Specifics of social cognition and methods of social cognition. Social cognition Specifics of the object of cognition

Specifics social cognition

The problem of truth is one of the oldest in philosophy. Philosophy itself is a product of the intention to truth. Even the etymology of the term "philosophy" in a hidden form contains an interest in truth and the truth of things and knowledge. Without going into lengthy debate, we note that the category “truth” was initially general philosophical, relating to both being and knowledge. In either an idealistic or a materialistic form, the concept of truth was used both to things ("veritas rei") and to epistemological images ("veritas intellectus"). People at all times were interested not only in the truth of knowledge about objects, but also in the fact that these objects “corresponded to their concepts.” The absolutization of epistemological truth that developed in the philosophy of French and English materialists of the New Age was a reaction to the medieval theocentric interpretation of the ontological truth of being as the correspondence of the existence of things to their spiritual divine essence. Materialists disputed the presence of a spiritual divine essence in things, but in the polemics they also threw out the “child” with the dirty water - the possibility of a materialist interpretation of the ontological truth of things. As a methodological basis for our analysis, we take the recognition of the general philosophical nature of the categories “truth” and “truth”. They will be used both to characterize knowledge about social objects, and for the social objects, processes, phenomena themselves, i.e. both in epistemological and ontological meanings.

The question of the criteria of truth was and remains central to the doctrine of truth - “alethiology” (or “veritonomy”).

Today in philosophy there are views that the criterion of epistemological truth is subject practice, the practice of social transformations, scientific experiment, logical criteria, authority, faith, procedural techniques (verification and falsification), convention, evidence, clarity, etc.

At different times, as a criterion for the ontological truth of things, compliance with the “first brick” of the universe, the atomic basis, the Good, its objective idea, metaphysical root causes, divine plan, essence (interpreted in different ways), concept, material nature, etc. was proposed.

In any variant, one thing remained undoubted: truth (or veracity) was determined through correspondence: knowledge - with knowledge (logical truth) or with an object (correspondent epistemological truth), things - with their essence or divine plan, or with their objective concept (ontological truth ). We will also use this scheme in further research.

People's study of society and themselves goes back to the forms of primitive beliefs: fetishism, totemism, animatism, animism, magic. In mythology, the problem of the genesis of society is constantly present; anthropomorphic myths are devoted to various stories of the emergence of people and their communities. In philosophy, from its very first steps, interest in this issue arises. Viewing man as a "microcosm" is one of the greatest concepts about social life. Ancient philosophy already considered the problem of the truth of social existence and the truth of knowledge about it. In many concepts of antiquity, truth is simultaneously the highest good, the highest beauty, and the highest virtue. To be true therefore meant to be beautiful, good, virtuous. The highest good of man is happiness. In order for a person to be healthy physically and spiritually, for him to be happy, it is necessary, as the Pythagoreans believed, for example, that the music of the individual soul correspond to cosmic music. The true “microcosm” is the one that corresponds to the macrocosm, man to the universe. This is an example of determining the ontological truth of a person. For Augustine, the truth of a person is determined through compliance with divine goodness. The humanists of the Renaissance - cosmic harmony. For thinkers of the New Age - the natural state. The Enlightenment saw the ontological truth of man in accordance with the reasonable principles of the world order. Kant – in the presence of a higher moral law in man (the “categorical imperative”). V. Soloviev intended to find truth, and thereby the highest happiness of man, in God-manhood. Bolsheviks - in accordance with the bright ideals of communism. Fascists - in serving the national idea or belonging to a superior race.

The truth of social knowledge was determined either by its correspondence to reality, or by the dogmas of sacred scripture, or official ideology, or by the statements of authorities (leaders, rulers, general secretaries, Fuhrers, etc.), or by usefulness, or by reasoning (verifiability), or by the absence of alternatives (falsifiability) .

Centuries change, and methods, forms, ways of determining and describing the truth of social phenomena and knowledge change. But the idea found by ancient thinkers about the inextricable connection of social truths (ontological and epistemological) with the problem of human happiness and the development of social matter within the framework of the existence of the entire universe remains unchanged. You can define and describe the truth of human social existence in different ways, but at the heart of different approaches lies the hidden hope of finding the secret of absolute human happiness.

We will be interested in the problem of the criterion of truth of social matter at the turn of the third millennium, especially in relation to our domestic reality. Russian reality had and has its own peculiarity, which can be called in one word “Eurozealism”. We are on the border between Europe (West) and Asia (East). Therefore, we will specifically consider the problem of ontological and epistemological truth in social life and thinking in the West and in the East. We will try to concretize general ideas about the truth of social existence and cognition using the example of one special area of ​​social cognition - political science. If we extremely simplify the understanding of the subject of our research, then it is in the search for the ultimate criterion of truth in social matter in all aspects of its implementation.

Let's start by clarifying the mosaic of ways to define and describe the truth and authenticity of social existence and thinking in modern (post-industrial) society.

§ 1. Dynamics of social reality and features of its knowledge.

Any work requires defining the basic concepts with the help of which the content of the subject of research will be revealed. These basic concepts are usually included in the title. For us, such main categories will be “definition” (definition), “description” (description), “truth”, “social”, “cognition”, “criterion”. They require at least a brief preliminary clarification of their basic meanings.

Definition (definiti o - determination) is a logical operation that reveals the content of a concept. Our study is not devoted to formal logic and does not aim to study the procedures for defining (Df) concepts as special forms of thoughts. We are interested in the specifics of the relationship between definitions and descriptions in social cognition. Therefore, interest in definition and description in a formal-logical sense is of an instrumental nature.

Definendum (Dfd) – a concept whose content needs to be disclosed; definition (Dfn) – a concept with the help of which the content of the defined concept is revealed.

Definitions can be nominal and real, explicit and implicit. In the context that interests us, nominal definitions mean the introduction of a new term instead of describing an event or object. For example, “the term “social” means relating to society, society, or a group of people.” Real definitions reveal the characteristics of an event or object. For example, “society is a collection of people organized in a certain way.” The difference between these definitions is clear: in the first case, the meaning of the term is explained, in the second, the characteristics of the subject are revealed.

An explicit definition reveals the essential characteristics of an object through generic and specific differences or clarification of its origin (genesis). Implicit Df include definitions through the relation of an object to its opposite or by context, or ostensive (from the Latin word ostendo - “I show”).

Definitions should not be too broad or too narrow, should not be in circles (such definitions are called "tautologies"), they should be clear and should not be negative.

Description (from Latin descriptio - description) is to indicate the characteristics of an event or object as correctly and comprehensively as possible. In formal logic, many authors classify description (Dsp) as a technique that replaces definition along with characterization and comparison. This interpretation is not without foundation, but it is necessary to stipulate a number of circumstances, which will be given the closest attention in our work in the future.

We will use the term “true” as a characteristic of material and spiritual objects. The concept of “truth” for us is a general philosophical category, applied both to things (ontological truth) and knowledge (epistemological truth). Truth means the correspondence of the real to the ideal, the derivative to its basis: a thing - to its nature (essence), a concept - to an object.

“Social” in our text will mean involvement in some aspects of the lives of people or different groups of people.

And finally, we interpret “knowledge” as the spiritual mastery of the world through practical activity.

These are the most General characteristics concepts included in the title of the work, the specifics of whose role in social cognition we have to find out.

Before moving directly to the topic, let us consider the possibility of “purely scientific” social knowledge and practice.

The question of social cognition, capable of adequately explaining the processes occurring in society, and, most importantly, capable of predicting development trends, is extremely relevant today. Modern reality painfully demonstrates the consequences of illiterate reform of social life: the necessary laws are not adopted on time, those adopted are not implemented, decisions do not correspond to urgent needs, what is desired does not correspond to possibilities. The need for rigorous social knowledge is also determined by the extreme speed of changes taking place. Accelerating development makes it difficult to obtain competent expert assessments of situations and foresee their consequences.

In this regard, a huge array of ideological, theoretical-methodological, axeological and other questions arises, some of which are included in the title of the work and became the subject of this study. The problem of the truth of definitions and descriptions in social cognition is directly related to the problem of the possibility of scientific support of social life and the processes of reforming all its aspects.

Social philosophy.

Topic 14.

The process of social cognition, in contrast to the cognition of nature, is closely related to the cognition of human activity, setting certain goals for itself. The social qualities of people, their spiritual and psychological state (needs, interests, goals, ideals, hopes, doubts, fear, knowledge and ignorance, hatred and mercy, love and greed, deception, etc.) can have a significant impact on the functioning of social laws, their modification, form of manifestation, substantive aspect of analysis and explanation of certain events and facts.

If in natural science it is initially possible to consider objects by themselves, moving away from their connections and from the cognizing subject, then in social cognition from the very beginning we are dealing not with objects or their systems, but with a system of relations and feelings of subjects. Social existence is an organic unity of the material and spiritual, objective and subjective.

Social existence is an objective reality. Depending on what part of this reality is included in the immediate sphere of practical, and therefore cognitive, interaction between people, it becomes an object of social cognition. Due to this circumstance, the subject of social cognition has a complex systemic character.

The success of social cognition depends on many factors - firstly, on the degree of maturity of each of the constituent elements of the subject of cognition, no matter in what form it appears; secondly, from the degree of consistency of their unity - the subject is not the sum of elements, but a system; thirdly, on the degree of activity of the subject’s character in connection with the assessment of certain social phenomena that a person encounters, and the actions that occur in connection with this assessment.

Marx formulated one of the basic principles of social cognition: social cognition is not a passive contemplation of an object, but acts as an effective activity of the knowing subject. However, in the relationship of the subject to the object, the activity of the subject cannot be exaggerated, because in practice this leads to subjectivist-voluntaristic methods.

It should be noted that there is another extreme - objectivism, leading to the denial of the need for active activity of the masses and individuals

Due to the originality and uniqueness of historical events repeatability in social life it is much more difficult to identify than in nature. However, thanks to the repeated implementation of certain actions by previous generations, invariant, essential connections are revealed, while the subjective side is activated. Laws are formed that do not depend on the consciousness of subsequent generations, but on the contrary, they determine their activities. The laws of society manifest themselves in a unique way; the relationships between historical necessity and the conscious activity of people are always specific. This determines the characteristics of society as an object of cognition and the specificity of social cognition.

The diversity of social existence determines the diversity of types of knowledge about society. Among them, humanitarian, socio-economic and socio-philosophical knowledge stand out as the main ones.

The system-forming basis of all social knowledge is socio-philosophical knowledge. They arise on the basis of a generalization of the culture and practice of their era and are focused on developing the most general ideas about the natural and social existence of man, the laws of his practical, ethical and aesthetic relations to the world. They identify the basic forms of human activity, the basic laws of their functioning and development as social systems, and analyze their interrelation and subordination.

The foundation of social knowledge is social facts, which must be considered not just as a “world of things”, but, first of all, as a world of subjective essences and human values. Unlike natural phenomena, all social facts represent a unity of material and spiritual, subjective and objective. Interpretation of facts can be like true and false.

The most important method of theoretical research of social facts, its principle is historical approach. It requires not just a statement of events in chronological order, but also consideration of the process of their formation, connection with the generating conditions, i.e. identifying the essence, objective causes and connections, patterns of development.

The inclusion of interests in social cognition does not deny the existence of objective truth. But its comprehension is a complex dialectical process of the relationship between adequacy and illusoryness, absoluteness and relativity of social truth and politics.

Thus, the cognitive capabilities of society are formed as a result of its practical-cognitive activity and change with its development.

2. Society: foundations of philosophical analysis.

To live, people must recreate their lives in all its scope and content. It is joint activity By production of their lives brings people together. The objective world becomes a human world only if it is involved in human activity.

Objects and phenomena of the material and spiritual world serve as connecting means: tools, natural environment, knowledge, ideals, etc. These connections are generally called social relations; they form a stable system - society.

Society arises and exists, therefore, through the interaction of two factors: activity and social relations.

Social relations are diverse. There are economic, socio-political, legal, moral, aesthetic, etc.

Defining society as a whole, we can say that it is a dynamic, historically self-developing system of social relations between people” between man and the world. Society is “man himself in his social relations” 1.

There are many philosophical concepts society, but each of them is more or less limited, schematic in comparison with real life. And none of them can claim a monopoly on the truth.

A subject is a person, a social group or society as a whole, actively carrying out the process of cognition and transformation of reality. The subject of cognition is a complex system, including as its components groups of people, individuals engaged in various spheres of spiritual and material production. The process of cognition involves not only human interaction with the world, but also the exchange of activities between various spheres of both spiritual and material production.

What the cognitive-transformative activity of the subject is aimed at is called an object. The object of knowledge in the broad sense of the word is the whole world. Recognition of the objectivity of the world and its reflection in human consciousness is the most important condition scientific understanding human cognition. But an object exists only if there is a subject who purposefully, actively and creatively interacts with it.

Absolutization of the relative independence of the subject, its separation from the concept of “object” lead to a cognitive dead end, since the process of cognition in this case loses connections with the surrounding world, with reality. The concepts of “object and subject” make it possible to define cognition as a process, the nature of which depends simultaneously on both the characteristics of the object and the specifics of the subject. The content of cognition primarily depends on the nature of the object. For example, as we have already noted, a large stone on the bank of a river can become the object of attention (cognition) of different people: the artist will see in it the center of the composition for the landscape; road engineer - material for the future road surface; geologist – mineral; and the tired traveler is a place of rest. At the same time, despite subjective differences in the perception of a stone, depending on the life-professional experience and goals of each person, they will all see the stone as a stone. In addition, each of the subjects of cognition will interact with the object (stone) in different ways: the traveler will rather physically (try by touch: is it smooth, is it warm, etc.); geologist - rather theoretically (characterize the color and identify the structure of crystals, try to determine the specific gravity, etc.).

An essential feature of the interaction between subject and object is that it is based on a material, objective-practical relationship. Not only the object, but also the subject has objective existence. But a person is not an ordinary objective phenomenon. The interaction of a subject with the world is not limited to mechanical, physical, chemical and even biological laws. The specific patterns that determine the content of this interaction are social and psychological patterns. Social relations of people, mediating (“objectifying”) the interaction of subject and object, determine the specific historical meaning of this process. A change in the meaning and significance of knowledge is possible due to historical change psychological attitudes and the base of existing knowledge of a person who is in an epistemological relationship with reality.

“Theoretical” cognition differs from “physical” (practical) knowledge primarily in that in its process an object is perceived not only by sensations or their complex, but also sensations are correlated with concepts (signs, symbols) with which it is customary in society to evaluate these sensations in to all their known diversity and depth. But not only the subjects of cognition differ, making their own adjustments to its display in the process of interaction with an object, depending on the level of culture, social affiliation, immediate and long-term goals, etc. They differ very significantly in the quality of their influence on the process of cognition and objects.

Subject-object relations of the cognition process

All objects of reality accessible to thought (cognition) can be divided into three large groups:

1) belonging to the natural world,

2) belonging to the company,

3) related to the phenomenon of consciousness itself.

And nature, and society, and consciousness are qualitatively different objects of knowledge. The more complex the structural-functional interdependencies of a system, the more complexly it reacts to external influences, the more actively it reflects the interaction in its structural-functional characteristics. At the same time, a high level of reflection, as a rule, is associated with great independence (“self-organization”) of the perceiving system and the multivariance of its behavior.

Actually, natural processes proceed on the basis of natural laws, and, in essence, do not depend on humans. Nature was the root cause of consciousness, and natural objects, regardless of their level of complexity, are only to a minimal extent capable of exerting a reverse influence on the results of cognition, although they can be cognized with varying degrees of correspondence to their essence. Unlike nature, society, even becoming an object of knowledge, is also its subject at the same time, therefore the results of knowledge of society are much more often relative. Society is not just more active than natural objects, it is itself so capable of creativity that it develops faster than the environment and therefore requires other means (methods) of cognition than nature. (Of course, the distinction made is not absolute: by cognizing nature, a person can also cognize his own subjective attitude towards nature, but such cases are not yet discussed. For now, it should be remembered that a person is able to cognize not only an object, but also his reflection in the object).

A special reality, acting as an object of knowledge, is the spiritual life of society as a whole and of a person individually, that is, consciousness. In the case of posing the problem of studying their essence, the process of cognition manifests itself mainly in the form of self-knowledge (reflection). This is the most complex and least explored area of ​​cognition, since thinking in this case has to directly interact with creatively unpredictable and unstable processes, which also occur at a very high speed (the “speed of thought”). Not by chance scientific knowledge to date, has achieved the greatest success in understanding nature, and the least in the study of consciousness and related processes.

Consciousness as an object of knowledge appears primarily in symbolic form. Objects of nature and society, at least on a sensory level, can almost always be represented in both symbolic and figurative form: the word “cat” may be unknown to a person who does not speak Russian, while the image of a cat will be correctly understood not only by a foreigner, but, under certain conditions, even to animals. It is impossible to “depict” thinking, thought.

An image cannot be created without an object. The sign is relatively independent from the object. Due to the independence of the form of a sign from the shape of the object that this sign designates, the connections between the object and the sign are always more arbitrary and diverse than between the object and the image. Thinking, arbitrarily creating signs of different levels of abstraction, forming something new that cannot be “depicted” for others in a form accessible to co-understanding, requires special cognitive means for study.

It is relatively easy to achieve common understanding in the knowledge of natural objects: a thunderstorm, winter, and a stone are all understood relatively equally. Meanwhile, the more “subjective” (subjective in nature) the object of knowledge, the more discrepancies in its interpretation: the same lecture (book) is perceived by all listeners and/or readers with the greater the number of significant differences, the greater the degree of thought the author concerns subjective objects!

It is the subject-object side of the processes of cognition that extremely aggravates the problem of the truth of the results of cognition, forcing one to doubt the reliability of even obvious truths, which in practice do not always stand the test of time.

Human cognition is subject to general laws. However, the characteristics of the object of knowledge determine its specificity. We have our own character traits and in social cognition, which is inherent social philosophy. It should, of course, be borne in mind that in the strict sense of the word, all knowledge has a social, social character. However, in this context we are talking about social cognition itself, in the narrow sense of the word, when it is expressed in a system of knowledge about society at its various levels and in various aspects.

The specificity of this type of cognition lies primarily in the fact that the object here is the activity of the subjects of cognition themselves. That is, people themselves are both subjects of knowledge and real actors. In addition, the object of cognition also becomes the interaction between the object and the subject of cognition. In other words, in contrast to the natural sciences, technical and other sciences, in the very object of social cognition, its subject is initially present.

Further, society and man, on the one hand, act as part of nature. On the other hand, these are the creations of both society itself and man himself, the materialized results of their activities. In society there are both social and individual forces, both material and ideal, objective and subjective factors; in it both feelings, passions, and reason matter; both conscious and unconscious, rational and irrational aspects of human life. Within society itself, its various structures and elements strive to satisfy their own needs, interests and goals. This complexity of social life, its diversity and different qualities determine the complexity and difficulty of social cognition and its specificity in relation to other types of cognition.

It is necessary to note the socio-historical conditionality of social cognition, including the level of development of the material and spiritual life of society, its social structure and the interests prevailing in it.

The specific combination of all these factors and aspects of the specificity of social cognition determines the diversity of points of view and theories that explain the development and functioning of social life. At the same time, this specificity largely determines the nature and characteristics of various aspects of social cognition: ontological, epistemological and value (axiological).

1. The ontological (from the Greek on (ontos) - existing) side of social cognition concerns the explanation of the existence of society, the patterns and trends of its functioning and development. At the same time, it also affects such a subject of social life as a person, to the extent that he is included in the system of social relations. In the aspect under consideration, the above-mentioned complexity of social life, as well as its dynamism, combined with the personal element of social cognition, are the objective basis for the diversity of points of view on the issue of the essence of people’s social existence.

From the answer to this follows the answer about the possibility of social science itself. If objective laws of social life exist, then, therefore, social science is possible. If there are no such laws in society, then there can be no scientific knowledge about society, because science deals with laws. There is no clear answer to this question today.

2. The epistemological (from the Greek gnosis - knowledge) side of social cognition is associated with

features of this knowledge itself, primarily with the question of whether it is capable of formulating its own laws and categories and whether it has them at all. In other words, we are talking about whether social cognition can lay claim to truth and have the status of science? The answer to this question largely depends on the scientist’s position on the ontological problem of social cognition, that is, on whether the objective existence of society and the presence of objective laws in it are recognized. As in cognition in general, in social cognition ontology largely determines epistemology.

The epistemological side of social cognition also includes the solution of such problems:

• -how knowledge of social phenomena is carried out;
• -what are the possibilities of their knowledge and what are the boundaries of knowledge;
• - the role of social practice in social cognition and the significance in this of the personal experience of the knowing subject;
• -the role of various kinds of sociological research and social experiments in social cognition.

In addition to the ontological and epistemological aspects of social cognition, there is also value--axiological its side (from the Greek axios - valuable), which plays an important role in understanding its specifics, since any knowledge, and especially social, is associated with certain value patterns, predilections and interests of various cognitive subjects. The value approach manifests itself from the very beginning of cognition - from the choice of the object of research. This choice is made by a specific subject with his life and cognitive experience, individual goals and objectives. In addition, value prerequisites and priorities largely determine not only the choice of the object of cognition, but also its forms and methods, as well as the specifics of interpretation of the results of social cognition.

How the researcher sees an object, what he comprehends in it and how he evaluates it follows from the value prerequisites of cognition. The difference in value positions determines the difference in the results and conclusions of knowledge.

The ontological, epistemological and axiological aspects of social cognition are closely interconnected, forming an integral structure of people’s cognitive activity.

1. Specifics of social cognition

The world - social and natural - is diverse and is the object of both natural and social sciences. But its study, first of all, assumes that it is adequately reflected by the subjects, otherwise it would be impossible to reveal its immanent logic and patterns of development. Therefore, we can say that the basis of any knowledge is the recognition of objectivity outside world and its reflection by the subject, the person. However, social cognition has a number of features determined by the specifics of the object of study itself.

Firstly, such an object is society, which is also a subject. The physicist deals with nature, that is, with an object that is opposed to him and always, so to speak, “submissively submits.” A social scientist deals with the activities of people who act consciously and create material and spiritual values.

An experimental physicist can repeat his experiments until he is finally convinced of the correctness of his results. A social scientist is deprived of such an opportunity, since, unlike nature, society changes faster, people change, living conditions, psychological atmosphere, etc. A physicist can hope for the “sincerity” of nature; the revelation of its secrets depends mainly on himself. A social scientist cannot be completely sure that people answer his questions sincerely. And if he examines history, then the question becomes even more complicated, since the past cannot be returned in any way. This is why the study of society is much more difficult than the study of natural processes and phenomena.

Secondly, social relations are more complex than natural processes and phenomena. At the macro level, they consist of material, political, social and spiritual relationships that are so intertwined that only in the abstract can they be separated from each other. In fact, let's take the political sphere of social life. It includes a variety of elements - power, the state, political parties, political and social institutions, etc. But there is no state without an economy, without social life, without spiritual production. Studying this entire complex of issues is a delicate and extremely complex matter. But, in addition to the macro level, there is also a micro level of social life, where the connections and relationships of various elements of society are even more confusing and contradictory; their disclosure also presents many complexities and difficulties.

Third, social reflection is not only direct, but also indirect. Some phenomena are reflected directly, while others are reflected indirectly. Thus, political consciousness reflects political life directly, that is, it fixes its attention only on the political sphere of society and, so to speak, follows from it. As for such a form of social consciousness as philosophy, it indirectly reflects political life in the sense that politics is not an object of study for it, although in one way or another it affects certain aspects of it. Art and fiction are entirely concerned with the indirect reflection of social life.

Fourthly, social cognition can be carried out through a number of mediating links. This means that spiritual values ​​in the form of certain forms of knowledge about society are passed on from generation to generation, and each generation uses them when studying and clarifying certain aspects of society. The physical knowledge of, say, the 17th century gives little to a modern physicist, but no historian of antiquity can ignore the historical works of Herodotus and Thucydides. And not only historical works, but also philosophical works of Plato, Aristotle and other luminaries ancient Greek philosophy. We believe what ancient thinkers wrote about their era, about their state structure and economic life, about their moral principles etc. And on the basis of studying their works, we create our own idea of ​​times distant from us.

Fifthly, subjects of history do not live in isolation from each other. They create together and create material and spiritual benefits. They belong to certain groups, estates and classes. Therefore, they develop not only individual, but also estate, class, caste consciousness, etc., which also creates certain difficulties for the researcher. An individual may not be aware of his class (even the class is not always aware of them) interests. Therefore, a scientist needs to find such objective criteria that would allow him to clearly and clearly separate one class interests from others, one worldview from another.

At sixth, society changes and develops faster than nature, and our knowledge about it becomes outdated faster. Therefore, it is necessary to constantly update them and enrich them with new content. Otherwise, you can lag behind life and science and subsequently slide into dogmatism, which is extremely dangerous for science.

Seventh, social cognition is directly related to the practical activities of people who are interested in using the results of scientific research in life. A mathematician can study abstract formulas and theories that are not directly related to life. Perhaps his scientific research will receive practical implementation after some time, but that will happen later, for now he is dealing with mathematical abstractions. In the field of social cognition, the question is somewhat different. Sciences such as sociology, jurisprudence, and political science have direct practical significance. They serve society, offer various models and schemes for improving social and political institutions, legislative acts, increasing labor productivity, etc. Even such an abstract discipline as philosophy is associated with practice, but not in the sense that it helps, say, to grow watermelons or build factories, but in the fact that it shapes a person’s worldview, orients him in the complex network of social life, helps him overcome difficulties and find his place in society.

Social cognition is carried out at the empirical and theoretical levels. Empirical level is connected with immediate reality, with everyday life person. In the process of practical exploration of the world, he at the same time cognizes and studies it. A person at the empirical level understands well that it is necessary to take into account the laws of the objective world and build his life taking into account their actions. A peasant, for example, when selling his goods, understands perfectly well that he cannot sell them below their value, otherwise it will not be profitable for him to grow agricultural products. The empirical level of knowledge is everyday knowledge, without which a person cannot navigate the complex labyrinth of life. They accumulate gradually over the years, thanks to them a person becomes wiser, more careful and more responsible in approaching life’s problems.

Theoretical level is a generalization of empirical observations, although a theory can go beyond the boundaries of empirics. Empirics is a phenomenon, and theory is an essence. It is thanks to theoretical knowledge that discoveries are made in the field of natural and social processes. Theory is a powerful factor social progress. It penetrates into the essence of the phenomena being studied, reveals their driving springs and functioning mechanisms. Both levels are closely related to each other. A theory without empirical facts is transformed into something divorced from real life speculation. But empirics cannot do without theoretical generalizations, since it is on the basis of such generalizations that it is possible to take a huge step towards mastering the objective world.

Social cognition heterogeneous. There are philosophical, sociological, legal, political science, historical and other types of social knowledge. Philosophical knowledge– the most abstract form of social cognition. It deals with universal, objective, repeating, essential, necessary connections of reality. It is carried out in theoretical form with the help of categories (matter and consciousness, possibility and reality, essence and phenomenon, cause and effect, etc.) and a certain logical apparatus. Philosophical knowledge is not specific knowledge of a specific subject, and therefore it cannot be reduced to immediate reality, although, of course, it adequately reflects it.

Sociological knowledge has a specific character and directly concerns certain aspects of social life. It helps a person to deeply study social, political, spiritual and other processes at the micro level (collectives, groups, layers, etc.). It equips a person with the appropriate recipes for the recovery of society, makes diagnoses like medicine, and offers remedies for social ills.

As for legal knowledge, it is associated with the development of legal norms and principles, with their use in practical life. Having knowledge in the field of rights, a citizen is protected from the arbitrariness of authorities and bureaucrats.

Political science knowledge reflects the political life of society, theoretically formulates the patterns of political development of society, and studies the functioning of political institutions and institutions.

Methods of social cognition. Each social science has its own methods of knowledge. In sociology, for example, the collection and processing of data, surveys, observation, interviews, social experiments, questionnaires, etc. are important. Political scientists also have their own methods for studying the analysis of the political sphere of society. As for the philosophy of history, methods that have universal significance are used here, that is, methods that; applicable to all spheres of public life. In this regard, in my opinion, first of all it should be called dialectical method , which was used by ancient philosophers. Hegel wrote that “dialectics is... the driving soul of every scientific development of thought and represents the only principle that brings into the content of science immanent connection and necessity, in which in general lies a genuine, and not external, elevation above the finite.” Hegel discovered the laws of dialectics (the law of unity and struggle of opposites, the law of the transition of quantity into quality and vice versa, the law of the negation of negation). But Hegel was an idealist and represented dialectics as the self-development of a concept, and not of the objective world. Marx transforms Hegelian dialectics both in form and content and creates a materialist dialectic that studies the most general laws of the development of society, nature and thinking (they were listed above).

The dialectical method involves the study of natural and social reality in development and change. “The great fundamental idea is that the world does not consist of ready-made, complete objects, a is a collection processes, in which objects that seem unchangeable, as well as mental pictures of them and concepts taken by the head, are in continuous change, now appearing, now destroyed, and progressive development, with all the apparent randomness and despite the ebb of time, ultimately makes its way - this great fundamental thought has entered the general consciousness to such an extent since the time of Hegel that hardly anyone will dispute it in a general form.” But development from the point of view of dialectics is carried out through the “struggle” of opposites. The objective world consists of opposite sides, and their constant “struggle” ultimately leads to the emergence of something new. Over time, this new becomes old, and in its place something new appears again. As a result of the collision between the new and the old, another new appears again. This process is endless. Therefore, as Lenin wrote, one of the main features of dialectics is the bifurcation of the whole and the knowledge of its contradictory parts. In addition, the dialectic method proceeds from the fact that all phenomena and processes are interconnected, and therefore they should be studied and investigated taking into account these connections and relationships.

The dialectical method includes the principle of historicism. It is impossible to study this or that social phenomenon if you do not know how and why it arose, what stages it went through and what consequences it caused. In historical science, for example, without the principle of historicism it is impossible to obtain any scientific results. A historian who tries to analyze certain historical facts and events from the point of view of his contemporary era cannot be called an objective researcher. Every phenomenon and every event should be considered in the context of the era in which it occurred. Let's say, it is absurd to criticize the military and political activities of Napoleon the First from the point of view of our time. Without observing the principle of historicism, there is not only historical science, but also other social sciences.

Another important means of social cognition is historical And logical methods. These methods in philosophy have existed since the time of Aristotle. But they were developed comprehensively by Hegel and Marx. The logical research method involves a theoretical reproduction of the object under study. At the same time, this method “is essentially nothing more than the same historical method, only freed from historical form and from interfering accidents. Where history begins, the train of thought must begin with the same, and its further movement will be nothing more than a reflection of the historical process in an abstract and theoretically consistent form; a corrected reflection, but corrected in accordance with the laws given by the real one himself historical process, and each moment can be considered at the point of its development where the process reaches full maturity, its classical form.”

Of course, this does not imply complete identity of logical and historical methods of research. In the philosophy of history, for example, the logical method is used since the philosophy of history theoretically, that is, logically reproduces the historical process. For example, in the philosophy of history, the problems of civilization are considered independently of specific civilizations in certain countries, because the philosopher of history examines the essential features of all civilizations, the general reasons for their genesis and death. In contrast to the philosophy of history, historical science uses the historical method of research, since the task of the historian is to specifically reproduce the historical past, and in chronological order. It is impossible, say, when studying the history of Russia, to begin with the modern era. In historical science, civilization is examined specifically, all its specific forms and characteristics are studied.

An important method is also the method ascent from the abstract to the concrete. It was used by many researchers, but found its most complete embodiment in the works of Hegel and Marx. Marx used it brilliantly in Capital. Marx himself expressed its essence as follows: “It seems correct to begin with the real and concrete, with actual preconditions, therefore, for example in political economy, with the population, which is the basis and subject of the entire social process of production. However, upon closer examination this turns out to be erroneous. A population is an abstraction, if I leave aside, for example, the classes of which it is composed. These classes are again an empty phrase if I do not know the foundations on which they rest, for example, wage labor, capital, etc. These latter presuppose exchange, division of labor, prices, etc. Capital, for example, is nothing without wages labor, without value, money, price, etc. Thus, if I were to start with population, it would be a chaotic idea of ​​the whole, and only through closer definitions would I approach analytically more and more simple concepts: from the concrete, given in the idea, to more and more meager abstractions, until he came to the simplest definitions. From here I would have to go back and forth until I finally came to population again, but this time not as a chaotic idea of ​​a whole, but as a rich totality, with numerous definitions and relationships. The first path is the one that political economy historically followed during its emergence. Economists of the 17th century, for example, always begin with a living whole, with a population, a nation, a state, several states, etc., but they always end by isolating by analysis some defining abstract universal relations, such as the division of labor, money, value. etc. As soon as these individual moments were more or less fixed and abstracted, economic systems began to emerge that ascend from the simplest - like labor, division of labor, need, exchange value - to the state, international exchange and the world market. The last method is obviously scientifically correct. The method of ascent from the abstract to the concrete is only a way by which thinking assimilates the concrete and reproduces it as spiritual concrete.” Marx's analysis of bourgeois society begins with the most abstract concept - the commodity - and ends with the most concrete concept - the concept of class.

Also used in social cognition hermeneutic method. The greatest modern French philosopher P. Ricoeur defines hermeneutics as “the theory of operations of understanding in their relationship with the interpretation of texts; the word "hermeneutics" means nothing more than the consistent implementation of interpretation." The origins of hermeneutics go back to ancient times, when the need arose to interpret written texts, although interpretation concerns not only written sources, but also oral speech. Therefore, the founder of philosophical hermeneutics F. Schleiermacher was right when he wrote that the main thing in hermeneutics is language.

In social cognition we are, of course, talking about written sources expressed in one language form or another. The interpretation of certain texts requires compliance with at least the following minimum conditions: 1. It is necessary to know the language in which the text is written. It should always be remembered that a translation from this language to another is never similar to the original. “Any translation that takes its task seriously is clearer and more primitive than the original. Even if it is a masterful imitation of the original, some shades and halftones inevitably disappear from it.” 2. You need to be an expert in the field in which the author of a particular work worked. It is absurd, for example, to a non-specialist in the field ancient philosophy interpret the works of Plato. 3. You need to know the era of appearance of this or that interpreted written source. It is necessary to imagine why this text appeared, what its author wanted to say, what ideological positions he adhered to. 4. Do not interpret historical sources from the point of view of modernity, but consider them in the context of the era being studied. 5. Avoid an evaluative approach in every possible way and strive for the most objective interpretation of texts.

2. Historical knowledge is a type of social knowledge

Being a type of social knowledge, historical knowledge at the same time has its own specificity, expressed in the fact that the object under study belongs to the past, while it needs to be “translated” into a system of modern concepts and linguistic means. But nevertheless, it does not at all follow from this that we need to abandon the study of the historical past. Modern means of cognition make it possible to reconstruct historical reality, create its theoretical picture and enable people to have a correct idea of ​​it.

As already noted, any knowledge presupposes, first of all, the recognition of the objective world and the reflection of the first in the human head. However, reflection in historical knowledge has a slightly different character than reflection of the present, for the present is present, while the past is absent. True, the absence of the past does not mean that it is “reduced” to zero. The past has been preserved in the form of material and spiritual values ​​inherited by subsequent generations. As Marx and Engels wrote, “history is nothing more than a successive succession of individual generations, each of which uses materials, capital, productive forces transferred to it by all previous generations; Because of this, this generation, on the one hand, continues the inherited activity under completely changed conditions, and on the other hand, modifies the old conditions through completely changed activity.” As a result, a single historical process is created, and inherited material and spiritual values ​​testify to the existence of certain features of the era, the way of life, relationships between people, etc. Thus, thanks to architectural monuments, we can judge the achievements of the ancient Greeks in the field of urban planning. The political works of Plato, Aristotle and other luminaries of ancient philosophy give us an idea of ​​the class and state structure of Greece during the era of slavery. Thus, one cannot doubt the possibility of knowing the historical past.

But at present, this kind of doubt is increasingly heard from many researchers. Postmodernists especially stand out in this regard. They deny the objective nature of the historical past, presenting it as an artificial construction with the help of language. “...The postmodern paradigm, which first of all captured the dominant position in modern literary criticism, spreading its influence to all spheres of humanities, called into question the “sacred cows” of historiography: 1) the very concept of historical reality, and with it the historian’s own identity , his professional sovereignty (having erased the seemingly inviolable line between history and literature); 2) criteria for the reliability of the source (blurring the boundary between fact and fiction) and, finally, 3) faith in the possibilities of historical knowledge and the desire for objective truth...” These "sacred cows" are nothing more than the fundamental principles of historical science.

Postmodernists understand the difficulties of social, including historical, knowledge, associated primarily with the object of knowledge itself, that is, with society, which is a product of the interaction of people endowed with consciousness and acting consciously. In socio-historical knowledge, the worldview positions of the researcher who studies the activities of people who have their own interests, goals and intentions are most clearly manifested. Willy-nilly, social scientists, especially historians, bring their likes and dislikes into the research, which to some extent distorts the real social picture. But you can’t do everything on this basis humanitarian sciences turn into discourse, into linguistic schemes that have nothing to do with social reality. “The historian’s text,” postmodernists argue, “is a narrative discourse, a narrative, subject to the same rules of rhetoric that are found in fiction... But if a writer or poet freely plays with meanings, resorts to artistic collages, allows himself to arbitrarily bring together and displace different eras and texts, then the historian works with historical source, and his constructions cannot in any way completely abstract from some given fact, which was not invented by him, but obliges him to offer as accurate and deep an interpretation as possible.” Postmodernists destroy the above-mentioned fundamental principles of historical science, without which historical knowledge is unthinkable. But we must be optimistic and hope that the science of history, as before, will occupy an important place in social science and help people study their own history, draw appropriate conclusions and generalizations from it.

Where does historical knowledge begin? What determines its relevance and what benefits does it bring? Let's start by answering the second question and first of all turn to Nietzsche's work “On the benefits and harms of history for life.” The German philosopher writes that man has history because he has memory, unlike animals. He remembers what happened yesterday, the day before yesterday, while the animal immediately forgets everything. The ability to forget is a non-historical feeling, and memory is a historical one. And it’s good that a person forgets a lot in his life, otherwise he simply would not be able to live. All activity requires oblivion, and “a person who would wish to experience everything only historically would be like one who is forced to abstain from sleep, or like an animal condemned to live only by chewing the same cud over and over again.” Thus, one can live quite calmly without memories, but it is absolutely unthinkable to live without the possibility of oblivion.

According to Nietzsche, there are certain boundaries beyond which the past must be forgotten, otherwise it, as the thinker puts it, can become the gravedigger of the present. He suggests not forgetting everything, but not remembering everything either: “...Historical and non-historical are equally necessary for the health of an individual, people and culture” . To a certain extent, the non-historical is more important for the people than the historical, for it is a kind of foundation for building a truly human society, although, on the other hand, only through the use of the experience of the past does a person become a person.

Nietzsche always insists that the boundaries of the historical and the non-historical must always be taken into account. Unhistorical attitude to life, writes German philosopher, allows you to carry out such events that play an extremely important role in the life of human society. He calls historical people those who strive for the future and hope for better life. “These historical people believe that the meaning of existence will be increasingly revealed over the course of process existence, they look back only in order, by studying the previous stages of the process, to understand its present and learn to more energetically desire the future; They do not know at all how unhistorically they think and act, despite all their historicism, and to what extent their studies of history are a service not to pure knowledge, but to life.”

Nietzsche introduces the concept of supra-historical people, for whom there is no process, but also no absolute oblivion. For them, the world and every single moment seem complete and stopped; they never think about what the meaning of historical teaching is - either in happiness, or in virtue, or in repentance. From their point of view, the past and the present are one and the same, although there is subtle diversity. Nietzsche himself supports historical people and believes that history should be studied. And since it is directly related to life, it cannot be, like, say, mathematics, a pure science. “History belongs to the living in three respects: as an active and striving being, as a protecting and honoring being, and, finally, as a suffering being in need of liberation. This trinity of relations corresponds to the trinity of the kinds of history, since it is possible to distinguish monumental, antique and critical kind of history."

The essence monumental history, Nietzsche expresses this: “That great moments in the struggle of units form one chain, that these moments, united into one whole, mark the rise of humanity to the heights of development in the course of millennia, that for me such a long-past moment is preserved in all its liveliness, brightness and greatness - this is precisely where the main idea of ​​that faith in humanity, which gives rise to the demand, finds its expression monumental stories" . Nietzsche means drawing certain lessons from the past. He who is constantly fighting for his ideals and principles needs teachers, whom he finds not among his contemporaries, but in history, rich in great historical events and personalities. The German philosopher calls such a person an active person, fighting, if not for his own happiness, then for the happiness of an entire people or all of humanity. What awaits such a person is not a reward, but perhaps glory and a place in history, where he will also be a teacher for future generations.

Nietzsche writes that there is a struggle against the monumental, because people want to live in the present, and not fight for the future and sacrifice themselves in the name of illusory happiness in this future. But no less, active people are appearing again who refer to the great exploits of past generations and call to follow their example. Great figures die, but their glory remains, which Nietzsche values ​​very highly. He believes that the monumental view is very useful for modern man, for “he learns to understand that the great thing that once existed existed, in any case, at least once.” Maybe, and that therefore it may become possible again some day; he makes his way with great courage, because now doubts about the feasibility of his desires, which take possession of him in moments of weakness, are deprived of all basis.” Nevertheless, Nietzsche expresses doubt that it is possible to use monumental history and draw certain lessons from it. The fact is that history does not repeat itself, and you cannot return past events and replay them. And it is no coincidence that the monumental view of history is forced to coarse it, blur the differences and pay the main attention to the general.

Without denying the overall significance of the monumental view of history, Nietzsche at the same time warns against its absolutization. He writes that “monumental history misleads with the help of analogies: through seductive parallels it inspires the courageous to feats of desperate courage, and turns animation into fanaticism; when this kind of history gets into the heads of capable egoists and dreamy villains, then as a result kingdoms are destroyed, rulers are killed, wars and revolutions arise, and the number of historical effects in themselves, that is, effects without sufficient causes, increases again. Until now we have been talking about the troubles that monumental history can cause among powerful and active natures, it makes no difference whether these latter are good or evil; but one can imagine what its influence will be if powerless and inactive natures take possession of it and try to use it.”

Antique history. It “belongs to the one who guards and honors the past, who with fidelity and love turns his gaze to where he came from, where he became what he is; With this reverent attitude, he seems to repay the debt of gratitude for the very fact of his existence.” The antique dealer indulges in sweet memories of the past, strives to preserve the entire past intact for future generations. He absolutizes the past and lives by it, and not by the present, he idealizes it so much that he doesn’t want to redo anything, doesn’t want to change anything, and is very upset when such changes are made. Nietzsche emphasizes that if antiquarian life is not inspired by modernity, then it will ultimately degenerate. She is capable of preserving the old, but not giving birth to new life, and therefore always resists the new, does not want it and hates it. In general, Nietzsche is critical of this kind of history, although he does not deny its necessity and even benefits.

Critical history. Its essence: “A person must possess and from time to time use the power to break and destroy the past in order to be able to live on; He achieves this goal by bringing the past to the court of history, subjecting the latter to the most thorough interrogation and, finally, passing judgment on it; but every past is worthy of being condemned - for such are all human affairs: human strength and human weakness have always been powerfully reflected in them.” Criticism of the past does not mean that justice wins. Life simply requires a critical attitude towards history, otherwise it itself will suffocate. You need to build a new life, and not constantly look back, you need to forget what happened and start from what is. And the past must be mercilessly criticized when it is clear how much injustice, cruelty and lies it contained. Nietzsche warns against such an attitude towards the past. Ruthless and unfair criticism of the past, the German philosopher emphasizes, “is a very dangerous operation, dangerous precisely for life itself, and those people or eras that serve life in this way, that is, by bringing the past to judgment and destroying it, are dangerous and are themselves subject to dangers people and eras. For since we must certainly be products of previous generations, we are at the same time products of their delusions, passions and mistakes, and even crimes, and it is impossible to completely break away from this chain.” And no matter how we try to get rid of the mistakes of the past, we will not succeed, because we ourselves came from there.

Nietzsche’s general conclusion about the three kinds of history: “...every person and every people needs, depending on its goals, strengths and needs, a certain acquaintance with the past, in the form of either monumental, or antiquarian, or critical history, but it needs it not as a gathering of pure thinkers limiting themselves to the contemplation of life alone, and not even as individual units who, in their thirst for knowledge, can be satisfied only by knowledge and for whom the expansion of this latter is an end in itself, but always in view of life, and therefore always under the authority and supreme guidance this life."

One cannot but agree with this conclusion of the German thinker. Indeed, the study of the historical past is not arbitrary, but is determined primarily by the needs of society. People always turn to the past in order to make it easier to study the present, to retain in memory everything that is valuable and positive, and at the same time to learn certain lessons for the future. Of course, it does not follow from this that the past can fully explain the present, for, despite the inextricable connection between them, the present exists, so to speak, lives, but in different circumstances.

The historian does not simply satisfy his curiosity. He is obliged to show how the object of research (this or that historical event or historical fact) influences the course of all world history, what is the place of this event among others.

Of course, he must show a personal interest in the development of his chosen topic, since without this there can be no talk of any research. But, I repeat, the relevance of historical knowledge is dictated primarily by the practical needs of the present. In order to know the present better, it is necessary to study the past, which Kant wrote about long before Nietzsche: “Knowledge of natural things - what they are there is now- always makes you want to also know what they were before, as well as through what series of changes they went through in order to achieve their present state in each given place.”

Analysis of the past allows us to explore the patterns of the present and outline the paths for the development of the future. 13without this it is unthinkable scientific explanation historical process. At the same time, we must not forget that the logic of historical science itself requires constant reference to certain historical topics. Every science is creative in nature, that is, it develops and is enriched with new theoretical principles. The same applies to historical science. At each stage of her development, she faces new problems that she must solve. There is an objective connection between the practical needs of society and the logic of the development of science itself, and ultimately the degree of development of science depends on the level of development of society, on its culture and intellectual capabilities.

Answering the first question, it should be noted that historical knowledge includes three stages. First This stage is associated with the collection of material on the issue of interest to the researcher. The more sources, the more reason to hope that we will receive some new knowledge about the historical past. The source can be described as unity objective and subjective. By objective we mean the existence of a source independent of man, and it does not matter whether we are able to decipher it or not. It contains objective (but not necessarily truthful) information about historical events or phenomena. By subjective we mean that the source is a product, the result of labor, which combines the feelings and emotions of its creator. Based on the source, you can determine the style of its author, the degree of talent or the level of understanding of the events described. The source can be anything that relates to the topic and contains any information about the object under study (chronicles, military orders, historical, philosophical, fiction, etc. literature, data from archeology, ethnography, etc., newsreels, video recordings, etc.).

Second The stage of historical knowledge is associated with the selection and classification of sources. It is extremely important to classify them correctly and select the most interesting and meaningful ones. Here, undoubtedly, the scientist himself plays a significant role. It is easy for an erudite researcher to determine which sources contain true information. Some sources, as M. Blok puts it, are simply false. Their authors deliberately mislead not only their contemporaries, but also future generations. Therefore, much depends on the qualifications, professionalism and erudition of the historian - in a word, on the general level of his culture. It is he who sorts the material and selects the most valuable, from his point of view, sources.

At first glance, the selection and classification of sources is purely arbitrary. But this is a misconception. This procedure is carried out by the researcher, but he lives in society, and, therefore, his views are formed under the influence of certain social conditions, and therefore he classifies sources depending on his ideological and social positions. He can absolutize the significance of some sources and belittle others.

On third At the stage of historical knowledge, the researcher sums up the results and makes theoretical generalizations of the material. First, he reconstructs the past, creates its theoretical model with the help of a logical apparatus and appropriate tools of cognition. Ultimately, he gains some new knowledge about the historical past, about how people lived and acted, how they mastered the natural world around them, and how they increased the social wealth of civilization.

3. Historical facts and their research

One of the central tasks of historical knowledge is to establish the authenticity historical facts and events, the discovery of new, hitherto unknown facts. But what is a fact? Answering this question is not as easy as it might seem at first glance. In everyday language, we often use the term “fact”, but do not think about its content. Meanwhile, in science there are often heated discussions regarding this term.

It can be said that the concept of fact is used in at least two senses. In the first sense, it is used to designate the historical facts, events and phenomena themselves. In this sense, the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945 is undoubtedly a historical fact, since it exists objectively, that is, independently of us. In the second sense, the concept of fact is used to designate sources reflecting historical facts. Thus, Thucydides’ work “The Peloponnesian War” is a fact reflecting this war, since it describes the military actions of Sparta and Athens.

Thus, one must strictly distinguish between the facts objective reality and facts that reflect this reality. The former exist objectively, the latter are the product of our activity, since we compile various kinds of statistical data, information, write historical and philosophical works, etc. All this represents a cognitive image that reflects the facts of historical reality. Of course, the reflection is approximate, because historical facts and events are so complex and multifaceted that it is impossible to give them an exhaustive description.

In the structure of historical facts, simple and complex facts can be distinguished. Simple facts include those facts that do not contain other facts or subfacts in themselves. For example, the fact of Napoleon's death on May 5, 1821 is a simple fact, since we are simply talking about stating the death of the former French emperor. Complex facts are those that contain many other facts within themselves. So, the war of 1941–1945 is such a complex fact.

Why is it necessary to study historical facts? Why do we need to know what happened in the ancient world, why they killed Julius Caesar? We study history not for the sake of pure curiosity, but in order to find out the patterns of its development. Analysis of historical facts and events allows us to present the whole world history as a single process and reveal the driving causes of this process. And when we discover this or that historical fact, we thereby establish a certain natural connection in the forward movement of humanity. Here Julius Caesar, in his “Notes” about the Gallic War, told us about many facts that are important for the study of the history of modern Europe. After all, a fact does not exist in isolation, it is connected with other facts that make up a single chain social development. And our task is to, by examining this or that historical fact, show its place among other facts, its role and functions.

Of course, we should not forget that the study of historical facts presents certain difficulties arising from the specifics of the object of study itself. Firstly, when studying facts and establishing their authenticity, the sources we need may be missing, especially if we are studying the distant historical past. Secondly, many sources may contain incorrect information about certain historical facts. That is why a thorough analysis of relevant sources is required: selection, comparison, comparison, etc. In addition, it is very important to remember that the problem under study is associated not with one fact, but with their totality, and therefore it is necessary to take into account many other facts - economic , social, political, etc. It is an integrated approach that makes it possible to create a correct idea of ​​a particular social phenomenon.

But the totality of facts is also not something isolated from other facts and phenomena. History is not just a “novel of facts” (Helvetius), but an objective process in which facts are interconnected and interdependent. When studying them, three aspects can be distinguished: ontological, epistemological And axiological.

Ontological aspect presupposes the recognition of a historical fact as an element of objective reality associated with its other elements. The fact of history, as already noted, is not isolated from other facts, and if we want to study the existence of the historical process, we must connect all the facts with each other and reveal their immanent logic. And this can be achieved only on the condition that the existence of facts is considered in their unity with other facts, its place in the historical process and its influence on the further course of society are revealed.

A fact is one or another specific event that requires its explanation and comprehension in connection with the broad social context of the era. Anyone who, for example, studies the period of Caesar's reign will inevitably become interested in the reasons for his rise to power and, in this regard, will pay attention to such a fact as Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon. This is how Plutarch describes this event: “When he (Caesar. - I.G.) approached a river called Rubicon, which separates pre-Alpine Gaul from Italy proper, he was overcome by deep thought at the thought of the coming moment, and he hesitated before the greatness of his daring. Having stopped the cart, he again for a long time silently pondering his plan from all sides, making one decision or another. He then shared his doubts with his friends present, among whom was Asinius Pollio; he understood the beginning of what disasters would be for all people crossing this river and how posterity would evaluate this step. Finally, as if casting aside thoughts and boldly rushing towards the future, he uttered the words usual for people entering into a courageous undertaking, the outcome of which is doubtful: “Let the die be cast!” - and moved towards the passage."

If we take this historical fact in isolation from other facts (the social, economic and political situation of Rome), then we will not be able to reveal its content. After all, many people crossed the Rubicon before Caesar, including Roman statesmen, but Caesar’s crossing meant the beginning of the civil war in Italy, which led to the collapse of the republican system and the establishment of the principate. Caesar became the sole ruler of the Roman state. By the way, many historians highly valued Caesar as a statesman who contributed to the further development of Rome. Thus, the greatest German historian of the last century, T. Mommsen, wrote that “Caesar was a born statesman. He began his activities in a party that fought against the existing government, and therefore for a long time he crept up on his goal, then played a prominent role in Rome, then entered the military field and took a place among the greatest commanders - not only because he won brilliant victories. victory, but also because he was one of the first to be able to achieve success not by a huge superiority of strength, but by unusually intense activity, when it was necessary, by skillful concentration of all his forces and unprecedented speed of movements.”

Epistemological The aspect of considering facts involves analyzing them from the point of view of cognitive function. If the ontological aspect does not directly take into account the subjective moments in the historical process (although, of course, it is absolutely clear that the historical process does not exist without the activity of people), then the epistemological analysis of the fact takes these moments into account. When reconstructing the historical past, one cannot abstract from the actions of the subjects of history, from their general cultural level and ability to create their own history. The intensity of the fact is determined by the activity of people, their ability to quickly change the course of the historical process, perform revolutionary actions and accelerate social development.

The study of facts in the epistemological aspect helps to better understand a particular historical event, determine the place of the subjective factor in society, find out the psychological mood of people, their experiences, and emotional state. This aspect also involves taking into account all possible situations for a complete reproduction of the past and thus requires a differentiated approach. For example, when studying the Battle of Waterloo, we need to take into account various situations associated with it, including the morale of the troops, Napoleon's health, etc. This will help us to better understand the reasons for the defeat of the French troops.

Axiological aspect, as is clear from the formulation of this term, is associated with the assessment of historical facts and events.

Of all the aspects, this is perhaps the most difficult and the most complex, because one must objectively evaluate historical facts, regardless of one’s own likes and dislikes. Weber, for example, reflecting on these problems, proposed strictly scientifically, without political bias, to evaluate any socio-political and other phenomena. He proceeded from the fact that “the establishment of facts, the establishment of a mathematical or logical state of affairs or the internal structure of cultural property, on the one hand, and on the other, an answer to questions about the value of culture and its individual formations and, accordingly, an answer to the question of how to acting within the framework of a cultural community and political alliances are two completely different things.” Therefore, a scientist must strictly scientifically and without any assessments present the facts and only the facts. And “where a man of science comes with his own value judgments, there is no longer room for a full understanding of the facts.”

One cannot but agree with Weber that the opportunistic scientist, based on opportunistic considerations, each time adapting to the political situation, interprets historical facts and events in his own way. It is absolutely clear that his interpretation of facts and the historical process in general is devoid of any objectivity and has nothing to do with scientific research. If, for example, yesterday one assessment of certain historical events was given, and today another, then such an approach has nothing in common with science, which must tell the truth and nothing but the truth.

But at the same time, it should be noted that every researcher has certain ideological positions. He lives in society, is surrounded by various social strata, classes, receives an appropriate education, in which the value approach plays a vital role, because any state understands perfectly well that the younger generation must be raised in a certain spirit, that it must value the wealth created by its predecessors. In addition, in society, due to its class differentiation, as well as the fact that the source of its development is internal contradictions, there are different approaches to certain historical events. And although the researcher must be objective and impartial, nevertheless he is still a man and a citizen, and he is not at all indifferent to what happens in the society in which he lives. He sympathizes with some, despises others, and tries not to notice others. This is how a person is designed, and nothing can be done about it. He has emotions and feelings that cannot but affect his scientific activities. In short, he cannot help but be biased, that is, he cannot help but evaluate subjectively (not to be confused with subjectivism) certain historical facts and events.

The main task of science is to obtain results that should adequately reflect the essence of the object under study. In other words, they must be true. The painstaking work of a historian is also devoted to establishing the truth of historical facts and events. On the basis of his works, people form a real idea of ​​their past, which helps them in practical activities, in mastering the values ​​inherited from past generations.

Obtaining true knowledge is an extremely difficult process, but it is even more difficult to do this in historical science. It is not easy, for example, for those who explore the ancient world. On the one hand, there are not always enough relevant sources, and the deciphering of many of them sometimes faces insurmountable obstacles, although the modern researcher has at his disposal more powerful means of knowledge than his colleagues of past times. It is not easy for a specialist of modern, contemporary history, since the facts being studied have not yet gone into “pure” history, so to speak, and influence the course of current processes. Under these conditions, he has to adapt and often sacrifice the truth in the name of the situation. Nevertheless, we must search for truths, because science requires no less courage and bravery than on the battlefield.

It is not surprising, therefore, that a scientist can be mistaken, although, as Hegel wrote, delusion is characteristic of any person. And error is the opposite of truth. However, this is such an opposite that does not completely deny one side or another of the truth. In other words, the contradiction between error and truth is dialectical, not formal. And therefore, delusion is not something that needs to be discarded out of hand. After all, it is associated with finding the truth, with obtaining genuine knowledge.

Misconception is a step on the path to finding truth. It can, under certain conditions, stimulate scientific activity and encourage new searches. But it can also slow down scientific research and ultimately force a scientist to quit science. One should not confuse a delusion with an erroneous theoretical position, although they are close in content. A delusion is something that has a rational grain. Moreover, a misconception can unexpectedly lead to new scientific discoveries. It goes without saying that delusion is based on certain scientific principles and means of knowing the truth. And, as Hegel noted, from “error is born truth, and in this lies reconciliation with error and with finitude. Otherness, or error as sublated, is itself a necessary moment of truth, which exists only when it makes itself its own result.”

In classical philosophical traditions, truth is defined as an adequate reflection of objective reality. I think that there is no reason to refuse such a characterization of truth. There is no reason to abandon the concept of objective truth, which includes two aspects - absolute and relative truth. The presence of these two forms of truth is associated with the specifics of the process of cognition of the world. Knowledge is endless, and in the course of our research we gain knowledge that more or less adequately reflects historical reality. This kind of truth is usually called absolute. Thus, no one doubts that Alexander the Great was the founder of the Greek Empire. This, so to speak, is an absolute truth, which should be distinguished from the “banal” truth, which contains only some information that is not subject to any revision either in the present or in the future. Let's say a person cannot live without food. This is a banal truth, it is absolute, but there are no moments of relativity in it. Absolute truth contains such moments. Relative truths do not fully reflect objective reality.

Both forms of truth are in indissoluble unity. Only in one case does absolute truth prevail, and in the other – relative truth. Let's take the same example: Alexander the Great was the founder of the Greek Empire. This is an absolute truth, but at the same time it is relative in the sense that the statement that Alexander founded an empire does not reveal the complex processes that took place during the formation of this huge empire. Analysis of these processes shows that many of them require further research and more fundamental consideration. Discussions about the dialectic of absolute and relative truth fully apply to historical knowledge. When establishing the truth of historical facts, we receive some elements of absolute truth, but the process of knowledge does not end there, and in the course of our further searches, new knowledge is added to these truths.

Truth scientific knowledge and theories must be confirmed by some indicators, otherwise they will not be recognized as scientific results. But finding the criterion of truth is a difficult and very complex matter. The search for such a criterion led to various concepts in science and philosophy. Some declared the criterion of truth to be the mutual agreement of scientists (conventionalism), that is, to consider as a criterion of truth what everyone agrees with, others declared utility to be a criterion of truth, others - the activity of the researcher himself, etc.

Marx put forward practice as the main criterion. Already in his “Theses on Feuerbach” he wrote: “The question of whether human thinking has objective truth is not a theoretical question at all, but a practical question. In practice, a person must prove the truth, that is, the reality and power, the this-worldliness of his thinking. The dispute about the validity or invalidity of thinking isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question.” It is practical activity that proves the truth or falsity of our knowledge.

The concept of practice cannot be limited only to material production, material activity, although this is the main thing, but other types of activity should be included in it - political, state, spiritual, etc. So, for example, the relative identity of the content of sources about the same object is essentially a practical verification of the truth of the results obtained.

Practice is not only criterion truth, but also the basis knowledge. Only in the process of practical activity to transform the world, to create material and spiritual values, does a person learn the natural and social reality around him. I think Hegel said that anyone who wants to learn to swim must jump into the water. No theoretical instructions will make a young man a football player until he plays football, and the criterion of his ability to play is practice. Hegel wrote that “the position of an unprejudiced person is simple and consists in the fact that he adheres with confidence and conviction to publicly recognized truth and builds on this solid foundation his course of action and a reliable position in life.”

As for historical knowledge, in this case practice serves as a criterion of truth, although there are certain difficulties associated with the subject of research. But here it is necessary to point out one feature of the criterion of truth in historical knowledge: the fact is that the selection of sources, their comparison and juxtaposition, their classification and scrupulous analysis - in short, scientific research, using all methods and means of knowing the world, should be considered as practical activities confirming our theoretical conclusions. Further, we must proceed from the fact that various sources, documents, archaeological data, works of literature and art, works on philosophy and history more or less fully reflect the historical reality that we are studying. No matter how skeptical we may be about the historical works of Thucydides, his History of the Peloponnesian War is a good source for studying this war. Is it possible to neglect Aristotle's Politics when studying the government structure of Ancient Greece?

We should not forget that the historical process is unified and continuous, everything in it is interconnected. There is no present without the past, just as there is no future without the present. True story inextricably linked with the past, which influences it. For example, the consequences of the conquests carried out by the Roman Empire did not disappear without a trace. They are still inextricably present in the life of many countries that once found themselves within the Roman Empire. A researcher of the history of Rome can easily confirm his theoretical conclusions with today's practice. Thus, it is not difficult to prove that the high level of civilization in Western countries is largely explained by the fact that Western Europe inherited the achievements of the Greco-Roman civilization, which through the mouth of Protagoras put forward the famous aphorism: “Man is the measure of all things.” And without this aphorism, the theory of natural law would not have appeared, according to which all people have the same rights to own things. Without Roman law, there would be no universal law in Western countries to which all citizens of the state are obliged to obey. Without strong Chinese traditions, there would not have been a smooth, evolutionary transition to market relations in China.

Practice as a criterion of truth must be viewed dialectically. On the one hand, this criterion is absolute, and on the other hand, it is relative. The criterion of practice is absolute in the sense that there is simply no other criterion of an objective nature. After all, conventionalism, utility, etc. are clearly subjective in nature. Some may agree and others may not. Some may find truth useful, while others may not. The criterion must be objective and not depend on anyone. Practice meets these requirements. On the other hand, the practice itself, which covers the activities of people to create material and spiritual values, is changing. Therefore, its criterion is relative, and if we do not want to turn theoretical knowledge into dogma, we must change it depending on changing circumstances, and not cling to it.

Currently, many social scientists ignore the dialectical method of cognition. But so much the worse for them: because someone ignores, say, the law of value, this law does not disappear. One may not recognize dialectics as a doctrine of development, but this will not stop the development and change of the objective world.

As Vader B. and Hapgood D. write, Napoleon was poisoned with arsenic for a long time. The consequences of this were particularly severe during the Battle of Waterloo. “But then a series of mistakes begins. Exhausted, with symptoms of arsenic poisoning, Napoleon falls asleep for an hour, waiting until the mud dries and Grouchy comes up” // Vendor B. Brilliant Napoleon. Vader B., Hapgood D. Who killed Napoleon? M., 1992. P. 127.