguments in its favor. Death for the Hindu was so limited to the body decaying before our eyes that such an expression as "atmano mritatvam" (immortality I), in Sanskrit is almost a tautology. There is no doubt that the followers of Brihaspati denied the future life, but all other schools rather fear the future life, prolonged metempsychosis, than doubt it; as for the final destruction of the true I, then this seems to be a self-contradiction for a Hindu. Some scientists are so surprised by such an unshakable belief in the future and eternal life among the people of India that they try to trace it back to the belief, supposedly common to all savages, who believe that after death a person leaves his spirit on earth, which can take the form of the body of an animal or even a tree . This is a simple fantasy, and although, of course, it is impossible to refute it, it does not follow from this that it has the right to our consideration. And besides, why would the Aryans begin to learn from savages, when at one time they themselves were also savages and there was no need for them to forget the so-called wisdom of the savage, just as there was no need to forget the sutras from which they are believed to have learned about this belief.
3. Pessimism
All Indian philosophers are accused of pessimism; in some cases such an accusation may be valid, but not in all. A people who borrowed their name for God from a word that in essence only means existent, real(sat), could hardly recognize existence as something that should not exist. Indian philosophers did not dwell forever on the misfortune of life. They don't always whine and protest against life as being worthless. Their pessimism is of a different kind. They simply claim that they received their first incentive for philosophical reflection from the fact that there is suffering in the world. Obviously, they believe that in a perfect world suffering does not occur, that it is some kind of anomaly, in any case something that should be explained and, if possible, eliminated. Suffering, of course, appears to be an imperfection, and as such it can beg the question of why it exists and how it can be destroyed. And this is not the mood that we are used to calling pessimism; In Indian philosophy we find no cry against divine injustice; it in no way encourages suicide. Yes, according to the Hindus, it would be useless, since the same worries and the same questions confront us in another life. Considering that the aim of Indian philosophy is to eliminate the suffering produced by ignorance and to achieve the highest happiness given by knowledge, we would be justified in calling this philosophy eudaimonic rather than pessimistic.
It is interesting, at any rate, to note the unanimity with which the major philosophical systems in India, and also some of her religious systems, start from the idea that the world is full of suffering and that this suffering must be explained and eliminated. This seems to have been one of the main impulses of philosophical thinking in India, if not the main impulse. If we start with Jaimini, we cannot expect real philosophy from his purva mimansa, which deals mainly with ritual matters like sacrifices etc. But although these sacrifices are represented as a means to a certain kind of bliss, and as a means of diminishing or alleviating the ordinary sorrows of life, they do not secure the supreme bliss to which all other philosophers strive. Uttara Mimamsa and all other philosophies occupy a higher position. Badarayana teaches that the cause of all evil is avidya, ignorance, and that the goal of his philosophy is to eliminate this ignorance through knowledge (vidya) and thus reach the highest knowledge of Brahman, which is the highest bliss (Tait.-up., II, 11). The Samkhya philosophy, at least as we know it from the karikas and sutras, begins directly with the recognition of the existence of three kinds of suffering and recognizes as its highest goal the complete cessation of all suffering; and the philosophy of yoga, showing the path to contemplation and self-concentration ( samadhi), claims that this is the best means for avoiding all earthly disturbances (II, 2) and for ultimately achieving kaivalyas(perfect freedom). Vaisesika promises his followers knowledge of the truth and through this the final cessation of suffering; even Gotama's philosophy of logic presents in its first sutra complete bliss (apavarga) as the highest reward, which is achieved by the complete destruction of all suffering through logic. That the Buddha's religion has the same origin in a clear understanding of human suffering and its causes and the same goal - destruction dukhi(suffering) this is too well known so that it does not need further explanation; but it should be remembered that other systems also give the same name to the state they are striving for, nirvana or dukhanta(end of dukkha suffering).
Therefore, Indian philosophy, which claims to be able to destroy suffering, can hardly be called pessimistic in the usual sense of the word. Even physical suffering, although it cannot be eliminated, ceases to affect the soul when I fully aware of our alienation from the body, and all mental suffering arising from worldly attachments disappears when we are freed from the desires that cause these attachments. Since the cause of all suffering is in ourselves (in our deeds and thoughts), in this or a previous life, then any protest against divine injustice immediately falls silent. We are what we ourselves have made, we suffer from what we have done, we reap what we have sown, and sowing good, although without any hope of a rich harvest, is recognized as the main goal of the philosopher here on earth.
Besides the conviction that all suffering can be eliminated by penetration into its nature and its origin, there are other ideas that we find in that rich treasury of ideas that opens up in India for every thinking person. These general ideas have, of course, had different expressions in separate systems, but this need not disturb us, and with some reflection we discover their common source. Thus, when we search for the causes of suffering, all the philosophical systems of India give us the same answer, although under different names. Vedanta speaks of ignorance (avidya); Samkhya about Aviveke(non-discrimination); nyaya o Mithyajnans(false knowledge), and all these various deviations from knowledge are generally depicted as bandha bonds broken through true knowledge given by various philosophical systems.
4. Karma
The next idea, apparently firmly rooted in the soul of the Hindu and therefore finding expression in all philosophical systems, is the belief in karma, action, that is, the continuity of action of any thought, word and deed over the centuries. “All deeds, good and evil, must and do bear fruit” - this is a position that not a single Hindu, neither modern nor those who lived thousands of years before us, doubted.*
*See The Mysteries of Karma Discovered by the Brahmin Yogi. Allahabad, 1898.
The same eternity that is attributed to deeds and their consequences is also attributed to the soul, with the difference that deeds cease to act when real freedom is achieved, but the soul remains even after the achievement of freedom, or final bliss. The idea of a soul ever ending was so foreign to the Hindu mind that the need for the proofs of immortality so common in European philosophy was apparently not felt. Knowing the meaning of a word be(being) the idea that being could become non-being seemed simply impossible to the Hindu mind. If being meant samsara, or the world, no matter how long it existed, the Hindu philosophers never recognized it as real. He never existed, does not exist and will not exist. Time, however long it may be, is nothing to the Hindu philosopher. Counting a thousand years as one day did not satisfy him. He imagined the duration of time through more daring similes, such as those of a man running his silk scarf along the chain of the Himalayan mountains once every thousand years. Over time, he will completely destroy (erase) these mountains; in a similar way the world, or samsara, of course, it ends, but even then eternity and the real remain far from each other. In order to make it easier to understand this eternity, a popular idea was invented pralayas(destruction or dissolution) of the entire world. Based on the teachings of Vedanta at the end of each kalpas comes pralaya(destruction) of the universe, and then Brahman returns to its causal state (karanavastha), containing both soul and matter in an undeveloped (avyakta) state.* However, in the end such paralayi Brahman creates or emits from himself a new world, matter again becomes visible, souls become active again and are reincarnated, albeit with higher enlightenment (vikasha) in accordance with their previous merits or sins. Thus Brahman receives his new karyavastha, that is, an active state that lasts until the next kalpas. But all this applies only to the changeable and unreal world. This is the world karma, a temporary product of ignorance (avidya) or maya, it is not the real reality. In Samkhya philosophy these pralayas occur when the balance of the three gunas is restored prakriti(matter),** while creation is the result of an imbalance between them. That which is not affected by the cosmic illusion, or at least only temporarily, and which at any moment can again acquire its self-knowledge, that is, its self-existence and freedom from all conditions and bonds, is truly eternal.
* Thibault. VSI, p. xxviii. ** Sankhya Sutras, VI, 42.
According to the Vaisheshika school of thought, this process of creation and dissolution depends on atoms. If they are separated, the world dissolves (pralaya); if movement arises in them and they unite, what we call creation takes place.
The idea of consuming the world at the end kalpas(eon) and its reappearance in the next kalpa is not yet found in the old Upanishads; they don't even contain the concept samsara, therefore Professor Garbe is inclined to consider the idea pralayas later, characteristic only of Samkhya philosophy and borrowed from it by other systems.* It is possible that this is so, but in the Bhagavad Gita (IX, 7) the idea of pralayas(takeovers) and about kalpah(periods), about their end and beginning (kalpakshay and kalpadau) is already quite familiar to poets. The nature of pralayas among different poets and philosophers is so different that it is much more likely that they all borrowed this idea from one common source, that is, from the folk faith of the people among whom they grew up, from whom they learned the language, and with it they acquired the material for their own thinking than that they invented the same theory in a slightly modified form by each.
* Garbe. Samkhya Philosophy, p. 221.
5. The infallibility of the Vedas
One more common element presupposed by all Indian philosophy may be pointed out: the recognition of the supreme authority and character of revelation attributed to the Vedas. Such an idea was, of course, striking in antiquity, although it seems quite familiar to us today. It is believed that the Samkhya philosophy originally did not imply belief in the revealed properties of the Vedas, but here, of course, shruti is spoken of (Sutra, I, 5). As far as we know Samkhya, it recognizes the authority of the Vedas, calling them shabda and referring to them regarding issues even unimportant. It should be noted that the difference between shruti And smriti(by revelation and tradition), so familiar in the later stages of the development of philosophy, is not yet found in the old Upanishads.
6. Three Gunas
The theory of the three gunas, recognized as the original property of Samkhya philosophy in its non-scientific form, also seems to have been quite familiar to most Hindu philosophers. The impulse to everything in nature, the cause of all life and all diversity, is attributed to the three gunas. Guna denotes property; but we are expressly warned not to understand this word in philosophy in its usual sense of property, but rather in the sense of substance, so that the gunas are in fact the constituent elements of nature. In a more general sense, they are nothing more than thesis, antithesis and something in between - for example, cold, hot and neither cold nor hot; good, evil, and neither good nor evil; light, dark and neither light nor dark, etc. in all parts of the physical and moral nature. The tension of these properties (the struggle between them) produces activity and struggle; and balance leads to temporary or final peace. This mutual tension is sometimes represented as an inequality produced by the predominance of one of the three gunas; for example, in the Maitrayana Upanishads (V, 2) we read: “This world in the beginning was tamas(darkness). This tamas stood in the Higher. Moved by the Supreme, he became unequal. In this form he was rajas (obscurity). Rajas, moved, also became unequal, and this form is sattva(virtue). Sattva, moved, became race(essence)". Here, obviously, we have the recognized names of the three gunas; in the Maitrayana Upanishad, the influence of the Sankhya is noticeable, and therefore it can be argued that her testimony is of little importance in proving the general acceptance of the theory of the gunas; in any case, they have no more meaning than the testimony of the later Upanishads or the Bhagavad Gita, where the three gunas are fully recognized.
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Introduction to the six systems of Indian philosophy.
V.Veretnov
Have you ever wondered?
Why, lately, more and more often, many of our people choose the eastern, and in particular the Indian way of searching for the meaning of life, getting rid of suffering and achieving bliss?
To what extent are such decisions justified and consciously made, and how do they fit in with the dominant Christian ones in our society: Orthodox, and recently rapidly growing with Protestant ideologies?
Who chooses which of the six systems of Indian philosophy: Vedanta, Purva Minansu, Sankhya, Yoga, Nyaya and Vaisheshika, and why?
Is it possible for a harmonious unification of Christian and Indian philosophical concepts achievements beyond consciousness within society, an individual?
Our people have been asking similar questions for many years and have not found exhaustive answers. Our small study is one of the attempts to advance on the path to the truth of its tireless seekers.
Some of the seekers would like to devote themselves exclusively to spiritual self-knowledge, others would like to combine spiritual and material-social prosperity.
In the philosophical and religious literature, coverage of the issues of the features of the six systems of Indian philosophy can be found both in the works of domestic scientists M. Ladoga, D. Andreev, N. Isaev, V. Lysenko, S. Burmirstrov, and foreign researchers M. Muller, S. Chatterjee, D. .Datta, including Indian scientists Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, A.Ch. Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupada and many others.
At the same time, consideration and comparison of six systems of Indian philosophy and Christian approaches to achieving superconsciousness in the context of the questions we posed in the introduction are found in the unique works of the end XIX century by Mitrofan of Ladoga and Max Muller.
One of the hypotheses for the increased interest in the six systems of Indian philosophy, both here and in the West, experts call the historical, cultural and demographic phenomenon of India. Domestic and Western philosophers note the fact that the development of philosophy in India for a long time occurred due to the lack of literature, occurred mnemonically, i.e. sutras, Upanishads, hymns and other philosophical texts were retold in schools from teacher to student. This circumstance makes it difficult to reliably determine the age of each system of Indian philosophy.
In addition, many authors of the texts of sacred books and commentaries on them considered themselves simply a link in the endless sequence of creation of each system that has survived to this day. Usually, talented students stayed and continued in the ashram (an analogue of the hermit places common among us, such as the Optina Hermitage) to explore themselves (spirit, soul, body, mind, mind, language, etc.), the surrounding nature, the highest deity - the Lord, Generalizing this knowledge, they then passed it on to the students of their school. If Western philosophy was divided into idealism and materialism, theism and atheism in traditional issues of the creation of the world, mechanisms of development, methods of knowledge, then Indian philosophy developed mainly in line with the idealistic theistic tradition, which made it possible not to conflict between religions and philosophy, but rather to develop and develop together. support each other. To be fair, it must be said that Indian philosophy in various systems resorted to the tools of materialists, such as the departure from monism and the use of dualism. On the other hand, Indian philosophy has common ideas for all six of its systems, which will be discussed below.
Indian philosophy Since ancient times, it has developed continuously, without sharp turns, such as those experienced by Western philosophy, which often changed the direction of its development. Its oldest documents, which are still considered holy today, are contained in the Vedas (before 1500 BC). Almost all the literature on Indian philosophy is written in the language of art connoisseurs and scientists - Sanskrit. Since most of the changes in Indian philosophy were associated with commentary on the basic, recognized authoritative texts, the old European philosophical scholars believed that Indian philosophy should be defined as the prehistory of philosophy, when in fact its development ran parallel to the development of Western philosophy, although in other forms. Like European philosophy before the 17th century, Indian philosophy also dealt primarily with religious problems, but it paid more attention to reflection on the knowledge of the transcendental. Since Hindus believe in the eternity of a cyclically renewed world process, they have not created a philosophy of history proper. Aesthetics and the doctrine of society and the state are special, separate sciences for them. In its historical development, Indian philosophy falls into three periods:
1. Vedic period (1500-500 BC),
2. classical, or Brahmano-Buddhist (500 BC - 1000 AD) and
3. post-classical or Hindu period (from 1000).
Six systems of Indian philosophy and their authors
1. Mimamsa (“clarification” of the Vedic text on sacrifices) deals with the explanation of the ritual, but in its methods it can be classified as an atheistic pluralist system,
2. Vedanta (the conclusion of the Vedas) in the Brahma Sutra, based on the Upanishads and the Bhagavad Gita, teaches about the emergence of the world from Brahma; individual souls, through knowledge or love of God - bhakti - achieve salvation, achieve unity with God, without merging with him. Influenced by the idealism of late Buddhist philosophy, Shankara (circa 800) gives the texts a new interpretation that evaluates the previous teaching about real transformation Brahmas are only as the lowest level of truth, as the appearance of truth; in reality, all diversity is an illusion (maya), individual souls are identical to the unchanging Brahma.
3. Sankhya (“reasonable weighing” or “enumeration”) preaches atheistic pluralism: the primary substance is only apparently connected with a kind of soul-spirit; overcoming this illusion guarantees liberation,
4. Yoga (tension, training) is the practice of contemplation; its theoretical basis is Samkhya, but it also recognizes a personal God.
5. Nyaya (rule, logic) - the doctrine of forms of thinking, which developed the five-term syllogism.
6. Sixth system of philosophy -Vaisesika , which sought to establish differences between everything that confronts us in the external and internal world. Vaisheshika developed the doctrine of categories and atomism; being theistic, she saw the liberation of man in the separation of the soul from all material things and its transformation into an organ of thinking.
Each of these six systems has its own founders. These philosophers are as follows:
1.Badarayana, also called Vyasa Dvapayana or Krishna Dwapayana, the supposed author of the Brahma Sutras, also called the Uttara Mimamsa Sutras or Vyasa Sutras.
4. Patanjali, also called Shesha or Phanin, author of the Yoga Sutras.
5.Kanada, also called Kanabhug, Kanabhakshaka or Uluka, author of the Vaisesika Sutras.
6. Gotama (Gautama), also called Akshapada, author of the Nyaya Sutras.
The general philosophical ideas of Indian philosophy are like the common language of Sanskrit or the air with which every thinking person interested in philosophy was permeated.
1. Metepsychosis-samsara
This is the best known of the general ideas about the transmigration of souls. Wherein human souls depending on the indicators of the karma of the balance of good and evil deeds, the soul moved either to a person of different mental and social status, or to an animal, or to a plant.
2. Immortality of the soul
The immortality of the soul is such a general and accepted idea among the Hindu that
No arguments were required. With the exception of the followers of Brihaspati, who denied a future life, all other schools recognized the immortality and eternity of the soul.
3.Pessimism
It should be noted that this pessimism is different from our ideas about pessimism. It is still closer to realism, and the Indians' increased attention to the suffering that takes place in our lives and ways to eliminate them.
4.Karma
Belief in karma as a continuous activity of thought, word and deed has existed in all ages. All deeds - good and evil - must bear fruit - this is the position that no Hindu doubted.
5. The infallibility of the Vedas
6.Three Huns
The theory of the three Huns is known to all Indian philosophers as properties that give impulses to everything in nature. In a more general sense, they can be thought of as thesis, antithesis, and something in between. In Samkhya philosophy there are three types:
A) good behavior, called virtue
B) indifferent behavior - passion, anger, greed, gloating, violence, discontent, rudeness, manifested in changes in facial expression.
C) Madness, intoxication, idleness, nihilism, lust, impurity, called bad behavior.
In their philosophical research, Indians saw the main goal of achieving bliss and getting rid of suffering through the comprehension of truth, true knowledge. They distinguished six types of comprehension of truth (prama): perception, inference, revelation, comparison, assumption, non-existence.
The structure of man studied by philosophers in six Indian philosophical systems is interesting. A person consists of several elements - body, soul, spirit, mind (mind) of society. Different systems give each element of a person different properties. In different systems they play a certain role in internal and external relations. A prerequisite for highlighting the properties of one or another element is the recognition of the common spirit within us - purusha, personal god - atman, supreme deity - brahman, nature - prakriti.
Many of our people are interested in esotericism, theosophy, and some Indian spiritual practices, such as yoga, justifying their choice and then engaging in it with their psychophysiological sensations. An alternative to this approach would be to theoretically study the six systems of Indian philosophy and then make a more conscious choice and test them in practice.
In conclusion, it should be noted that the six systems of Indian philosophy have a powerful potential of true knowledge for solving pressing problems of a person, family, enterprise, society, state, ecology, unfortunately unconscious and not further developed by all interested researchers. In addition, a more detailed study of the six systems of Indian philosophy will make it possible to formulate on their basis models for the harmonious unification of the interests of people of different religions and philosophical beliefs for the preservation of peace and the sustainable development of human civilization.