Kant's interpretation of space and time as pure forms of contemplation. Medova A.A

Space and time. Kant produced two no less subjectivist “interpretations” of views
to space and time.

The essence of the first, “metaphysical » their interpretation is contained in the provisions that
« space is a necessary a priori idea underlying all external intuitions", A " time is a necessary representation underlying all intuitions».

The essence of the second, “transcendental » their interpretation consists,

Firstly, in clarifying that space it is “only the form of all phenomena of external senses", A time is “the direct condition of internal phenomena (of our soul) and thereby indirectly also the condition of external phenomena.”

Secondly, - and this is the main thing - that space and time are not objective definitions of things and have no reality outside the “subjective conditions of contemplation" Kant proclaims theses about "transcendental ideality" of space and time, asserting "that space there is nothing as soon as we reject the conditions of possibility of all experience and accept it as something underlying things
in yourself,” and that time, “if we abstract from the subjective conditions of sensory intuition, it means absolutely nothing and cannot be counted among objects in themselves...”

Everything contemplated in space and time does not represent “things-in-themselves,” being as such an unmistakable indicator of their lack of representation in consciousness. And it is precisely from these theses that the agnostic conclusion follows that since people contemplate everything in space and time, and since sensory contemplation is a necessary basis for intellectual knowledge, the human mind is fundamentally deprived of the ability to cognize “things-in-themselves.”

According to Kant, space and time are “empirically real” in the only sense that they have significance “for all objects that can ever be given to our senses...” (39. 3. 139), i.e. for phenomena. In other words, all things as phenomena (and only as phenomena!), as objects of sensory contemplation, necessarily exist in space and time. Kant called this universality and the necessity of the existence of phenomena in space and time the “objective significance” of the latter, thereby interpreting objectivity itself in a subjective and idealistic way.

Kant believed that conclusions about space and time as necessary a priori representations underlying intuitions provide a philosophical justification for the ability of mathematics to put forward propositions that have universal and necessary significance. The fact is that, according to Kant, one of the two main branches of mathematics - geometry - has as its basis spatial representations, and the other branch - arithmetic - has temporal representations.

Abstract Topic:

Space and time in Kant's philosophy.

Plan.

Introduction

1. Immanuel Kant and his philosophy.

2. Space and time.

Conclusion.

Literature.

Introduction.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is considered the founder of German classical philosophy - a grand stage in world history philosophical thought, covering more than a century of spiritual and intellectual development - intense, very bright in its results and extremely important in its impact on human spiritual history. He is associated with truly great names: along with Kant, these are Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling (1775-1854), Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) - all highly original thinkers. Each is so distinctive that it is difficult not to wonder whether it is even possible to speak of German classical philosophy as a relatively unified holistic education? And yet it is possible: with all the rich variety of ideas and concepts, German classics are distinguished by their adherence to a number of essential principles that are consistent throughout this entire stage in the development of philosophy. They allow us to consider German classical philosophy as a single spiritual formation.

The first feature of the teachings of thinkers classified as German classics is a similar understanding of the role of philosophy in the history of mankind and in the development of world culture. Philosophy. they entrusted the highest spiritual mission - to be the critical conscience of culture. Philosophy, absorbing the living juices of culture, civilization, and broadly understood humanism, is called upon to carry out broad and deep critical reflection in relation to human life. This was a very bold claim. But German philosophers of the 18th-19th centuries. achieved undoubted success in its implementation. Hegel said: “Philosophy is... its contemporary epoch, comprehended in thinking.” And the representatives of the German philosophical classics really managed to capture the rhythm, dynamics, and demands of their anxious and turbulent time - a period of deep socio-historical transformations. They turned their attention both to human history as such and to human essence. Of course, for this it was necessary to develop a philosophy of a very wide problematic range - to embrace in thought the essential features of the development of the natural world and human existence. At the same time, a single idea of the highest cultural-civilizing, humanistic mission of philosophy was carried through all the problematic sections. Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel also exalt philosophy so highly because they think of it as a strict and systematic science, although a specific science in comparison with natural science and with disciplines that more or less specifically study man. And yet, philosophy is nourished by the life-giving sources of science, is guided by scientific models and strives (and should) to build itself as a science. However, philosophy not only relies on science, subject to the criteria of scientificity, but also gives science and scientificity broad humanistic and methodological orientations.

At the same time, it would be wrong to present the matter as if other areas of human activity and culture gain self-reflection only from philosophy. Critical self-awareness is the work of the entire culture.

The second feature of German classical thought is that it had the mission to give philosophy the appearance of a widely developed and much more differentiated than before, a special system of disciplines, ideas and concepts, a complex and multifaceted system, the individual links of which are linked into a single intellectual chain of philosophical abstractions. It's no coincidence that it's German philosophical classics extremely difficult to master. But here’s the paradox: it was this highly professional, extremely abstract, difficult-to-understand philosophy that was able to have a huge impact not only on culture, but also on social practice, in particular on the sphere of politics.

So, German classical philosophy represents unity also in the sense that its representatives Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel build their very complex and ramified teachings, systems that include philosophical problems of very high generality. First of all, they talk philosophically about the world-about the world in general, about the patterns of its development. This is the so-called ontological aspect of philosophy - the doctrine of being. In close unity with it, the doctrine of knowledge is built, i.e. theory of knowledge, epistemology. Philosophy is also developed as a doctrine about man, i.e. philosophical anthropology. At the same time, the classics of German thought strive to talk about man, exploring various forms of human activity, including human social life. They think about society, public man within the framework of the philosophy of law, morality, world history, art, religion - these were the various areas and disciplines of philosophy in Kant's era. So, the philosophy of each of the representatives German classics- an extensive system of ideas, principles, concepts related to previous philosophy and innovatively transforming the philosophical heritage. All of them are also united by the fact that they solve the problems of philosophy on the basis of very broad and fundamental ideological reflections, a comprehensive philosophical view of the world, man, and all of existence.

1. Immanuel Kant and his philosophy.

KANT Immanuel (April 22, 1724, Koenigsberg, now Kaliningrad - February 12, 1804, ibid.), German philosopher, founder of "criticism" and "German classical philosophy".

He was born into the large family of Johann Georg Kant in Konigsberg, where he lived almost his entire life, without traveling more than one hundred and twenty kilometers outside the city. Kant was brought up in an environment where special influence had the ideas of Pietism - a radical renovationist movement in Lutheranism. After studying at the Pietist school, where he discovered an excellent ability for the Latin language, in which all four of his dissertations were subsequently written (Kant knew ancient Greek and French worse, and spoke almost no English), in 1740 Kant entered the Albertina University of Königsberg. Among Kant’s university teachers, the Wolffian M. Knutzen especially stood out, introducing him to the achievements modern science. Since 1747, due to financial circumstances, Kant has been working as a home teacher outside of Königsberg in the families of a pastor, a landowner and a count. In 1755, Kant returned to Konigsberg and, completing his studies at the university, defended his master's thesis “On Fire.” Then, within a year, he defended two more dissertations, which gave him the right to lecture as an associate professor and professor. However, Kant did not become a professor at this time and worked as an extraordinary (that is, receiving money only from listeners, and not from the staff) associate professor until 1770, when he was appointed to the post of ordinary professor of the department of logic and metaphysics at the University of Königsberg. During his teaching career, Kant lectured on a wide range of subjects, from mathematics to anthropology. In 1796 he stopped lecturing, and in 1801 he left the university. Kant's health gradually weakened, but he continued to work until 1803.

Kant's lifestyle and many of his habits are famous, especially evident after he bought his own house in 1784. Every day, at five o'clock in the morning, Kant was woken up by his servant, retired soldier Martin Lampe, Kant got up, drank a couple of cups of tea and smoked a pipe, then began preparing for his lectures. Soon after the lectures it was time for lunch, which was usually attended by several guests. The dinner lasted several hours and was accompanied by conversations on a variety of topics, but not philosophical ones. After lunch, Kant took his now legendary daily walk around the city. In the evenings, Kant loved to look at the cathedral building, which was very clearly visible from the window of his room.

Kant always carefully monitored his health and developed an original system of hygiene regulations. He was not married, although he did not have any special prejudices against the female half of humanity.
In their philosophical views Kant was influenced by H. Wolf, A. G. Baumgarten, J. J. Rousseau, D. Hume and other thinkers. Using Baumgarten's Wolffian textbook, Kant lectured on metaphysics. He said about Rousseau that the latter’s writings weaned him from arrogance. Hume “awakened” Kant “from his dogmatic sleep.”

"Precritical" philosophy.
Kant's work is divided into two periods: “pre-critical” (up to about 1771) and “critical”. The pre-critical period is a time of Kant's slow liberation from the ideas of Wolffian metaphysics. Critical - the time when Kant raised the question of the possibility of metaphysics as a science and created new guidelines in philosophy, and above all the theory of the activity of consciousness.
The pre-critical period is characterized by Kant's intensive methodological searches and his development of natural scientific questions. Of particular interest are Kant’s cosmogonic researches, which he outlined in his 1755 work “General Natural History and Theory of the Heavens.” The basis of his cosmogonic theory is the concept of an aentropic Universe, spontaneously developing from chaos to order. Kant argued that to explain the possibility of the formation of planetary systems, it is enough to assume matter endowed with forces of attraction and repulsion, while relying on Newtonian physics. Despite the naturalistic nature of this theory, Kant was confident that it did not pose a danger to theology (it is curious that Kant still had problems with censorship on theological issues, but in the 1790s and for a completely different reason). In the pre-critical period, Kant also paid much attention to the study of the nature of space. In his dissertation “Physical Monadology” (1756), he wrote that space as a continuous dynamic environment is created by the interaction of discrete simple substances (the condition for which Kant considered the presence of a common cause for all these substances - God) and has a relative character. In this regard, already in his student work “On the True Estimation of Living Forces” (1749), Kant suggested the possibility of multidimensional spaces.
The central work of the pre-critical period - “The Only Possible Ground for Proving the Existence of God” (1763) - is a kind of encyclopedia before critical philosophy Kant with an emphasis on theological issues. Criticizing here the traditional proofs of the existence of God, Kant at the same time puts forward his own, “ontological” argument, based on the recognition of the necessity of some kind of existence (if nothing exists, then there is no material for things, and they are impossible; but the impossible is impossible, which means what -existence is necessary) and the identification of this primary existence with God.

Transition to criticism .

Kant's transition to critical philosophy was not a one-time event, but went through several important stages. The first step was associated with a radical change in Kant's views on space and time. At the end of the 60s. Kant accepted the concept of absolute space and time and interpreted it in a subjectivist sense, that is, he recognized space and time as subjective forms of human receptivity independent of things (the doctrine of “transcendental idealism”). Direct spatio-temporal objects of the senses thus turned out to be deprived of independent existence, that is, independent of the perceiving subject, and were called “phenomena.” Things, as they exist independently of us (“in themselves”), were called by Kant “noumena.” The results of this “revolution” were consolidated by Kant in his 1770 dissertation “On the Form and Principles of the Sensibly Perceptible and Intelligible World.” The dissertation also summarizes Kant's search for a rigorous metaphysical method in the pre-critical period. He puts forward here the idea of a clear distinction between the spheres of applicability of sensory and rational ideas and warns against hasty violation of their boundaries. One of the main reasons for confusion in metaphysics, Kant names attempts to attribute sensory predicates (for example, “somewhere”, “sometime”) to rational concepts such as “existence”, “ground”, etc. At the same time, Kant still I am confident in the fundamental possibility of rational knowledge of noumena. A new turning point was Kant’s “awakening” from his “dogmatic sleep,” which occurred in 1771 under the influence of the analysis of the principle of causality undertaken by D. Hume and the empirical conclusions following from this analysis. Pondering the threat of the complete empiricization of philosophy and, therefore, the destruction of the fundamental differences between sensory and rational representations, Kant formulates the “main question” of the new “critical” philosophy: “how are a priori synthetic knowledge possible?” The search for a solution to this problem took several years (“the decade of Kant’s silence” - a period of the highest intensity of his work, from which a large number of very interesting manuscripts and several student records of his lectures on metaphysics and other philosophical disciplines remained), until 1780, when “in 4- 5 months" Kant wrote the Critique of Pure Reason (1781), the first of three Critiques. In 1783, “Prolegomena to any future metaphysics” was published, explaining the “Critique”. In 1785 Kant published the “Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals”, in 1786 - “Metaphysical principles of natural science”, which sets out the principles of his philosophy of nature, based on the theses formulated by him in the “Critique of Pure Reason”. In 1787, Kant published a second, partially revised edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. At the same time, Kant decided to expand the system with two more “Critics”. The Critique of Practical Reason was published in 1788, and the Critique of Judgment in 1790. In the 90s important works appear that complement Kant’s three “Critiques”: “Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone” (1793), “Metaphysics of Morals” (1797), “Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View” (1798). During the same period and until the last months of his life, Kant worked on a treatise (still unfinished), which was supposed to connect physics and metaphysics.

System of critical philosophy .

Kant's system of critical philosophy consists of two main parts: theoretical and practical. The connecting link between them is Kant’s doctrine of expediency in its two forms: objective (the expediency of nature) and subjective (comprehensible in “judgments of taste” and aesthetic experiences). All the main problems of criticism come down to one question: “what is a person?” This question summarizes more specific questions of human knowledge: “what can I know?”, “what should I do?”, “what can I hope for?” Theoretical philosophy answers the first question (equivalent to the above question about the possibility of a priori synthetic knowledge), practical philosophy answers the second and third. The study of man can be carried out either at the transcendental level, when the a priori principles of humanity are identified, or at the empirical level, when man is considered as he exists in nature and society. The study of the first kind is carried out by “transcendental anthropology” (which incorporates the principles of Kant’s three “Critiques”), while the second topic, in itself much less philosophical, is developed by “anthropology from a pragmatic point of view.”

Criticism of traditional metaphysics.

The futile attempts to know things in themselves are discussed by Kant in the “Transcendental Dialectic” section of the Critique of Pure Reason, which together with the “Analytics” constitutes the Transcendental Logic. Here he polemicizes with the foundations of the three main sciences of the so-called “particular metaphysics” (the place of “general metaphysics”, or ontology, is taken by the “analytics of reason”): rational psychology, cosmology and natural theology. The main mistake of rational psychology, which claims to know the essence of the soul, is the unacceptable confusion of the thinking I with the I as a thing in itself, and the transfer of analytical conclusions about the first to the second. Cosmology encounters the “antinomies of pure reason,” contradictions that force the mind to think about the limits of its own knowledge and abandon the opinion that the world given to us in the senses is a world of things in themselves. The key to resolving antinomies, according to Kant, is “transcendental idealism,” which implies the division of all possible objects into things in themselves and phenomena, the former being thought of by us exclusively problematically. In his critique of natural theology, Kant distinguishes three types of possible proofs of the existence of God: “ontological” (previously called “Cartesian” by him; Kant’s own early ontological proof is not at all offered by Kant in the Critique as a possible proof), “cosmological” and “physical- theological." The first is carried out completely a priori, the second and third - a posteriori, and the cosmological is based on “experience in general”, the physical-theological - on the specific experience of the purposeful structure of the world. Kant shows that a posteriori proofs in any case cannot be completed and require an a priori ontological argument. The latter (God is an all-real being, which means that among the components of his essence there must be being - otherwise he is not all-real - and this means that God necessarily exists) is criticized by him on the basis that “being is not a real predicate” and that the addition of being to the concept of a thing does not expand its content, but only adds the thing itself to the concept.

The doctrine of reason.

“Dialectics” serves Kant not only to criticize traditional metaphysics, but also to study the highest cognitive ability of man - reason. Reason is interpreted by Kant as the ability that allows one to think the unconditional. Reason grows from reason (which is the source of rules), bringing its concepts to the unconditional. Kant calls such concepts of reason, to which no object can be given in experience, “ideas of pure reason.” He identifies three possible classes of ideas corresponding to the subjects of the three sciences of “private metaphysics”. Reason in its “real” function (in the “logical” function, reason is the ability to draw conclusions) allows for theoretical and practical application. The theoretical takes place when representing objects, the practical when creating them according to the principles of reason. The theoretical application of reason, according to Kant, is regulative and constitutive, and only regulative application is legitimate when we look at the world “as if” it corresponded to the ideas of reason. This use of reason directs the mind to an ever deeper study of nature and the search for its universal laws. Constitutive application presupposes the possibility of demonstrative attribution to things in themselves of a priori laws of reason. Kant resolutely rejects this possibility. However, the concepts of reason can still be applied to things in themselves, but not for the purposes of knowledge, but as “postulates of practical reason.” The laws of the latter are studied by Kant in the “Critique of Practical Reason” and other works.

Practical philosophy.

The basis of Kant's practical philosophy is the doctrine of moral law as a “fact of pure reason.” Morality is associated with unconditional obligation. This means, Kant believes, that its laws stem from the ability to think the unconditional, that is, from reason. Since these universal precepts determine the will to act, they can be called practical. Being universal, they presuppose the possibility of their fulfillment regardless of the conditions of sensibility, and, therefore, presuppose the “transcendental freedom” of human will. The human will does not automatically follow moral precepts (it is not “sacred”), just as things follow the laws of nature. These prescriptions act for her as “categorical imperatives,” i.e., unconditional requirements. The content of the categorical imperative is revealed by the formula “act in such a way that the maxim of your will can be the principle of universal legislation.” Another Kantian formulation is also known: “never treat a person only as a means, but always also as an end.” Concrete moral guidelines are given to a person by a moral feeling, the only feeling that, as Kant says, we know completely a priori. This feeling arises as a result of the suppression of sensual inclinations by practical reason. However, the pure pleasure of doing duty is not the motive for performing good deeds. They are unselfish (in contrast to “legal” actions that look similar to them), although they are associated with the hope of receiving a reward in the form of happiness. Kant calls the unity of virtue and happiness “the highest good.” Man must contribute to the greater good. Kant does not deny the naturalness of a person’s desire for happiness, which he understands as the sum of pleasures, but believes that the condition for happiness must be moral behavior. One of the formulations of the categorical imperative is the call to become worthy of happiness. However, virtuous behavior itself cannot generate happiness, which depends not on the laws of morality, but on the laws of nature. Therefore, a moral person hopes for the existence of a wise creator of the world who will be able to reconcile bliss and virtue in the posthumous existence of man, the belief in which stems from the need for improvement of the soul, which can continue indefinitely.

Aesthetic concept.

Practical philosophy reveals the laws of the kingdom of freedom, while theoretical philosophy sets out the laws according to which natural processes flow. The connecting link between nature and freedom, according to Kant, is the concept of expediency. Relating to nature from the side of its subject, it at the same time points to a rational source, and therefore to freedom. The laws of expediency are studied by Kant in the Critique of Judgment.

Objective expediency is illustrated by biological organisms, while subjective expediency is manifested in the harmonious interaction of the cognitive forces of the soul that arises in the perception of beauty. Judgments that capture aesthetic experiences are called by Kant “judgments of taste.” Judgments of taste are isomorphic to moral judgments: they are also disinterested, necessary and universal (though subjective). Therefore, for Kant, the beautiful acts as a symbol of the good. The beautiful cannot be confused with the pleasant, which is entirely subjective and random. Kant also distinguishes from the feeling of beauty the feeling of the sublime, which grows from the awareness of the moral greatness of a person in the face of the enormity of the world. An important role in Kant's aesthetic philosophy is played by his concept of genius. Genius is the ability to be original, manifested in a single impulse of conscious and unconscious activity. Genius embodies in sensual images “aesthetic ideas” that cannot be exhausted by any concept and which provide endless reasons for the harmonious interaction of reason and imagination.

Social philosophy.
Kant's problems of creativity are not limited to the field of art. Essentially, he talks about the creation by man of a whole artificial world, the world of culture. The laws of the development of culture and civilization are discussed by Kant in a number of his later works. Kant recognizes the sources of the progress of human society as the natural competition of people in their desire for self-affirmation. At the same time, human history represents a progressive movement towards full recognition of freedom and the value of the individual, towards “eternal peace” and the creation of a global federal state.

Influence on subsequent philosophy.
Kant's philosophy had a tremendous impact on subsequent thought. Kant is the founder of “German classical philosophy”, represented by the large-scale philosophical systems of J. G. Fichte, F. W. J. Schelling and G. W. F. Hegel. A. Schopenhauer was also greatly influenced by Kant. Kant's ideas also influenced the Romantic movement. In the second half of the 19th century, “neo-Kantianism” enjoyed great authority. In the 20th century, Kant's serious influence is recognized by leading representatives of the phenomenological school, as well as existentialism, philosophical anthropology and analytical philosophy.

2. Space and time.

The most important attributes of moving matter include space and time. However, philosophy and natural science did not immediately come to such an understanding of them. Ancient atomists believed that everything consists of material particles - atoms and empty space. Newton considered space and time in isolation from each other and as something independent, existing independently of matter and motion; they, according to his ideas, are “containers” in which various bodies are located and events take place. Absolute space, according to Newton, is a box without walls, and absolute time is an empty stream of duration that absorbs all events.

According to the views of objective idealists, space and time, existing objectively, are derived from the world mind, the world absolute idea, etc. These are the views of Plato, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Hegel, neo-Thomists and some other philosophers. Thus, in Hegel’s teaching, space and time are the result of a self-developing absolute idea. He wrote: “The idea, the spirit, stands above time, because it constitutes the concept of time itself. The spirit is eternal, exists in itself and for itself, does not get carried away by the flow of time, because it does not lose itself in one side of the process.”

In subjective idealistic philosophy, space and time are considered as subjective forms of ordering our sensations. This point of view was adhered to by Berkeley, Hume, Mach, Avenarius and others. The concept of I. Kant is also close to these views. He argued that space and time are the pure forms of any sensory visual representation, that they are not properties of the things themselves, but are given before any experience (a priori), they are forms of sensory intuition, thanks to which we group our perceptions. According to Kant, our sensations and perceptions are ordered in space and time, but on this basis there cannot be confidence in the ordering of real bodies in space and time. Our perception of the orderliness of things and events cannot be transferred or “projected” onto reality.
Thus, the concept of Kant and his followers denies the objective existence of space and time. According to Kant, “things in themselves” are non-spatial and non-temporal.

It should be noted that in Kant’s teaching there is a rational point contained in posing the question of how consistent our perceptions, ideas of the objective reality, objective space and time in their concrete diversity? Kant did not use the expression “perceptual space and time,” which was introduced later, at the end of the 19th century, but he essentially substantiated the original meaning and significance of perceptual space and time in relation to human experience.
The further history of the development of teachings shaped the views according to which space and time are forms of moving matter; outside space and time, the movement of matter would be impossible, i.e. the understanding of space and time as properties of the objective world developed. From this point of view, perceptual space and time is an image (sensation, sensory perception, idea) in the consciousness of the age, to a certain extent corresponding to real space and time. The orderliness of our sensations, perceptions, and ideas is determined by the orderliness of the real bodies themselves and the events of the objective world. In reality, some bodies are located next to us, others are further away, to the right, to the left, etc., and events occur earlier, later, etc. But our sensory images of space and time cannot be unconditionally transferred or “projected” onto the real world. The question of the existence of objective space and time is much more complex than it appears at first glance.

The search for answers to the question of the correspondence of our perceptual space and time to their objective content inevitably led to the development of philosophical and natural scientific concepts, to the creation of various mathematical models capable of more accurately reproducing and expressing real space and time, and more fully revealing the relationship between the subjective and objective in a given problem. This is how conceptual space and time arose (Latin - understanding, system).

The relational understanding of space and time as universal forms of existence of moving matter was consistently and clearly formulated and substantiated by F. Engels. It received its scientific confirmation in natural science and a deeper logical justification in Einstein's theory of relativity. The essence of this understanding is that space and time are forms of existence of matter, they do not simply depend on their content - moving matter, but are in unity with their content, determined by moving matter. In this sense, space and time are universal, objective forms of moving matter, their nature is always revealed in specific forms of motion of matter, therefore the space-time structure of the Universe is not the same for its different parts, for different levels and forms of motion of matter. It follows that it is impossible to understand the actual nature of space and time independently of the movement of matter; the properties of the space-time structure are determined by material movement. Space and time are in unity with each other, with movement and matter.

Space and time have General characteristics as directly interconnected forms of existence of matter: objectivity, absoluteness (in the sense of universality and necessity), relativity (dependence on specific properties, features, types and states of matter), unity of continuity (absence of empty space) and discontinuity (separate existence of material bodies, each of which has spatial and temporal boundaries), infinity. At the same time, they also have differences that characterize their peculiarities.
The diversity of all properties and relationships of various material objects constitutes the objective content of real space.

Space is an objective, universal, logical form of the existence of matter, determined by the interaction of various systems, characterizing their extent, relative location, structure and coexistence.
A characteristic property of space is extension, manifested in the juxtaposition and coexistence of different elements. In the totality of different positions of the elements, a certain system of coexistence is formed, a spatial structure that has specific properties: three-dimensionality, continuity and discontinuity, symmetry and asymmetry, distribution of matter and fields, distance between objects, their location, etc.

Real space is three-dimensional. Three-dimensionality is organically connected with the structure of various objects and their movement. This means that all spatial relations in their existence can be described on the basis of three dimensions (coordinates). Statements about the multidimensionality of real space are not confirmed by any experiments, experiments, etc. Typically, multidimensional space is used in mathematics and physics for more full description microworld processes that cannot be visually represented. These “spaces” are abstract, conceptual, designed to express functional connections between various properties of complex processes of the microworld. The theory of relativity uses four dimensions: time is added to the spatial dimensions (the fourth dimension). This only indicates that this object with certain spatial coordinates is located exactly here at this time. certain time. Real space is three-dimensional. All bodies are three-dimensional, extended in three directions: length, width, height. This means that at each point in space no more than three mutually perpendicular lines can be drawn. The three-dimensionality of real space is a fact established empirically, but there is no theoretical justification for this fact yet, and therefore discussion of the issue of multidimensional spaces seems legitimate.

Time also has its own specific properties. Interaction of various material systems, processes and events constitute the content of real time. In reality, we are observing a change in various phenomena, events, processes, etc. Some of them have already happened a long time ago, others have a place in the present, others are expected, etc. In all this diversity of the world, we observe different durations and different time intervals between occurring events, we note the replacement of some phenomena by others.

Time is an objective, universal, natural form of existence of matter, determined by the interaction of various systems, characterizing the duration and sequence of changes in their states. Time exists as a connection of change, alternation of various systems and their states, expressing their duration and sequence of existence, representing an objective, universal form of connection of successive events and phenomena. The material world and its universal forms are infinite and eternal. But the time of existence of each specific thing, phenomenon, event, etc., is, of course, discontinuous, since every thing has a beginning and an end of its existence. However, the emergence and destruction of specific things does not mean their complete, absolute destruction; their specific forms of existence change, and this sequential connection of changing specific forms of existence is continuous and eternal. Concrete, transitory and passing things and events are included in a single continuous flow of eternity; through the finite, temporary existence of things, their universal connection is manifested, revealing the uncreatability and indestructibility of the world in time, i.e. its eternity.

Real time characterizes a certain direction of all phenomena and events. It is irreversible, asymmetrical, always directed from the Past through the present to the future, its flow can neither be stopped nor reversed. Otherwise, time is uniform and presupposes a strictly defined order, a sequence of moments of the past, present, and future. This one-dimensionality, unidirectionality, irreversibility of the flow of time is determined by the fundamental irreversibility of movement and change of all systems of the material world, its processes and states, and is due to the irreversibility of cause-and-effect relationships. For the emergence of any phenomenon, it is necessary, first of all, to realize the causes that give rise to it, which is determined by the principles of conservation of matter, the principle of the universal connection of the phenomena of the world.

Space and time can be considered separately only mentally, in the abstract. In reality, they constitute a single space-time structure of the world, inseparable both from each other and from material movement; natural science fully confirms and concretizes the ideas about the unity of space, time, movement and matter.

It took a long time for new ideas to emerge, explaining that the spatio-temporal structure of the world is heterogeneous, that the “flat” geometry of Euclid is not an absolute, complete expression of real spatial properties. Thus, the Russian scientist N.I. Lobachevsky created in the 20s. XIX century new geometry, substantiated the idea of dependence of spatial properties on the physical properties of matter. Lobachevsky showed that real spatial forms belong to the material world itself, are determined by its properties, and various provisions of geometry only more or less correctly express individual properties of real space and have an experimental origin. In this sense, it becomes clear that the entire variety of properties of infinite space cannot be expressed by just one Euclidean geometry, which is why other geometries arose. For example, Riemannian geometry, in which the “straight line” and “angle” are different from the “straight line” and “angle” in Euclidian geometry, and the sum of the angles of a triangle is greater than 180°.

The development of knowledge about real space and time allows us to constantly clarify, improve and change our ideas about them as objective, universal forms of the movement of matter. Einstein's theory of relativity confirmed and established the inextricable connection of space and time with moving matter. The main conclusion of the theory of relativity is that space and time do not exist without matter, that their metric properties are determined by the distribution of material masses and depend on the interaction of gravitational forces between moving masses. Space and time are not absolute, unchangeable, since they are determined, conditioned by moving matter as a form by their content and depend on the level of organization of matter and its movement; their characteristics in different material systems are relative and different.
The special theory of relativity established that space-time characteristics in different correlative material frames of reference will be different. In a moving frame of reference relative to a stationary one, the length of the body will be shorter, and time will slow down. Thus, there is no constant length in the world, there is no simultaneity of events occurring in different material systems. And in this case we are not talking about the difference in space-time characteristics in the perception of some observer, i.e. does not depend on the subject of observation, but on changes in the spatiotemporal properties of material systems depending on their objective relative motion.

The relativity of space and time is determined by its allocated material content, and therefore in each specific case it manifests itself in its own special structure and has its own specific properties. For example, in biological systems the spatial organization is different than in objects of inanimate nature. In particular, it was discovered that molecules of living matter have an asymmetry of spatial structure, while molecules of inorganic matter do not have such properties. Living organisms have their own rhythms, biological clocks, and certain periods of cell renewal. These rhythms are manifested in the physiological functions of all living organisms and depend on a variety of different factors. In this case, we are dealing with the study of the features of the spatio-temporal structure of biological forms of movement.

Space and time have a special structure in social forms of movement. These features arise from all the organizational activities of people who have the will, memory, and experience of those events in which they are participants and eyewitnesses. Consequently, we are already dealing with the characteristics of historical space and time, with the characteristics of psychological time associated with subjective experience, etc.
Philosophy, based on a generalization of achievements in the study of space and time by modern science, considers them as objective, universal forms of the existence of matter, the necessary conditions existence of material movement.

Conclusion

KANT Immanuel(1724-1804), German philosopher, founder of German classical philosophy; professor at the University of Koenigsberg, foreign honorary member of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences (1794). In 1747-55 he developed a cosmogonic hypothesis of the origin of the solar system from the original nebula (“General Natural History and Theory of the Heavens”, 1755). In the “critical philosophy” developed since 1770 (“Critique of Pure Reason”, 1781; “Critique of Practical Reason”, 1788; “Critique of Judgment”, 1790) he opposed the dogmatism of speculative metaphysics and skepticism with the dualistic doctrine of unknowable “things in themselves” (the objective source of sensations) and knowable phenomena that form the sphere of infinite possible experience. The condition of cognition is generally valid a priori forms that organize the chaos of sensations. The ideas of God, freedom, immortality, theoretically unprovable, are, however, postulates of “practical reason”, a necessary prerequisite for morality. The central principle of Kant's ethics, based on the concept of duty, is categorical imperative. Kant's teaching on the antinomies of theoretical reason played a large role in the development of dialectics.

The most important part of the Critique of Pure Reason is the doctrine of space and time.

It is not easy to give a clear explanation of Kant's theory of space and time because the theory itself is unclear. It is expounded both in the Critique of Pure Reason and in the Prolegomena. The presentation in the Prolegomena is more popular, but less complete than in the Critique.

Kant believes that the immediate objects of perception are caused partly by external things and partly by our own perceptual apparatus. Locke accustomed the world to the idea that secondary qualities - colors, sounds, smell, etc. - are subjective and do not belong to the object, since it exists in itself. Kant, like Berkeley and Hume, although not quite in the same way, goes further and makes primary qualities also subjective. For the most part, Kant has no doubt that our sensations have causes, which he calls “things-in-themselves” or noumena. What appears to us in perception, which he calls a phenomenon, consists of two parts: what is caused by the object - this part he calls sensation, and what is caused by our subjective apparatus, which, as he says, organizes diversity into certain relationship. He calls this last part the form of the phenomenon. This part is not the sensation itself and, therefore, does not depend on the randomness of the environment, it is always the same, since it is always present in us, and it is a priori in the sense that it does not depend on experience. The pure form of sensibility is called "pure intuition"; there are two such forms, namely space and time: one for external sensations, the other for internal ones.

Literature.

1. Kant I. Works: In 6 volumes - M., 1963-1966.

2. Kant I. Works 1747-1777: In 2 volumes - T. 2. - M., 1940.

3. Kant I. Treatises and letters. - M., 1980.

4. Kant I. Critique of pure reason // Works: In b t. -T. 3. - M., 1964.

5. Kant I. Criticism of practical reason // Works: In 6 volumes - Vol. 4. - Ch. 1. -M., 1965.

6. Kant I. Critique of the ability to judge // Works: In 6 volumes - T. 5. - M., 1966.

7. Kant I. Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view // Works: In 6 volumes - T. 6. - M., 1966.

8. Kant I. The idea of universal history in the world-civil plan // Works: In 6 volumes - T. 6. - M., 1966.

9. Kant I. Towards Eternal Peace // Works: In 6 volumes - T. 6. - M., 1966.

10. Kant I. The supposed beginning of human history // Treatises and letters. - M., 1980.

11. Blinnikov L.V. Great philosophers. - M., 1998.

12. Gulyga A. Kant. - M., 1977.

13. Science, 1980. /Monuments to the philosopher. thoughts/.

14. Abrahamyan L.A. Kant's main work: To the 200th anniversary of the publication of the “Critique of Pure Reason” - Yerevan: Hayastan, 1981,

15. Baskin Yu.Ya. Kant. - M:. Legal lit., 1984. - 88 p.

16. Bakhtomin N.K. Theory scientific knowledge Immanuel Kant: Experience of modern times. reading the Critique of Pure Reason. M.: Nauka, 1986,

17. Grinishin D.M., Kornilov S.V. Immanuel Kant: scientist, philosopher, humanist. - L.: Publishing house Leningr. University, 1984,

Abstract Topic:

Space and time in Kant's philosophy.

Plan.

Introduction

1. Immanuel Kant and his philosophy.

2. Space and time.

Conclusion.

Literature.

Introduction.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is considered the founder of German classical philosophy - a grandiose stage in the history of world philosophical thought, covering more than a century of spiritual and intellectual development - intense, very bright in its results and extremely important in its impact on human spiritual history. He is associated with truly great names: along with Kant, these are Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling (1775-1854), Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) - all highly original thinkers. Each is so unique that it is difficult not to wonder whether it is even possible to speak of German classical philosophy as a relatively unified, holistic entity? And yet it is possible: with all the rich variety of ideas and concepts, German classics are distinguished by their adherence to a number of essential principles that are consistent throughout this entire stage in the development of philosophy. They allow us to consider German classical philosophy as a single spiritual formation.

The second feature of German classical thought is that it had the mission to give philosophy the appearance of a widely developed and much more differentiated than before, a special system of disciplines, ideas and concepts, a complex and multifaceted system, the individual links of which are linked into a single intellectual chain of philosophical abstractions. It is no coincidence that German philosophical classics are extremely difficult to master. But here’s the paradox: it was this highly professional, extremely abstract, difficult-to-understand philosophy that was able to have a huge impact not only on culture, but also on social practice, in particular on the sphere of politics.

So, German classical philosophy also represents unity in the sense that its representatives Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel build their very complex and ramified teachings, systems that include philosophical problems of very high generality. First of all, they talk philosophically about the world—about the world as a whole, about the laws of its development. This is the so-called ontological aspect of philosophy - the doctrine of being. In close unity with it, the doctrine of knowledge is built, i.e. theory of knowledge, epistemology. Philosophy is also developed as a doctrine about man, i.e. philosophical anthropology. At the same time, the classics of German thought strive to talk about man, exploring various forms of human activity, including human social life. They think about society, social man within the framework of the philosophy of law, morality, world history, art, religion - these were the various areas and disciplines of philosophy in the era of Kant. So, the philosophy of each of the representatives of the German classics is an extensive system of ideas, principles, concepts related to previous philosophy and innovatively transforming the philosophical heritage. All of them are also united by the fact that they solve the problems of philosophy on the basis of very broad and fundamental ideological reflections, a comprehensive philosophical view of the world, man, and all of existence.

1. Immanuel Kant and his philosophy.

KANT Immanuel (April 22, 1724, Koenigsberg, now Kaliningrad - February 12, 1804, ibid.), German philosopher, founder of “criticism” and “German classical philosophy.”

He was born into the large family of Johann Georg Kant in Konigsberg, where he lived almost his entire life, without traveling more than one hundred and twenty kilometers outside the city. Kant was brought up in an environment where the ideas of Pietism, a radical renewalist movement in Lutheranism, had a special influence. After studying at the Pietist school, where he discovered an excellent ability for the Latin language, in which all four of his dissertations were subsequently written (Kant knew ancient Greek and French worse, and spoke almost no English), in 1740 Kant entered the Albertina University of Königsberg. Among Kant's university teachers, the Wolffian M. Knutzen especially stood out, introducing him to the achievements of modern science. Since 1747, due to financial circumstances, Kant has been working as a home teacher outside of Königsberg in the families of a pastor, a landowner and a count. In 1755, Kant returned to Konigsberg and, completing his studies at the university, defended his master's thesis “On Fire.” Then, within a year, he defended two more dissertations, which gave him the right to lecture as an associate professor and professor. However, Kant did not become a professor at this time and worked as an extraordinary (that is, receiving money only from listeners, and not from the staff) associate professor until 1770, when he was appointed to the post of ordinary professor of the department of logic and metaphysics at the University of Königsberg. During his teaching career, Kant lectured on a wide range of subjects, from mathematics to anthropology. In 1796 he stopped lecturing, and in 1801 he left the university. Kant's health gradually weakened, but he continued to work until 1803.

Kant always carefully monitored his health and developed an original system of hygiene regulations. He was not married, although he did not have any special prejudices against the female half of humanity.
In his philosophical views, Kant was influenced by H. Wolf, A. G. Baumgarten, J. J. Rousseau, D. Hume and other thinkers. Using Baumgarten's Wolffian textbook, Kant lectured on metaphysics. He said about Rousseau that the latter’s writings weaned him from arrogance. Hume "awakened" Kant "from his dogmatic sleep."

"Precritical" philosophy.
Kant's work is divided into two periods: "pre-critical" (up to about 1771) and "critical". The pre-critical period is a time of Kant's slow liberation from the ideas of Wolffian metaphysics. Critical - the time when Kant raised the question of the possibility of metaphysics as a science and created new guidelines in philosophy, and above all the theory of the activity of consciousness.
The pre-critical period is characterized by Kant's intensive methodological searches and his development of natural scientific questions. Of particular interest are Kant’s cosmogonic researches, which he outlined in his 1755 work “General Natural History and Theory of the Heavens.” The basis of his cosmogonic theory is the concept of an aentropic Universe, spontaneously developing from chaos to order. Kant argued that to explain the possibility of the formation of planetary systems, it is enough to assume matter endowed with forces of attraction and repulsion, while relying on Newtonian physics. Despite the naturalistic nature of this theory, Kant was confident that it did not pose a danger to theology (it is curious that Kant still had problems with censorship on theological issues, but in the 1790s and for a completely different reason). In the pre-critical period, Kant also paid much attention to the study of the nature of space. In his dissertation “Physical Monadology” (1756), he wrote that space as a continuous dynamic environment is created by the interaction of discrete simple substances (the condition for which Kant considered the presence of a common cause for all these substances - God) and has a relative character. In this regard, already in his student work “On the True Estimation of Living Forces” (1749), Kant suggested the possibility of multidimensional spaces.
The central work of the pre-critical period - “The Only Possible Ground for Proving the Existence of God” (1763) - is a kind of encyclopedia of Kant’s pre-critical philosophy with an emphasis on theological issues. Criticizing here the traditional proofs of the existence of God, Kant at the same time puts forward his own, “ontological” argument, based on the recognition of the necessity of some kind of existence (if nothing exists, then there is no material for things, and they are impossible; but the impossible is impossible, which means what -existence is necessary) and the identification of this primary existence with God.

Transition to criticism .

The most important part of the Critique of Pure Reason is the doctrine of space and time.

Kant believes that the immediate objects of perception are caused partly by external things and partly by our own perceptual apparatus. Locke accustomed the world to the idea that secondary qualities - colors, sounds, smell, etc. - are subjective and do not belong to the object, since it exists in itself. Kant, like Berkeley and Hume, although not quite in the same way, goes further and makes primary qualities also subjective. For the most part, Kant has no doubt that our sensations have causes, which he calls “things-in-themselves” or noumena. What appears to us in perception, which he calls a phenomenon, consists of two parts: what is caused by the object - this part he calls sensation, and what is caused by our subjective apparatus, which, as he says, organizes diversity into certain relationship. He calls this last part the form of the phenomenon. This part is not the sensation itself and, therefore, does not depend on the randomness of the environment, it is always the same, since it is always present in us, and it is a priori in the sense that it does not depend on experience. The pure form of sensibility is called “pure intuition” (Anschauung); there are two such forms, namely space and time: one for external sensations, the other for internal ones.

To prove that space and time are a priori forms, Kant puts forward two classes of arguments: one class of arguments is metaphysical, and the other is epistemological, or, as he calls them, transcendental. Arguments of the first class are derived directly from the nature of space and time, arguments of the second - indirectly, from the possibility of pure mathematics. Arguments regarding space are presented more fully than arguments regarding time because the latter are considered to be essentially the same as the former.

Regarding space, four metaphysical arguments are put forward:

1) Space is not an empirical concept abstracted from external experience, since space is presupposed when sensations are attributed to something external, and external experience is possible only through the representation of space.

2) Space is a necessary representation a priori, which underlies all external perceptions, since we cannot imagine that space should not exist, whereas we can imagine that nothing exists in space.

3) Space is not a discursive, or general, concept of the relations of things in general, since there is only one space and what we call “spaces” are parts of it, not examples.

4) Space is represented as an infinitely given quantity, which contains within itself all parts of space. This relation is different from that which the concept has to its examples, and, consequently, space is not a concept, but Anschauung.

The transcendental argument regarding space derives from geometry. Kant claims that Euclidean geometry is known a priori, although it is synthetic, that is, not derived from logic itself. Geometric proofs, he argues, depend on figures. We can see, for example, that if two straight lines intersecting at right angles to each other are given, then only a straight line can be drawn through their point of intersection at right angles to both straight lines. This knowledge, as Kant believes, is not derived from experience. But my intuition can anticipate what will be found in the object only if it contains only the form of my sensibility, which predetermines in my subjectivity all actual impressions. Objects of sense must be subject to geometry because geometry concerns our modes of perception, and therefore we cannot perceive in any other way. This explains why geometry, although synthetic, is a priori and apodictic.

The arguments regarding time are essentially the same, with the conclusion that arithmetic replaces geometry, since counting requires time.

Let us now examine these arguments one by one.

The first of the metaphysical arguments regarding space states: “Space is not an empirical concept abstracted from external experience. In fact, the representation of space must already lie at the basis in order for certain sensations to be related to something outside of me (that is, to something in a different place in space than where I am), and also in order for so that I can imagine them as being outside [and next to] each other, therefore, not only as different, but also as being in different places.” As a result, external experience is the only one possible through the representation of space.

The phrase “outside of me (that is, in a place other than where I am)” is difficult to understand. As a thing in itself, I am not located anywhere, and there is nothing spatially outside of me. My body can only be understood as a phenomenon. Thus, all that is really meant is expressed in the second part of the sentence, namely, that I perceive different objects as objects in different places. The image that may arise in one's mind is that of a cloakroom attendant hanging different coats on different hooks; the hooks must already exist, but the subjectivity of the wardrobe attendant puts the coat in order.

There is here, as elsewhere in Kant's theory of the subjectivity of space and time, a difficulty which he seems never to have felt. What makes me arrange the objects of perception the way I do and not otherwise? Why, for example, do I always see people's eyes above their mouths and not below them? According to Kant, the eyes and mouth exist as things in themselves and cause my separate perceptions, but nothing in them corresponds to the spatial arrangement that exists in my perception. This is contradicted by the physical theory of colors. We do not believe that there are colors in matter in the sense that our perceptions have color, but we do believe that different colors correspond to different wavelengths. Since waves involve space and time, they cannot be the causes of our perceptions for Kant. If, on the other hand, the space and time of our perceptions have copies in the world of matter, as physics suggests, then geometry applies to these copies and Kant's argument is false. Kant believed that the understanding organizes the raw material of sensations, but he never thought that it is necessary to say why the understanding organizes this material in this particular way and not otherwise.

With regard to time, this difficulty is even greater, since when considering time one has to take into account causality. I perceive lightning before I perceive thunder. A thing in itself A causes my perception of lightning, and another thing in itself B causes my perception of thunder, but A not before B, since time exists only in relations of perception. Why then do two timeless things A and B produce an effect at different times? This must be entirely arbitrary if Kant is right, and then there must be no relation between A and B corresponding to the fact that the perception caused by A is earlier than the perception caused by B.

The second metaphysical argument states that one can imagine that there is nothing in space, but one cannot imagine that there is no space. It seems to me that a serious argument cannot be based on what can and cannot be imagined. But I emphasize that I deny the possibility of representing empty space. You can imagine yourself looking at a dark cloudy sky, but then you are in space and you are imagining clouds that you cannot see. As Weininger pointed out, Kantian space is absolute, like Newtonian space, and not just a system of relations. But I don’t see how you can imagine absolutely empty space.

The third metaphysical argument states: “Space is not a discursive, or, as they say, general, concept of the relationships of things in general, but a purely visual representation. In fact, one can imagine only one single space, and if they talk about many spaces, then by them they mean only parts of the same single space, moreover, these parts cannot precede a single all-encompassing space as its constituent elements (from of which its addition would be possible), but can only be thought of as being in it. Space is essentially unified; the diversity in it, and, consequently, also the general concept of spaces in general, is based exclusively on limitations.” From this Kant concludes that space is an a priori intuition.

The essence of this argument is the denial of multiplicity in space itself. What we call "spaces" are not examples general concept“space”, nor parts of the whole. I do not know exactly what their logical status is, according to Kant, but, in any case, they logically follow space. For those who accept, as practically everyone does nowadays, a relativistic view of space, this argument falls away, since neither “space” nor “spaces” can be considered as substances.

The fourth metaphysical argument concerns mainly the proof that space is an intuition and not a concept. His premise is “space is imagined (or represented - vorgestellt) as an infinitely given quantity.” This is the view of a person living in a flat area, like the area where Koenigsberg is located. I do not see how a dweller in the Alpine valleys could accept it. It is difficult to understand how something infinite can be “given.” I must consider it obvious that the part of space which is given is that which is filled with objects of perception, and that for other parts we have only the sense of the possibility of movement. And if it is permissible to use such a vulgar argument, then modern astronomers claim that space is not in fact infinite, but is rounded, like the surface of a ball.

The transcendental (or epistemological) argument, which is best established in the Prolegomena, is clearer than the metaphysical arguments and also more clearly refutable. "Geometry", as we now know, is a name that combines two different scientific disciplines. On the one hand, there is pure geometry, which derives consequences from axioms without asking whether these axioms are true. It contains nothing that does not follow from logic and is not “synthetic”, and does not need figures such as those used in geometry textbooks. On the other hand, there is geometry as a branch of physics, as it, for example, appears in the general theory of relativity - this is an empirical science in which axioms are derived from measurements and differ from the axioms of Euclidean geometry. Thus, there are two types of geometry: one is a priori, but not synthetic, the other is synthetic, but not a priori. This gets rid of the transcendental argument.

Let us now try to consider the questions that Kant poses when he considers space more generally. If we start from the view, which is accepted in physics as self-evident, that our perceptions have external causes which are (in a certain sense) material, then we are led to the conclusion that all real qualities in perceptions are different from qualities in their imperceptible causes, but that there is a certain structural similarity between the system of perceptions and the system of their causes. There is, for example, a correspondence between colors (as perceived) and waves of certain lengths (as inferred by physicists). Likewise, there must be a correspondence between space as an ingredient of perceptions and space as an ingredient in the system of imperceptible causes of perceptions. All this is based on the principle of “same cause, same effect,” with its opposite principle: “different effects, different causes.” Thus, for example, when visual representation A appears to the left of visual representation B, we will assume that there is some corresponding relation between cause A and cause B.

We have, according to this view, two spaces - one subjective and the other objective, one known in experience, and the other only inferred. But there is no difference in this respect between space and other aspects of perception, such as colors and sounds. All of them in their subjective forms are known empirically. All of them in their objective forms are derived through the principle of causality. There is no reason to consider our knowledge of space in any way different from our knowledge of color, and sound, and smell.

As regards time, the matter is different, for if we maintain faith in the imperceptible causes of perception, objective time must be identical with subjective time. If not, we are faced with the difficulties already discussed in connection with lightning and thunder. Or take this case: you hear talking man, you answer him, and he hears you. His speech and his perceptions of your answer, to the extent that you touch them, are in the imperceptible world. And in this world, the first comes before the last. Moreover, his speech precedes your perception of sound in the objective world of physics. Your perception of sound precedes your response in the subjective world of perception. And your answer precedes his perception of sound in the objective world of physics. Clearly the relation "precedes" must be the same in all these statements. While there is therefore an important sense in which perceptual space is subjective, there is no sense in which perceptual time is subjective.

The above arguments assume, as Kant thought, that perceptions are caused by things in themselves, or, as we should say, by events in the world of physics. This assumption, however, is in no way logically necessary. If it is rejected, perceptions cease to be “subjective” in any significant sense, since there is nothing to oppose them.

The "thing in itself" was a very awkward element in Kant's philosophy, and it was rejected by his immediate successors, who accordingly fell into something very like solipsism. The contradictions in Kant's philosophy inevitably led to the fact that the philosophers who were under his influence had to quickly develop either in an empiricist or in an absolutist direction, in fact, in the latter direction, and German philosophy developed until the period after Hegel's death.

Kant's immediate successor, Fichte (1762-1814), rejected "things in themselves" and carried subjectivism to a degree that seemed to border on madness. He believed that the Self is the only ultimate reality and that it exists because it affirms itself. But the Self, which has a subordinate reality, also exists only because the Self accepts it. Fichte is important not as a pure philosopher, but as the theoretical founder of German nationalism in his “Speeches to the German Nation” (1807-1808), in which he sought to inspire the Germans to resist Napoleon after the Battle of Jena. The self as a metaphysical concept was easily confused with Fichte's empirical; since I was a German, it followed that the Germans were superior to all other nations. “To have character and to be German,” says Fichte, “undoubtedly mean the same thing.” On this basis, he developed a whole philosophy of nationalist totalitarianism, which had a very great influence in Germany.

His immediate successor, Schelling (1775-1854), was more attractive, but no less subjectivist. He was closely associated with German romance. Philosophically he is insignificant, although he was famous in his time. An important result of the development of Kant's philosophy was the philosophy of Hegel.

The most important part of the Critique of Pure Reason is the doctrine of space and time. In this section I propose to undertake a critical examination of this teaching.

Kant believes that the immediate objects of perception are caused partly by external things and partly by our own perceptual apparatus. Locke accustomed the world to the idea that secondary qualities - colors, sounds, smell, etc. - are subjective and do not belong to the object as it exists in itself. Kant, like Berkeley and Hume, although not quite in the same way, goes further and makes primary qualities also subjective. For the most part, Kant has no doubt that our sensations have causes, which he calls “things-in-themselves” or noumena. What appears to us in perception, which he calls a phenomenon, consists of two parts: what is caused by the object - this part he calls sensation, and what is caused by our subjective apparatus, which, as he says, organizes diversity in certain relationships. He calls this last part the form of the phenomenon. This part is not the sensation itself and, therefore, does not depend on the randomness of the environment, it is always the same, since it is always present in us, and it is a priori in the sense that it does not depend on experience. The pure form of sensibility is called “pure intuition” (Anschauung); There are two such forms, namely space and time: one for external sensations, the other for internal ones.

Regarding space, four metaphysical arguments are put forward:

2) Space is a necessary representation a priori, which underlies all external perceptions, since we cannot imagine that space should not exist, whereas we can imagine that nothing exists in space.

3) Space is not a discursive, or general, concept of the relations of things in general, since there is only one space and what we call “spaces” are parts of it, not examples.

4) Space is represented as an infinitely given quantity that contains within itself all parts of space. This relation is different from that which the concept has to its examples, and, consequently, space is not a concept, but Anschauung.

The transcendental argument regarding space is derived from geometry. Kant claims that Euclidean geometry is known a priori, although it is synthetic, that is, not derived from logic itself. Geometric proofs, he argues, depend on figures. We can see, for example, that if two straight lines intersect at right angles to each other are given, then only one straight line can be drawn through their point of intersection at right angles to both straight lines. This knowledge, as Kant believes, is not derived from experience. But my intuition can anticipate what will be found in the object only if it contains only the form of my sensibility, which predetermines in my subjectivity all actual impressions. Objects of sense must be subject to geometry, because geometry concerns our modes of perception, and therefore we cannot perceive in any other way. This explains why geometry, although synthetic, is a priori and apodictic.

The arguments regarding time are essentially the same, except that arithmetic replaces geometry, since counting requires time.

Let us now examine these arguments one by one. The first of the metaphysical arguments regarding space reads: “Space is not an empirical concept abstracted from external experience. In fact, the representation of space must already lie at the basis in order for certain sensations to be related to something outside of me (that is, to something - in a different place in space than where I am), and also so that I can imagine them as being outside (and next to each other, therefore, not only as different, but also as being in different places." As a result, external experience is the only one possible through the representation of space.

The phrase "outside of me (that is, in a different place than I myself am)" is difficult to understand. As a thing in itself, I am not located anywhere, and there is nothing spatially outside of me. My body can only be understood as a phenomenon. Thus, all that is really meant is expressed in the second part of the sentence, namely, that I perceive different objects as objects in different places. The image that may arise in one's mind is that of a cloakroom attendant hanging different coats on different hooks; the hooks must already exist, but the subjectivity of the wardrobe attendant arranges the coat.

There is here, as elsewhere in Kant's theory of the subjectivity of space and time, a difficulty which he seems never to have felt. What makes me arrange the objects of perception the way I do and not otherwise? Why, for example, do I always see people's eyes above their mouths and not below them? According to Kant, the eyes and mouth exist as things in themselves and cause my separate perceptions, but nothing in them corresponds to the spatial arrangement that exists in my perception. This is contradicted by the physical theory of colors. We do not believe that there are colors in matter in the sense that our perceptions have color, but we do believe that different colors correspond to different wavelengths. Since waves, however, involve space and time, they cannot be the causes of our perceptions for Kant. If, on the other hand, the space and time of our perceptions have copies in the world of matter, as physics suggests, then geometry applies to these copies and Kant's argument is false. Kant believed that the understanding organizes the raw material of sensations, but he never thought that it is necessary to say why the understanding organizes this material in this particular way and not otherwise.

With regard to time, this difficulty is even greater, since when considering time one has to take into account causality. I perceive lightning before I perceive thunder. A thing in itself A causes my perception of lightning, and another thing in itself B causes my perception of thunder, but A not before B, since time exists only in relations of perceptions. Why then do two timeless things A and B produce an effect at different times? This must be entirely arbitrary if Kant is right, and then there must be no relation between A and B corresponding to the fact that the perception caused by A is earlier than the perception caused by B.

The third metaphysical argument reads: “Space is not a discursive, or, as they say, general, concept of the relations of things in general, but a purely visual representation. In fact, one can imagine only one single space, and if one speaks of many spaces, then by them we mean only parts of one and the same unified space, moreover, these parts cannot precede a single all-encompassing space as its constituent elements (from which its composition could be possible), but can only be thought of as being in it. Space is essentially unified ; the diversity in it, and, consequently, also the general concept of spaces in general, is based exclusively on restrictions." From this Kant concludes that space is an a priori intuition.

The essence of this argument is the denial of multiplicity in space itself. What we call "spaces" are neither examples of the general concept of "space" nor parts of a whole. I do not know exactly what their logical status is, according to Kant, but, in any case, they logically follow space. For those who accept, as practically everyone does nowadays, a relativistic view of space, this argument falls away, since neither “space” nor “spaces” can be considered as substances.

The fourth metaphysical argument concerns mainly the proof that space is an intuition and not a concept. His premise is "space is imagined (or represented - vorgestellt) as an infinitely given quantity." This is the view of a person living in a flat area, like the area where Koenigsberg is located. I do not see how a dweller in the Alpine valleys could accept it. It is difficult to understand how something infinite can be “given.” I must consider it obvious that the part of space which is given is that which is filled with objects of perception, and that for other parts we have only the sense of the possibility of movement. And if it is permissible to use such a vulgar argument, then modern astronomers claim that space is not in fact infinite, but is rounded, like the surface of a ball.

The transcendental (or epistemological) argument, which is best established in the Prolegomena, is clearer than the metaphysical arguments, and also more clearly refutable. "Geometry", as we now know, is a name that combines two different scientific disciplines. On the one hand, there is pure geometry, which derives consequences from axioms without asking whether these axioms are true. It does not contain anything that does not follow from logic and is not “synthetic”, and does not need figures such as those used in geometry textbooks. On the other hand, there is geometry as a branch of physics, as it appears, for example, in the general theory of relativity - this is an empirical science in which axioms are derived from measurements and differ from the axioms of Euclidean geometry. Thus, there are two types of geometry: one is a priori, but not synthetic, the other is synthetic, but not a priori. This gets rid of the transcendental argument.

We have, according to this view, two spaces - one subjective and the other objective, one is known in experience, and the other is only inferred. But there is no difference in this respect between space and other aspects of perception, such as colors and sounds. All of them in their subjective forms are known empirically. All of them in their objective forms are derived through the principle of causality. There is no reason to consider our knowledge of space in any way different from our knowledge of color, and sound, and smell.

As regards time, the matter is different, for if we maintain faith in the imperceptible causes of perceptions, objective time must be identical with subjective time. If not, we are faced with the difficulties already discussed in connection with lightning and thunder. Or take this case: you hear a person speaking, you answer him, and he hears you. His speech and his perceptions of your answer, both as far as you touch them, are in the unperceived world. And in this world, the first comes before the last. Moreover, his speech precedes your perception of sound in the objective world of physics. Your perception of sound precedes your response in the subjective world of perception. And your answer precedes his perception of sound in the objective world of physics. It is clear that the relation "precedes" must be the same in all these statements. While there is therefore an important sense in which perceptual space is subjective, there is no sense in which perceptual time is subjective.

The above arguments assume, as Kant thought, that perceptions are caused by things in themselves, or, as we should say, by events in the world of physics. This assumption, however, is in no way logically necessary. If it is rejected, perceptions cease to be in any essential sense “subjective,” since there is nothing to oppose them.

The "thing in itself" was a very awkward element in Kant's philosophy, and it was rejected by his immediate successors, who accordingly fell into something very like solipsism. The contradictions in Kant's philosophy inevitably led to the fact that philosophers who were under his influence had to quickly develop either in an empiricist or in an absolutist direction. In fact, German philosophy developed in the latter direction until the period after Hegel's death.