Is the philosophy of a zombie different from a human. "Puzzle with the toxin" 10 thought experiments of modern philosophy

Philosophical zombie

Few people believe in the actual existence of zombies, but many believe that they are at least conceivable, meaning they are logically or metaphysically possible. It is argued that if zombies are at least minimally possible, then physicalism is erroneous and it is necessary to recognize some duality (duality) of this world. It is in this conclusion that most philosophers see the main merit of the zombie theory. At the same time, it is also interesting for its assumptions about the nature of consciousness and about the relationship between the material (physical) and spiritual (phenomenal), and the use of the zombie idea in the criticism of physicalism raises more general questions about the relationship of the conceivable (imaginability), representable (conceivability) and possible (possibility). ). Finally, the idea of zombies leads researchers to such a difficult problem of the theory of knowledge as the problem of "other minds" ("other minds" problem).

Types of zombies

"P-zombie" (p-zombie) was used primarily as an argument against certain types of physicalism, in particular, behaviorism. According to behaviorism, mental states exist solely in terms of behavior. Thus, belief, desire, thinking, consciousness, and so on, are simply certain types of behavior or inclination towards them. It then turns out that a pi-zombie that is behaviorally indistinguishable from a "normal" human, but lacks conscious experience, is logically impossible according to the behaviorist position as a being. This is explained by the strict dependence in the origin of consciousness on behavior. Based on the foregoing, it can be concluded that appealing to intuition about the existence of a pi-zombie thus described reinforces the argument that behaviorism is false.

There are several types of zombies. They vary in their degree of resemblance to "normal" human beings and are applied in different thought experiments in the following way.

"Behavioral Zombie"(behavioral zombie) is behaviorally indistinguishable from a human and yet has no conscious experience.
"Neurological Zombie"(neurological zombie) has, this is emphasized, a human brain and is otherwise physically indistinguishable from a human; however, he has no conscious experience.
"Soulless Zombie"(soulless zombie) has no soul, but is otherwise completely human-like; this concept is used to find out what the soul might mean.

However, the "philosophical zombie" is primarily seen in the context of arguments against physicalism (or functionalism) in general. Thus, a pi-zombie is generally understood to mean a being that is physically indistinguishable from a "normal" human but lacks conscious experience.

"Zombies" and physicalism

Kripke

Saul Kripke

A good way to visually demonstrate the weaknesses of physicalism is to refer to some of the ideas of the American analytic philosopher Saul Kripke in Naming and Necessity (1972).

Imagine God, writes Kripke, creating the world and deciding to create the entire physical universe according to the full definition (denoted P) in purely physical terms. P describes, firstly, the location and state of elementary particles throughout space and time, and, secondly, the laws that govern their behavior. Now the question arises: having created a purely physical universe according to this specification, should God have done something else to condition the existence of human consciousness? A positive answer to this question implies that there is more to consciousness than just the physical facts from which it could be inferred (dualism). Since consciousness requires non-physical properties in the strict sense, and such properties would not exist in a purely physical world, it would be a zombie world. Physicalists, on the other hand, chose to answer the question in the negative. Then they must say that by establishing purely physical facts according to P, God has thus established all the mental facts about the organisms whose existence is provided for by P, including facts about people's thoughts, feelings, emotions, and events.

Obviously, physicalists are true to the notion that the physical world defined by P is the only true order things, while all other true statements are alternative ways of talking about the same world. In this sense, physicalists must hold that the facts of consciousness "follow" the physical facts and that zombie worlds are "impossible." Therefore, proving the possibility of zombies would show that the mental facts do not follow the physical facts: that a zombie world is possible and that physicalism is wrong.

Chalmers

However, the zombie argument against physicalism in general was best applied and developed in detail by David Chalmers in The Conscious Mind (1996). According to Chalmers, it is possible to coherently (coherently) imagine a whole world of zombies: a world physically indistinguishable from our world, but completely devoid of conscious experience. In such a world, the counterpart of every being that is conscious in our world would be a "pi-zombie". The structure of Chalmers' version of the "zombie argument" can be outlined as follows:

If physicalism is correct, then there can be no world in which all physical facts are the same as those in the real (our) world, but in which there are also additional facts. This is because, according to physicalism, all facts are completely determined by physical facts; thus, any world that is physically indistinguishable from our world is completely indistinguishable from our world.
But there is possible world, in which all physical facts are the same as in the real world, but in which there are additional facts. (For example, it is possible that there is a world exactly like ours in every physical respect, but in it everyone lacks certain mental states, namely any phenomenal events or qualia. People there look and act exactly like people in actual world, but they do not feel anything; when, for example, someone is successfully shot, the latter screams in pain, as if he really feels it, but this is not at all the case).
Therefore, physicalism is false. (The conclusion follows modus tollens (((A→B) & non-B) → non-A).)

This leads to the following questions: for example, in what sense is the concept of "possibility" used here? Some philosophers argue that the relevant kind of possibility is not as weak as logical possibility. They believe that despite the logical possibility of a zombie world (that is, there is no logical contradiction in any full description situation), such a weak concept is irrelevant (does not correspond) to the analysis of a metaphysical thesis like physicalism. Most philosophers agree that the corresponding concept of possibility is a kind of metaphysical possibility. That the claimant of the "zombie argument" is the only one who can say, sitting in a chair and using only the power of reason, that this whole zombie situation is metaphysically possible. Chalmers states: "From the conceivability of zombies, the proponents of the argument infer their metaphysical possibility." Chalmers argues that this conclusion from conceivability to metaphysical possibility is not entirely valid, but it is valid for such phenomenal concepts as consciousness. In fact, according to Chalmers, what is logically possible is also, in this case, metaphysically possible.

Criticism of the "zombie argument"

Daniel Dennett

Aporia of Zeno: Achilles and the tortoise · Dichotomy· Stadium · Arrow of Zeno Physical Demon Laplace · Maxwell's Demon · quantum immortality · quantum suicide · Shroedinger `s cat · Bell's paradox · Submarine Paradox ·

The Philosophical Zombie Theory

In analytic philosophy, an intriguing line of research has emerged in recent decades called the "zombie problem." Philosophical zombies generally refer to unconscious systems that are behaviorally, functionally, and/or physically identical, indistinguishable, and/or similar to conscious beings. The problem of philosophical zombies is vast, multifaceted, multifaceted. Over the past thirty years, dozens of monographs and hundreds of major articles eminent foreign authors. There was even a classification of researchers. For example, zombiephiles are those who adopt zombie themes to criticize or substantiate theories of consciousness. Zombie phobes, on the other hand, ignore the theme of zombies.

In the zombie problem, the zombie argument is the most important. In its general form, it is formulated as a conditionally categorical conclusion (modus ponens): 1. If zombies are possible, then some theory of consciousness is false. 2. Zombies are possible

The zombie conceivability argument is considered possible. It is presented in the form of a syllogism: 1) zombies are conceivable; 2) everything conceivable is possible; 3) hence, zombies are possible.

But even this was not enough. "Thinkability" is understood in a differentiated form. Thus, D. Chalmers uses the ideas of Kripke's "two-dimensional semantics" to the concept of conceivability, highlighting the a priori and a posteriori conceivability of zombies. His followers note a number of gradations - "n-thinkability". Exploring the modal aspects of the zombie problem is a special topic.

Researchers begin to define the concept of "philosophical zombie" in a contrasting way, highlighting it among incomparable terms: "Zombie" is a stupid person; wonderful type; rookie; rum and soda cocktail; post-punk band; A UNIX process that "idle" uses computing resources, a series of computer games, etc. Two years ago, a "computer zombie" was added to this list - a kind of sabotage software that is updated at the direction of a hacker to clog the Internet with spam (a big computer security problem!) .

David Chalmers points to the heuristic role of zombies as hypotheses that creatively inspire philosophers. He uses a vague metaphor as a substitute for the definition - zombies have "everything is dark inside." More clearly, the position of D. Chalmers himself is prescribed by his student Ishvan Aranusi: a zombie is a physical duplicate of me, therefore it must be my functional duplicate. Larry Houser points to the destructive function of zombies, as they destroy the well-developed materialistic philosophy of consciousness and scientific psychology. Aaron Lenaier considers zombies to be a bait in the mind/body debate and the exploration of consciousness. Andrew Bale adjoins him, emphasizing the purely theoretical and essentially technical nature of the concept in discussions on the problem of consciousness. Owen Flanagan and Thomas Polger call zombies "the unfortunate fool" who fights on one side, then on the other in philosophical battles over the mind. However, they point to the productivity of the topic, since the zombie problem sharpens the issue of the role of consciousness to the utmost, reveals the inconsistency of functionalism, refutes the Turing test and demonstrates the insolvability of the traditional problem of "other minds" - how can one be sure that some, and maybe even all the people around us are not zombies? Todd S. Moody, considering zombies to be a functionally complete and detailed description of cognitive activity, i.e. an emotionless simulacrum of a conscious being, believes that the zombie problem is a very useful variation on the theme of "other minds" and a vivid conceptualization philosophical questions about consciousness. Dan Lloyd connects the “other problem” with the criterion of “zombieness” and believes that this criterion entails linguistic indistinguishability, in which not only ordinary conversations, but even discussions on the topics of the philosophy of mind cannot be distinguished - as if they are not conducted between zombies. , and between people Gasparov I.G. The conceivability of zombies and the psychophysical problem. // Philosophy of consciousness: classics and modernity. M., 2007. S. 127.

It should be noted that the explicit approach to the definition of the concept of a zombie suffers from conceptual fuzziness. How can one conceive the possibility of an unconscious being that is behaviorally, functionally, and even physically indistinguishable from a conscious being? At first glance, this seems to be a contradiction. Therefore, a number of researchers believe, for example, E. Bale, that the concept of a zombie is not a single concept, but subtle variations in the design of thought experiments with zombies, and these variations can have important consequences for certain philosophical conclusions.

Let's consider the largest mental experiments in chronological order, which, according to a number of authors, reflects the actual evolution of the problem of philosophical zombies (T. Polger, R. Kirk). The first two thought experiments with zombies were proposed by Robert Kirk in two small papers.

D. Chalmers continues the speculative line of the zombie problem, significantly supplementing it with modal-logical studies. He suggests imagining one's own duplicate, an artificial "version" of Chalmers, organized in exactly the same way as the real philosopher Chalmers is organized. The difference is this: where the real Chalmers has neurons, the "double" has silicon chips. For Chalmers himself and, as he believes, for many others, it is obvious that the “Zombie Chalmers” does not have consciousness, because everything is empty and dark inside him, since there is nothing in silicon or biochemistry that causes consciousness. For Chalmers, the conceivability, and therefore the logical possibility, of zombie-Chalmers is also obvious. Commentators usually quote the following: “I confess that the logical possibility of zombies seems quite obvious to me... There is no contradiction in this description, although the acceptance of its logical possibility is based on intuition. It seems to me that almost everyone is able to conceive of this possibility. I can't detect any logical incoherence [in the zombie idea] and have a clear picture when I imagine zombies. Some may deny the possibility of zombies, but they must be competent on the issue of possibility, and this competence must be higher than that of those who admit the possibility of zombies. In short, it is up to the one who claims that a description of a zombie is logically impossible to prove [possibility/impossibility] of a zombie. At the same time, [the opponent] must clearly show where an explicit or implicitly revealed contradiction is seen. That is, the burden of proof lies with the anti-zombie, not the zombie.

The zombie experiment is important to D. Chalmers. Formally, this is indicated by the glossary of the book: the word "zombie" is the most frequently used in the book. Chalmer's choice of the "logical possibility" (or conceivability) of zombies is the intention to provide a vivid extravagant example and reinforce the basic neo-dualistic premise that conscious states, or "qualia" are not subject to physical and functional analysis Rakitov A.I. Regulatory world: knowledge and knowledge-based society // Questions of Philosophy, 2005, No. 5..

However, according to critics (R. Kirk, E. Cottrell), D. Chalmers too simply "dealt" with the problem of the conceivability of zombies, proceeding immediately to the zombie argument. Nor is he consistent in applying the zombie conceivability argument. Therefore, critics offer zombie Chalmers for the opposition, i.e. to implement the strategy of anti-zombists: if it is possible to convincingly show the unthinkability of Chalmers-zombies, then D. Chalmers' theory collapses.

1. The concept of zombies is important for putting things in order in the definition of consciousness, since the limit to any concept is supposed to be a contradictory or, at least, opposite concept. That is, the concept of an unconscious zombie is logically necessary to develop the concept of a conscious being. Here the taxonomy of zombies becomes important, taking into account the following parameters: a) theories of consciousness that the analyzed zombies refute or certify (first of all, physicalism, behaviorism, functionalism), b) modalities (degrees of conceivability and possibility of zombies), etc.

2. Zombies provide rich factual material in the study of the unconscious. Of course, these facts are imaginary, nevertheless, after passing through the crucible of thought experiments, they become quite convincing. Dozombian means of explication of the unconscious are inoperative concepts of the unconscious "in general" or psychoanalytic empirical pettiness of the "minimal sufficient certainty" of the concept of the unconscious, as D.I. Dubrovsky Dubrovsky D. I. Why subjective reality, or “why information processes do not go in the dark?” (Response to D. Chalmers) // Questions of Philosophy. 2007. No. 3.

3. Thought experiments with zombies accumulate in essence the parameters of all major thought experiments in the philosophy of mind. They reveal only particular aspects of the dependence of conscious phenomena on the physical, behavioral, functional, personal, social. Therefore, the methodological-integrative function of the concept of zombies in relation to these experiments is obvious.

4. The importance of the zombie problem is caused not only by the interests of the speculative metaphysics of consciousness, as in D. Chalmers. Applications of the zombie problem can be traced in all sciences, in the field of view of which is the role, functions, structures of consciousness. Obvious applications in public and humanities. Today, zombies are the focus of researchers artificial intelligence and serve as a basis for criticizing or supporting such promising directions in information technology like artificial life, artificial personality, artificial society. Methods for identifying zombies are akin to the Turing test - a basic thought experiment of the philosophy of artificial intelligence, designed to determine the intelligence of systems. The test for identifying the consciousness / unconsciousness of systems (the Zombie test) can be considered a variation of the Turing test. The Zombie test plus knowledge of the internal structural-functional relationships of the tested system creates modifiable conditions for determining consciousness/unconsciousness. And this significantly brings closer to solving the problem of the “other” (consciousness, etc.) Kovalchuk M.V. Breakthrough direction: convergent NBIC technologies // Technopolis XXI. 2009. No. 3 (19)..

What is a philosophical zombie? First, it is a being whose behavior is indistinguishable from that of a being endowed with consciousness. Secondly, with all the similarities in behavior, the philosophical zombie does not have consciousness, it does not have internal experiences. For Dennett, the conceptual possibility of zombies is of great importance: if philosophical zombies are possible, then human consciousness is not at all necessary for the functioning of a living organism.

As an example that argues for the possibility of a philosophical zombie, Dennett cites the Shaki robot. This robot has an I / O system, as well as an interface through which it receives data about the outside world. If we “ask” the robot “what do you perceive?”, then in response we will receive the values of certain characteristics that are recorded in the robot’s memory through a message interface with outside world(it could be a video camera). Regardless of what transformations will receive the initial data from the camera, they will be the answer to the question. For example, it can be an array of zeros and ones, or words that were originally set by the programmer to describe the environment (square, circle, triangle). Shaka has only this way of expressing data and the question of “how does he actually imagine what he perceives?” meaningless, he does not choose how to say what he finds in introspection. As Dennett writes, "Shakey just found himself with things to say." Thus, the connection between statements and questions is direct, it is not mediated by internal contemplation and introspection, because they do not exist - a robot is an absolutely mechanical system, which we have no doubt about the absence of subjective experience.

What if we improved such a robot? Give him sensors that allow him to have sight, smell, etc., as well as sensors for his internal (but unconscious, Dennett insists) states? Dennett calls this robot Zimbo. Zimbo is a zombie that is behaviorally complex, thanks to his control system that allows for recursive self-determination. Such a zimbo will be sure that he has subjective experience - although he will not have it! He will convince all interlocutors that he really feels certain experiences, as well as annoyance from the fact that his subjective experience can be doubted.

The question is the following: is it possible the existence of such a zimbo? From a positivist point of view, this idea is unverifiable: if a zimbo is behaviorally indistinguishable from a human, then there is absolutely no way to tell whether he has mental states (subjective experience) or not. Similarly, a given idea is unfalsifiable for the same reasons.

On the other hand, we can nevertheless formulate the very definition of zimbo in speech. For most researchers, this is enough to establish a conceptual possibility, but my position is that the existence of a zimbo is conceptually impossible, due to internal inconsistency. The idea of a zimbo is based on the position of the first person: if we looked at the zimbo from the inside, we would see that he does not have any mental states. But the problem is that we, by definition, cannot perform this operation of "testing for subjective experience." The first-person position consists in complete identification with the subject of research. If we want to take the position of a zimbo, then we must become a zimbo, that is, look at the world through his eyes (use the data of his "sense organs"), and also lose the most subjective experience (by definition, which describes the zimbo).

In this case, we can give a verbal account of our states, but in no way can we understand that we do not have any subjective experience, since the very term "understanding" refers to the existence of a subject who makes a judgment. That is, plunging into the “state of zimbo”, we lose the opportunity to answer “do I have internal states”, since there are no internal states. The essential definition of internal states is that they are immediate givens of consciousness: the ultimate description of pain is that we experience this feeling with all evidence and are not able to ignore it.

How then is such a situation possible when we can accept the idea that something behaves exactly like us, but does not have internal states, if, when trying to “get into the skin” of a zimbo, we stop thinking, and therefore lose the very content of the idea about zimbo? In this case, the idea of zimbo stands in line with statements that, when trying to analyze them, lead to the evidence of the emptiness of their mental content: we can use them in speech as phraseological units that describe something that is inaccessible to “understanding”, although we may be aware of them .

A good analogy to the idea of a zombie is the idea of a four-dimensional orthogonal space: instead of three planes perpendicular to each other, we work with four. Despite the fact that we can set a coordinate system for such a space, as well as analytically prove theorems, calculate values and take integrals from four-dimensional functions, it will remain inaccessible to our subjective experience, and will exist only as a mathematical object.

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What is a thought experiment?

A thought experiment in philosophy, physics and a number of other sciences is a form of cognitive activity, where a situation is modeled not in the form of a real experiment familiar to each of us, but in the imagination. This concept was first introduced into use by the Austrian positivist philosopher, mechanic and physicist Ernst Mach.

Today, the term "thought experiment" is actively used by various scientists, entrepreneurs, politicians and specialists in various fields around the world. Some of them prefer to conduct their own thought experiments, and some give all sorts of examples of them, with the best examples of which we want to introduce you.

As the name implies, we will consider eight experiments in total.

Philosophical zombie

Imagine a living dead. But not sinister, but such a modest, harmless, similar to an ordinary person. The only thing that distinguishes him from people is that he cannot feel anything, does not have conscious experience, but he is able to repeat their actions and reactions after people, for example, if he is burned with fire, he skillfully imitates pain.

If such a zombie existed, it would go against the theory of physicalism, where the perception of a person is due only to the processes of the physical plane. The philosophical zombie also does not correlate in any way with behavioral views, according to which any manifestations, desires and consciousness of a person are reduced to behavioral factors, and such a zombie cannot be distinguished from an ordinary person. This experiment also partially concerns the problem of artificial intelligence, because in the place of a zombie there may be a notorious android capable of copying human habits.

quantum suicide

The second experiment concerns quantum mechanics, but here it changes - from the position of an eyewitness to the position of a participant. Take Schrödinger's cat, for example, shooting himself in the head with a gun powered by the decay of a radioactive atom. The gun can misfire 50% of the time. , there is a collision of two quantum theories: "Copenhagen" and many-worlds.

According to the first, the cat cannot be in two states at the same time, i.e. he will either be alive or dead. But according to the second, any new attempt to shoot, as it were, divides the universe into two alternatives: in the first, the cat is alive, in the second, it is dead. However, the alter-ego of the cat, who remained to live, will remain unaware of his death in a parallel reality.

The author of the experiment, Professor Max Tegmark, leans towards the theory of the multiverse. But most of the experts in the field of quantum mechanics, who were interviewed by Tegmark, trust the "Copenhagen" quantum theory.

Poison and reward

Curtain of ignorance

A wonderful experiment on the topic of social justice.

Example: everything related to social organization is entrusted to a certain group of people. In order for the concept they came up with to be as objective as possible, these people were deprived of knowledge about their status in society, belonging to classes, intelligence quotient and others that can guarantee competitive superiority - this is all the “curtain of ignorance”.

The question is, what concept of the organization of society will people choose, being incapable of taking into account their own personal interests?

Chinese room

A man who is in a room with baskets filled with hieroglyphs. He has at his disposal a detailed manual in his native language, explaining the laws of combining unusual signs. It is not necessary to understand the meaning of all hieroglyphs, because only the drawing rules apply. But in the process of working with hieroglyphs, you can create a text that is no different from the written language of a Chinese resident.

Outside the door of the room are people passing cards with questions in Chinese to the recluse. Our hero, taking into account the rules from the textbook, answers them - his answers do not make sense for him, but for the Chinese they are quite logical.

If we imagine the hero as a computer, the textbook as an information base, and people's messages as questions and answers to the computer, the experiment will show the limitations of the computer and its inability to master human thinking in the process of simply responding to initial conditions through programmed way.

Infinite monkey theorem

Based on this experiment, an abstract monkey, if he beats the keys of a printing mechanism in a chaotic manner for eternity, at one of the moments will be able to print any text that was originally given, for example, Shakespeare's Hamlet.

Attempts were even made to bring this experiment to life: teachers and students at the University of Plymouth raised two thousand dollars to give out a computer to six macaques in the zoo. A month has passed, but the “testees” have not achieved success - their literary heritage contains only five pages, where the letter “S” predominates. The computer was almost completely destroyed. But the experimenters themselves said that they learned a lot from their project.

You can come up with some of your own unusual thought experiments - for this you just need to turn on your head and. But have you ever thought, by the way, that many of us, almost everyone, mentally conduct all kinds of experiments involving, for example, ourselves, someone close to us or even pets? The next time you imagine a situation, write it down on paper or even publish it - maybe your ideas will get a good development.

Few people believe in the actual existence of zombies, but many believe that they are at least conceivable, that is, they are logically or metaphysically possible. It is argued that if zombies are at least minimally possible, then physicalism is erroneous and it is necessary to recognize some duality (duality) of this world. It is in this conclusion that most philosophers see the main merit of the zombie theory. At the same time, it is also interesting for its assumptions about the nature of consciousness and about the relationship between the material (physical) and spiritual (phenomenal), and the use of the zombie idea in the criticism of physicalism raises more general questions about the relationship of the conceivable (imaginability), representable (conceivability) and possible (possibility). ). Finally, the idea of zombies leads researchers to such a difficult problem of the theory of knowledge as the problem of "other minds" ("other minds" problem).

Types of zombies

"P-zombie" (p-zombie) was used primarily as an argument against certain types of physicalism, such as behaviorism. According to behaviorism, mental states exist solely in terms of behavior: thus belief, desire, thinking, consciousness, and so on, are simply certain behaviors or inclinations towards them. It then turns out that a pi-zombie that is behaviorally indistinguishable from a "normal" human, but lacks conscious experience, is logically impossible according to the behaviorist position as a being. This is explained by the strict dependence in the origin of consciousness on behavior. Based on the foregoing, we can conclude that appealing to intuition about the existence of the pi-zombie described in this way reinforces the argument about the falsity of behaviorism.

There are several types of zombies. They vary in their degree of resemblance to "normal" human beings and are applied in various thought experiments as follows:

"Behavioral Zombie"(behavioral zombie) is behaviorally indistinguishable from a human and yet has no conscious experience.
"Neurological Zombie"(neurological zombie) has, this is emphasized, a human brain and is otherwise physically indistinguishable from a human; however, there is no conscious experience.
"Soulless Zombie"(soulless zombie) lacks a soul, but is otherwise completely human; this concept is used to find out what, in any case, the soul could mean.

"Zombies" and physicalism

Kripke

File:Kripke.JPG

Saul Kripke

A good way to visually demonstrate the weaknesses of physicalism is to refer to some of the ideas of the American analytical philosopher Sola Kripke set forth in his Naming and Necessity (1972).
Imagine God, writes Kripke, creating the world and deciding to bring the entire physical universe into existence according to the full definition of P in purely physical terms. P describes things like the placement and states of elementary particles throughout space and time, along with the laws that govern their behavior. Now the question is, having created a purely physical universe according to this specification, did God have to do something else to condition the existence of human consciousness? A positive answer to this question implies that there is more to consciousness than just the physical facts from which it could be inferred (dualism). Since consciousness requires non-physical properties in the strict sense, and such properties would not exist in a purely physical world, it would be a zombie world. Physicalists, on the other hand, chose to answer the question in the negative. Then they must say that by establishing purely physical facts according to P, God has thus established all the mental facts about the organisms whose existence is provided for by P, including facts about people's thoughts, feelings, emotions, and events.
Obviously, physicalists are true to the notion that the physical world defined by P is the only true order of things, with all other true statements being alternative ways of talking about the same world. In this sense, physicalists must hold that the facts of consciousness "follow" the physical facts, and that zombie worlds are "not possible." Therefore, proving the possibility of the existence of zombies will show that the mental facts do not follow the physical facts: that a zombie world is possible and physicalism is wrong.

Chalmers

File:David Chalmers TASC2008.JPG

David Chalmers

However, the zombie argument against physicalism in general has been best applied and developed in detail. David Chalmers in The Conscious Mind (1996). According to Chalmers, it is possible to coherently (coherently) imagine a whole world of zombies: a world physically indistinguishable from our world, but completely devoid of conscious experience. In such a world, the counterpart of every being that is conscious in our world would be a "pi-zombie". The structure of Chalmers' version of the "zombie argument" can be outlined as follows:

1. If physicalism is correct, then it is not possible to have a world in which all physical facts are the same as those in the real (our) world, but in which there are also additional facts. This is because, according to physicalism, all facts are completely determined by physical facts; thus, any world that is physically indistinguishable from our world is completely indistinguishable from our world.

2. But there is a possible world in which all physical facts are the same as in the real world, but in which there are additional facts. (For example, it is possible that there is a world exactly like ours in every physical respect, but in it everyone lacks certain mental states, namely any phenomenal events or qualia. People there look and act exactly like people in the actual world , but they do not feel anything; when, for example, someone is successfully shot, the latter screams in pain, as if he really feels it, but this is not at all)

3. Therefore, physicalism is false. (Conclusion follows modus tollens (((A&B) & non-B) → non-A))

An argument is logically valid because if its premises are true, then the conclusion must also be true. However, some philosophers doubt that his premises are correct. For example, regarding premise 2: is such a zombie world really possible? Chalmers states that "there certainly seems to be a logically coherent situation depicted; I cannot see the contradiction in the description." Since such a world is conceivable, Chalmers claims that it is possible; and if such a world is possible, then physicalism is wrong. Chalmers argues solely for the sake of logical possibility, and he believes that this is the essence of all that his argument requires. He states: "Zombies are probably not possible in nature: they probably cannot exist in our world, with its natural laws."
This leads to the following questions, for example, in what sense is the concept of "possibility" used here? Some philosophers argue that the relevant kind of possibility is not as weak as the logical possibility. They hold that, despite the logical possibility of a zombie world (that is, there is no logical contradiction in any complete description of the situation), such a weak concept is not relevant to the analysis of a metaphysical thesis like physicalism. Most philosophers agree that the corresponding concept of possibility is a kind of metaphysical possibility. That the claimant of the "zombie argument" is the only one who can say, sitting in a chair and using only the power of reason, that this whole zombie situation is metaphysically possible. Chalmers states: "From the conceivability of zombies, the proponents of the argument infer their metaphysical possibility." Chalmers argues that this conclusion from conceivability to metaphysical possibility is not entirely valid, but it is valid for phenomenal concepts such as consciousness. In fact, according to Chalmers, what is logically possible is also, in this case, metaphysically possible.

Criticism of the "zombie argument"

Daniel Dennett

Daniel Dennett - A well-known critic of the "zombie argument", as he believes that it is of no use in philosophical discussions, it is based on illusions and contradictory in nature, to the extent that it correlates with the concept of man. Although it should be noted that Dennett himself, in his 1991 work Mind Explained, referred to the idea of "zombies" as "something well known and even states "general agreement among philosophers" that "zombies are or would be such people who demonstrate a completely natural, accompanied by attention and speech, lively behavior, but at the same time in reality they are completely devoid of consciousness, being something like automatons. The physicalist could respond to the zombie argument in several ways. Most answers deny premise 2 (Chalmers' version above), that is, they deny that a zombie world is possible.
The unequivocal answer is that the idea of qualia and the corresponding phenomenal representations of consciousness are unrelated concepts, and the idea of a zombie is therefore controversial. Daniel Dennett and others take this position. They argue that although subjective experience, etc. exists in some view, they do not come forward as claims of a proponent of the zombie argument; pain, for example, is not something that can be quietly separated from a person's mental life without causing behavioral or physiological deviations (divergences). Dennett coined the term "zimboes" ("philosophical zombies" who have second-tier beliefs or "advanced self-monitoring mechanisms") to argue that the idea of a philosophical zombie is controversial. He states: "Philosophers should hastily abandon the idea of zombies, but since they continue to be in close embrace, this gives me an excellent opportunity to focus on the most seductive error in the current thinking."
In a similar way Nigel Thomas argues that the notion of zombies is inherently self-contradictory: because zombies, barring various assumptions, behave exactly like normal humans they would claim to be conscious. Thomas insists that any interpretation of this claim (that is, whether it is taken to be true, false, or neither true nor false) inevitably entails either a contradiction or sheer absurdity. Taking the position of physicalism, one had either to believe that anyone, including themselves, could be a zombie, or that no one can be a zombie - a consequence of the assertion that one's own belief that zombies exist (or do not exist) is a product of the physical world and is therefore no different from anyone else's. This argument was advanced by Daniel Dennett, who argues that Zimbos are conscious, they have qualia, they endure pain - they are only "wrong" (according to this sad tradition) in a way that none of them can ever discover." While it has been argued that zombies are metaphysically impossible under the assumption of physicalism, it has also been argued that zombies are not conceivable. concepts (or fantasies), and end up imagining something that violates their own definition."
According to Dennett, there are no differences at all between people and "philosophical zombies". After all, consciousness, which zombies supposedly lack, simply does not exist, and in the sense in which it exists, zombies completely possess it. That is why, if desired, all people can be called zombies.

conclusions

The zombie argument is difficult to bear because it reveals disagreements about the basic questions that philosophers have about the method and boundaries of philosophy itself. He gets to the core of the controversy about the nature and abilities of conceptual analysis. Proponents of the zombie argument, such as Chalmers, think that conceptual analysis is a central part (if not the only part) of philosophy and therefore it (the zombie argument) will certainly help to do a lot of important philosophical work. However, others, such as Dennett, Paul Churchland, Willard Quine and others, have diametrically opposed views on the nature and scope of philosophical analysis. Therefore, discussion of the zombie argument remains vigorous in contemporary philosophy of mind.

Literature

1. Vasiliev V. V. “The Difficult Problem of Consciousness”. M.: "Progress-Tradition", 2009
2. Volkov D. B. D. Dennett's theory of consciousness: dissertation for competition degree candidate philosophical sciences: 09.00.03 / Volkov Dmitry Borisovich; [Place of protection: Mosk. state un-t im. M.V. Lomonosov].- M., 2008
3. Gartseva N. M. Naturalistic dualism of D. Chalmers: dissertation for the degree of candidate of philosophical sciences: 09.00.03 / Gartseva Natalya Mikhailovna; [Place of protection: Mosk. state un-t im. M.V. Lomonosov].- M., 2009
4. Chalmers D. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1996
5. Chalmers D. Consciousness and its Place in Nature, in the Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, S. Stich and F. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell, 2003
6. Chalmers D. Imagination, Indexicality, and Intensions, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 68, no. 1, 2004
7. Dennett D. Consciousness Explained, Boston, Little, Brown and Company. 1991
8. Dennett D. The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies, Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol. 2, no. 4, 1995. P. 322–326.
9. Dennett D. The Zombic Hunch: Extinction of an Intuition?, Royal Institute of Philosophy Millennial Lecture, 1999
10. Kripke S. Naming and Necessity, in Semantics of Natural Language, ed. by D. Davidson and G. Harman, Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel, 1972, pp. 253-355.
11. Thomas N.J.T. Zombie Killer, in S.R. Hameroff, A.W. Kaszniak, & A.C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II: The Second Tucson Discussions and Debates (pp. 171–177),