Philosophy in accessible language: the philosophy of Kant. Kant’s interpretation of space and time as pure forms of contemplation What are space and time according to Kant

The most important part of the Critique of Pure Reason is the doctrine of space and time. In this section I propose to undertake a critical examination of this teaching.

It is not easy to give a clear explanation of Kant's theory of space and time because the theory itself is unclear. It is expounded both in the Critique of Pure Reason and in the Prolegomena. The presentation in the Prolegomena is more popular, but less complete than in the Critique. First, I will try to explain the theory as clearly as I can. Only after I have presented it will I try to criticize it.

Kant believes that the immediate objects of perception are caused partly by external things and partly by our own perceptual apparatus. Locke accustomed the world to the idea that secondary qualities - colors, sounds, smell, etc. - are subjective and do not belong to the object as it exists in itself. Kant, like Berkeley and Hume, although not quite in the same way, goes further and makes primary qualities also subjective. For the most part, Kant has no doubt that our sensations have causes, which he calls “things-in-themselves” or noumena. What appears to us in perception, which he calls a phenomenon, consists of two parts: what is caused by the object - this part he calls sensation, and what is caused by our subjective apparatus, which, as he says, organizes diversity into certain relationship. He calls this last part the form of the phenomenon. This part is not the sensation itself and, therefore, does not depend on the randomness of the environment, it is always the same, since it is always present in us, and it is a priori in the sense that it does not depend on experience. The pure form of sensibility is called “pure intuition” (Anschauung); There are two such forms, namely space and time: one for external sensations, the other for internal ones.

To prove that space and time are a priori forms, Kant puts forward two classes of arguments: one class of arguments is metaphysical, and the other is epistemological, or, as he calls them, transcendental. Arguments of the first class are derived directly from the nature of space and time, arguments of the second - indirectly, from the possibility of pure mathematics. Arguments regarding space are more fully stated than arguments regarding time because the latter are considered to be essentially the same as the former.

Regarding space, four metaphysical arguments are put forward:

1) Space is not an empirical concept abstracted from external experience, since space is assumed when sensations are attributed to something external and external experience is possible only through the representation of space.

2) Space is a necessary representation a priori, which underlies all external perceptions, since we cannot imagine that space should not exist, whereas we can imagine that nothing exists in space.

3) Space is not a discursive, or general, concept of the relations of things in general, since there is only one space, and what we call "spaces" are parts of it, not examples.

4) Space appears to be infinite given a quantity that contains within itself all parts of space. This relation is different from that which the concept has to its examples, and, therefore, space is not a concept, but Anschauung.

The transcendental argument regarding space is derived from geometry. Kant claims that Euclidean geometry is known a priori, although it is synthetic, that is, not derived from logic itself. Geometric proofs, he argues, depend on figures. We can see, for example, that if two straight lines intersecting at right angles are given, then only one straight line can be drawn through the point of their intersection at right angles to both straight lines. This knowledge, as Kant believes, is not derived from experience. But my intuition can anticipate what will be found in the object only if it contains only the form of my sensibility, which predetermines in my subjectivity all actual impressions. Objects of sense must be subject to geometry, because geometry concerns our modes of perception, and therefore we cannot perceive in any other way. This explains why geometry, although synthetic, is a priori and apodictic.

The arguments regarding time are essentially the same, except that arithmetic replaces geometry, since counting requires time.

Let us now examine these arguments one by one.

The first of the metaphysical arguments regarding space states: “Space is not an empirical concept abstracted from external experience. In fact, the representation of space must already lie at the basis in order for certain sensations to be related to something outside of me (that is, to something in a different place in space than where I am), and also in order for so that I can imagine them as being outside [and next to] each other, therefore, not only as different, but also as being in different places.” As a result, external experience is the only one possible through the representation of space.

The phrase “outside of me (that is, in a place other than where I am)” is difficult to understand. As a thing in itself, I am not located anywhere, and there is nothing spatially outside of me. My body can only be understood as a phenomenon. Thus, all that is really meant is expressed in the second part of the sentence, namely, that I perceive different objects as objects in different places. The image that may arise in someone's mind is that of a cloakroom attendant hanging different coats on different hooks; the hooks must already exist, but the subjectivity of the wardrobe attendant arranges the coat.

There is here, as elsewhere in Kant's theory of the subjectivity of space and time, a difficulty which he seems never to have felt. What makes me arrange the objects of perception the way I do and not otherwise? Why, for example, do I always see people's eyes above their mouths and not below them? According to Kant, the eyes and mouth exist as things in themselves and cause my separate perceptions, but nothing in them corresponds to the spatial arrangement that exists in my perception. This is contradicted by the physical theory of colors. We do not believe that there are colors in matter in the sense that our perceptions have color, but we do believe that different colors correspond to different wavelengths. Since waves, however, involve space and time, they cannot be the causes of our perceptions for Kant. If, on the other hand, the space and time of our perceptions have copies in the world of matter, as physics suggests, then geometry applies to these copies and Kant's argument is false. Kant believed that the understanding organizes the raw material of sensations, but he never thought that it is necessary to say why the understanding organizes this material in this particular way and not otherwise.

With regard to time, this difficulty is even greater, since when considering time one has to take into account causality. I perceive lightning before I perceive thunder. Thing in itself A causes my perception of lightning, and the other thing in itself IN causes my perception of thunder, but A Not earlier IN, since time exists only in relations of perceptions. Why then two timeless things A And IN do they take effect at different times? This must be entirely arbitrary if Kant is right, and then there must be no relation between A And IN, corresponding to the fact that the perception caused A, earlier than the perception caused IN.

The second metaphysical argument states that one can imagine that there is nothing in space, but one cannot imagine that there is no space. It seems to me that a serious argument cannot be based on what can and cannot be imagined. But I emphasize that I deny the possibility of representing empty space. You can imagine yourself looking at a dark cloudy sky, but then you are in space and you are imagining clouds that you cannot see. As Weininger pointed out, Kantian space is absolute, like Newtonian space, and not just a system of relations. But I don’t see how you can imagine absolutely empty space.

The third metaphysical argument states: “Space is not a discursive, or, as they say, general, concept of the relationships of things in general, but a purely visual representation. In fact, one can imagine only one single space, and if they talk about many spaces, then by them they mean only parts of the same single space, moreover, these parts cannot precede a single all-encompassing space as its constituent elements (from of which its addition would be possible), but can only be thought of as being in it. Space is essentially unified; the diversity in it, and therefore also the general concept of spaces in general, is based exclusively on limitations.” From this Kant concludes that space is an a priori intuition.

The essence of this argument is the denial of multiplicity in space itself. What we call "spaces" are not examples general concept“space”, nor parts of the whole. I do not know exactly what their logical status is, according to Kant, but, in any case, they logically follow space. For those who accept, as practically everyone does nowadays, a relativistic view of space, this argument falls away, since neither “space” nor “spaces” can be considered as substances.

The fourth metaphysical argument concerns mainly the proof that space is an intuition and not a concept. His premise – “space is imagined (or imagined – vorgestellt) as infinite given size". This is the view of a person living in a flat area, like the area where Koenigsberg is located. I do not see how a dweller in the Alpine valleys could accept it. It is difficult to understand how something infinite can be “given.” I must consider it obvious that the part of space which is given is that which is filled with objects of perception, and that for other parts we have only the sense of the possibility of movement. And if it is permissible to use such a vulgar argument, then modern astronomers claim that space is not in fact infinite, but is rounded, like the surface of a ball.

The transcendental (or epistemological) argument, which is best established in the Prolegomena, is clearer than the metaphysical arguments and also more clearly refutable. "Geometry", as we now know, is a name that combines two different scientific disciplines. On the one hand, there is pure geometry, which derives consequences from axioms without asking whether these axioms are true. It contains nothing that does not follow from logic and is not “synthetic”, and does not need figures such as those used in geometry textbooks. On the other hand, there is geometry as a branch of physics, as it appears, for example, in the general theory of relativity - this is an empirical science in which axioms are derived from measurements and differ from the axioms of Euclidean geometry. Thus, there are two types of geometry: one is a priori, but not synthetic, the other is synthetic, but not a priori. This gets rid of the transcendental argument.

Let us now try to consider the questions that Kant poses when he considers space more generally. If we start from the view, which is accepted in physics as self-evident, that our perceptions have external causes which are (in a certain sense) material, then we are led to the conclusion that all real qualities in perceptions are different from qualities in their imperceptible causes, but that there is a certain structural similarity between the system of perceptions and the system of their causes. There is, for example, a correspondence between colors (as perceived) and waves of certain lengths (as inferred by physicists). Likewise, there must be a correspondence between space as an ingredient of perceptions and space as an ingredient in the system of imperceptible causes of perceptions. All this is based on the principle of “same cause, same effect,” with its opposite principle: “different effects, different causes.” Thus, for example, when a visual representation A appears to the left of visual representation IN, we will assume that there is some corresponding relationship between the cause A and the reason IN.

We have, according to this view, two spaces - one subjective and the other objective, one known in experience, and the other only inferred. But there is no difference in this respect between space and other aspects of perception such as colors and sounds. All of them in their subjective forms are known empirically. All of them in their objective forms are derived through the principle of causality. There is no reason to consider our knowledge of space in any way different from our knowledge of color, and sound, and smell.

As regards time, the matter is different, for if we maintain faith in imperceptible causes of perceptions, objective time must be identical with subjective time. If not, we are faced with the difficulties already discussed in connection with lightning and thunder. Or take this case: you hear talking man, you answer him, and he hears you. His speech and his perceptions of your answer, both insofar as you touch them, are in the unperceived world. And in this world, the first comes before the last. Moreover, his speech precedes your perception of sound in the objective world of physics. Your perception of sound precedes your response in the subjective world of perception. And your answer precedes his perception of sound in the objective world of physics. Clearly the relation "precedes" must be the same in all these statements. While there is therefore an important sense in which perceptual space is subjective, there is no sense in which perceptual time is subjective.

The above arguments assume, as Kant thought, that perceptions are caused by things in themselves, or, as we should say, by events in the world of physics. This assumption, however, is in no way logically necessary. If it is rejected, perceptions cease to be in any significant sense “subjective,” since there is nothing to oppose them.

The "thing in itself" was a very awkward element in Kant's philosophy, and it was rejected by his immediate successors, who accordingly fell into something very like solipsism. The contradictions in Kant's philosophy inevitably led to the fact that philosophers who were under his influence had to quickly develop either in an empiricist or in an absolutist direction. In fact, it developed in the latter direction German philosophy until the period after Hegel's death.

Kant's immediate successor, Fichte (1762–1814), rejected “things in themselves” and carried subjectivism to a degree that seemed to border on madness. He believed that I is the only ultimate reality and that it exists because it affirms itself. But I, which has a subordinate reality, also exists only because I accepts it. Fichte is important not as a pure philosopher, but as the theoretical founder of German nationalism in his “Speeches to the German Nation” (1807–1808), in which he sought to inspire the Germans to resist Napoleon after the Battle of Jena. I how the metaphysical concept was easily confused with the empirical Fichte; because the I was German, it followed that the Germans were superior to all other nations. “To have character and to be German,” says Fichte, “certainly mean the same thing.” On this basis, he developed a whole philosophy of nationalist totalitarianism, which had a very great influence in Germany.

His immediate successor, Schelling (1775–1854), was more attractive, but no less subjectivist. He was closely associated with German romance. Philosophically he is insignificant, although he was famous in his time. An important result of the development of Kant's philosophy was the philosophy of Hegel.

What will we do with the received material:

If this material was useful to you, you can save it to your page on social networks:

The most important part of the Critique of Pure Reason is the doctrine of space and time. In this section I propose to undertake a critical examination of this teaching.

It is not easy to give a clear explanation of Kant's theory of space and time because the theory itself is unclear. It is expounded both in the Critique of Pure Reason and in the Prolegomena. The presentation in the Prolegomena is more popular, but less complete than in the Critique. First, I will try to explain the theory as clearly as I can. Only after I have presented it will I try to criticize it.

Kant believes that the immediate objects of perception are caused partly by external things and partly by our own perceptual apparatus. Locke accustomed the world to the idea that secondary qualities - colors, sounds, smell, etc. - are subjective and do not belong to the object as it exists in itself. Kant, like Berkeley and Hume, although not quite in the same way, goes further and makes primary qualities also subjective. For the most part, Kant has no doubt that our sensations have causes, which he calls “things-in-themselves” or noumena. What appears to us in perception, which he calls a phenomenon, consists of two parts: what is caused by the object - this part he calls sensation, and what is caused by our subjective apparatus, which, as he says, organizes diversity in certain relationships. He calls this last part the form of the phenomenon. This part is not the sensation itself and, therefore, does not depend on the randomness of the environment, it is always the same, since it is always present in us, and it is a priori in the sense that it does not depend on experience. The pure form of sensibility is called “pure intuition” (Anschauung); There are two such forms, namely space and time: one for external sensations, the other for internal ones.

To prove that space and time are a priori forms, Kant puts forward two classes of arguments: one class of arguments is metaphysical, and the other is epistemological, or, as he calls them, transcendental. Arguments of the first class are derived directly from the nature of space and time, arguments of the second - indirectly, from the possibility of pure mathematics. Arguments regarding space are presented more fully than arguments regarding time because the latter are considered to be essentially the same as the former.

Regarding space, four metaphysical arguments are put forward:

1) Space is not an empirical concept abstracted from external experience, since space is presupposed when sensations are attributed to something external, and external experience is possible only through the representation of space.

2) Space is a necessary representation a priori, which underlies all external perceptions, since we cannot imagine that space should not exist, whereas we can imagine that nothing exists in space.

3) Space is not a discursive, or general, concept of the relations of things in general, since there is only one space and what we call “spaces” are parts of it, not examples.

4) Space is represented as an infinitely given quantity that contains within itself all parts of space. This relation is different from that which the concept has to its examples, and, therefore, space is not a concept, but Anschauung.

The transcendental argument regarding space is derived from geometry. Kant claims that Euclidean geometry is known a priori, although it is synthetic, that is, not derived from logic itself. Geometric proofs, he argues, depend on figures. We can see, for example, that if two straight lines intersect at right angles to each other are given, then only one straight line can be drawn through their point of intersection at right angles to both straight lines. This knowledge, as Kant believes, is not derived from experience. But my intuition can anticipate what will be found in the object only if it contains only the form of my sensibility, which predetermines in my subjectivity all actual impressions. Objects of sense must be subject to geometry, because geometry concerns our modes of perception, and therefore we cannot perceive in any other way. This explains why geometry, although synthetic, is a priori and apodictic.

The arguments regarding time are essentially the same, except that arithmetic replaces geometry, since counting requires time.

Let us now examine these arguments one by one. The first of the metaphysical arguments regarding space reads: “Space is not an empirical concept abstracted from external experience. In fact, the representation of space must already lie at the basis in order for certain sensations to be related to something outside of me (that is, to something - in a different place in space than where I am), and also so that I can imagine them as being outside (and next to each other, therefore, not only as different, but also as being in different places." As a result, external experience is the only one possible through the representation of space.

The phrase "outside of me (that is, in a different place than I myself am)" is difficult to understand. As a thing in itself, I am not located anywhere, and there is nothing spatially outside of me. My body can only be understood as a phenomenon. Thus, all that is really meant is expressed in the second part of the sentence, namely, that I perceive different objects as objects in different places. The image that may arise in one's mind is that of a cloakroom attendant hanging different coats on different hooks; the hooks must already exist, but the subjectivity of the wardrobe attendant arranges the coat.

There is here, as elsewhere in Kant's theory of the subjectivity of space and time, a difficulty which he seems never to have felt. What makes me arrange the objects of perception the way I do and not otherwise? Why, for example, do I always see people's eyes above their mouths and not below them? According to Kant, the eyes and mouth exist as things in themselves and cause my separate perceptions, but nothing in them corresponds to the spatial arrangement that exists in my perception. This is contradicted by the physical theory of colors. We do not believe that there are colors in matter in the sense that our perceptions have color, but we do believe that different colors correspond to different wavelengths. Since waves, however, involve space and time, they cannot be the causes of our perceptions for Kant. If, on the other hand, the space and time of our perceptions have copies in the world of matter, as physics suggests, then geometry applies to these copies and Kant's argument is false. Kant believed that the understanding organizes the raw material of sensations, but he never thought that it is necessary to say why the understanding organizes this material in this particular way and not otherwise.

With regard to time, this difficulty is even greater, since when considering time one has to take into account causality. I perceive lightning before I perceive thunder. A thing in itself A causes my perception of lightning, and another thing in itself B causes my perception of thunder, but A not before B, since time exists only in relations of perceptions. Why then do two timeless things A and B produce an effect at different times? This must be entirely arbitrary if Kant is right, and then there must be no relation between A and B corresponding to the fact that the perception caused by A is earlier than the perception caused by B.

The second metaphysical argument states that one can imagine that there is nothing in space, but one cannot imagine that there is no space. It seems to me that a serious argument cannot be based on what can and cannot be imagined. But I emphasize that I deny the possibility of representing empty space. You can imagine yourself looking at a dark cloudy sky, but then you are in space and you are imagining clouds that you cannot see. As Weininger pointed out, Kantian space is absolute, like Newtonian space, and not just a system of relations. But I don’t see how you can imagine absolutely empty space.

The third metaphysical argument reads: “Space is not a discursive, or, as they say, general, concept of the relations of things in general, but a purely visual representation. In fact, one can imagine only one single space, and if one speaks of many spaces, then by them we mean only parts of one and the same unified space, moreover, these parts cannot precede a single all-encompassing space as its constituent elements (from which its composition could be possible), but can only be thought of as being in it. Space is essentially unified ; the diversity in it, and, consequently, also the general concept of spaces in general, is based exclusively on restrictions." From this Kant concludes that space is an a priori intuition.

The essence of this argument is the denial of multiplicity in space itself. What we call "spaces" are neither examples of the general concept of "space" nor parts of a whole. I do not know exactly what their logical status is, according to Kant, but, in any case, they logically follow space. For those who accept, as practically everyone does nowadays, a relativistic view of space, this argument falls away, since neither “space” nor “spaces” can be considered as substances.

The fourth metaphysical argument concerns mainly the proof that space is an intuition and not a concept. His premise is "space is imagined (or represented - vorgestellt) as an infinitely given quantity." This is the view of a person living in a flat area, like the area where Koenigsberg is located. I do not see how a dweller in the Alpine valleys could accept it. It is difficult to understand how something infinite can be “given.” I must consider it obvious that the part of space which is given is that which is filled with objects of perception, and that for other parts we have only the sense of the possibility of movement. And if it is permissible to use such a vulgar argument, then modern astronomers claim that space is not in fact infinite, but is rounded, like the surface of a ball.

The transcendental (or epistemological) argument, which is best established in the Prolegomena, is clearer than the metaphysical arguments, and also more clearly refutable. "Geometry", as we now know, is a name that combines two different scientific disciplines. On the one hand, there is pure geometry, which derives consequences from axioms without asking whether these axioms are true. It does not contain anything that does not follow from logic and is not “synthetic”, and does not need figures such as those used in geometry textbooks. On the other hand, there is geometry as a branch of physics, as it appears, for example, in the general theory of relativity - this is an empirical science in which axioms are derived from measurements and differ from the axioms of Euclidean geometry. Thus, there are two types of geometry: one is a priori, but not synthetic, the other is synthetic, but not a priori. This gets rid of the transcendental argument.

Let us now try to consider the questions that Kant poses when he considers space more generally. If we start from the view, which is accepted in physics as self-evident, that our perceptions have external causes which are (in a certain sense) material, then we are led to the conclusion that all real qualities in perceptions are different from qualities in their imperceptible causes, but that there is a certain structural similarity between the system of perceptions and the system of their causes. There is, for example, a correspondence between colors (as perceived) and waves of certain lengths (as inferred by physicists). Likewise, there must be a correspondence between space as an ingredient of perceptions and space as an ingredient in the system of imperceptible causes of perceptions. All this is based on the principle of “same cause, same effect,” with its opposite principle: “different effects, different causes.” Thus, for example, when visual representation A appears to the left of visual representation B, we will assume that there is some corresponding relation between cause A and cause B.

We have, according to this view, two spaces - one subjective and the other objective, one is known in experience, and the other is only inferred. But there is no difference in this respect between space and other aspects of perception, such as colors and sounds. All of them in their subjective forms are known empirically. All of them in their objective forms are derived through the principle of causality. There is no reason to consider our knowledge of space in any way different from our knowledge of color, and sound, and smell.

As regards time, the matter is different, for if we maintain faith in the imperceptible causes of perceptions, objective time must be identical with subjective time. If not, we are faced with the difficulties already discussed in connection with lightning and thunder. Or take this case: you hear a person speaking, you answer him, and he hears you. His speech and his perceptions of your answer, both as far as you touch them, are in the unperceived world. And in this world, the first comes before the last. Moreover, his speech precedes your perception of sound in the objective world of physics. Your perception of sound precedes your response in the subjective world of perception. And your answer precedes his perception of sound in the objective world of physics. It is clear that the relation "precedes" must be the same in all these statements. While there is therefore an important sense in which perceptual space is subjective, there is no sense in which perceptual time is subjective.

The above arguments assume, as Kant thought, that perceptions are caused by things in themselves, or, as we should say, by events in the world of physics. This assumption, however, is in no way logically necessary. If it is rejected, perceptions cease to be in any essential sense “subjective,” since there is nothing to oppose them.

The "thing in itself" was a very awkward element in Kant's philosophy, and it was rejected by his immediate successors, who accordingly fell into something very like solipsism. The contradictions in Kant's philosophy inevitably led to the fact that philosophers who were under his influence had to quickly develop either in an empiricist or in an absolutist direction. In fact, German philosophy developed in the latter direction until the period after Hegel's death.

Kant's immediate successor, Fichte (1762-1814), rejected "things in themselves" and carried subjectivism to a degree that seemed to border on madness. He believed that the Self is the only ultimate reality and that it exists because it affirms itself. But the Self, which has a subordinate reality, also exists only because the Self accepts it. Fichte is important not as a pure philosopher, but as the theoretical founder of German nationalism in his “Speeches to the German Nation” (1807-1808), in which he sought to inspire the Germans to resist Napoleon after the Battle of Jena. The self as a metaphysical concept was easily confused with Fichte's empirical; since I was a German, it followed that the Germans were superior to all other nations. “To have character and to be German,” says Fichte, “certainly mean the same thing.” On this basis, he developed a whole philosophy of nationalist totalitarianism, which had a very great influence in Germany.

His immediate successor, Schelling (1775-1854), was more attractive, but no less subjectivist. He was closely associated with German romance. Philosophically he is insignificant, although he was famous in his time. An important result of the development of Kant's philosophy was the philosophy of Hegel.

Explication of the concept of human essence is currently one of the most relevant philosophical problems. Without exaggeration, we can say that it has always remained so, and in the future it will also not lose its relevance. Philosophers from different eras and cultures were engaged in constructing models of human essence, proposing various methods for its construction. Among the most fundamental and representative anthropological concepts created in European philosophy over the past 250 years is the concept of I. Kant. One of the most influential and noticeable models of human essence that arose in the last century can be generally called existential-phenomenological (it will be considered based on the analysis of texts by M. Merleau-Ponty). The article is devoted comparative analysis these models, namely the interpretations of the phenomenon of temporality belonging to Kant and Merleau-Ponty as one of the manifestations of the essence of man.

The basis for choosing these two concepts is, as already mentioned, their commonality in the matter of understanding time. Both Kantian and existential-phenomenological models think of time as directly related to subjectivity, i.e. with human consciousness. Both Kant and Merleau-Ponty analyzed phenomenon of time. In addition to this, there is another common feature of these concepts. It lies in the fact that the problem of human essence is comprehended by both philosophers solely on the basis of the experience of self-perception, i.e. based on “inner feeling” (the term belongs to Kant). Both philosophers build

“subjectivist” models of man: the latter is understood not as one of the objects of the external world, but precisely as a subject, as a bearer of a specific worldview. We can say that in these models there is no person the one who is seen but, on the contrary, there is the one who sees Not the one they think about A the one who thinks etc. Kant and Merleau-Ponty explore the most difficult epistemological task: they analyze the essence of man, while trying to avoid the intellectual split into the knowing subject and the object of knowledge; in their thinking they start from the direct experience of self-perception and self-awareness.

Despite the common methodological principles, the models of human essence belonging to I. Kant and M. Merleau-Ponty are fundamentally different, if only due to the fact that they are separated by a two-hundred-year time period. Comparing them is of scientific interest, since it will allow us to highlight and comprehend principles of human understanding, characteristic of the philosophy of the Enlightenment and the philosophy of the twentieth century. Through such a comparison, we will be able to discover the constant and mobile elements of the model of human essence and perceive the different experiences of its construction.

Kant on time as subjectivity

Time is understood by the Koenigsberg philosopher as a subjective condition necessary for a person to contemplate the world and himself. As is known, time, according to Kant, is an a priori form of sensibility, or, in other words, it is “a way of arranging ideas in the soul.”

Thus, the first thing Kant encounters on the path to studying consciousness is the phenomenon of time. The inner content of a person is determined by him as follows: “Not to mention the fact that ideas external senses constitute the basic material with which we supply our soul, the very time in which we posit these ideas and which even precedes the awareness of them in experience, being at their basis as a formal condition of the way in which we posit them in the soul, already contains relations of succession, simultaneity and that which exists simultaneously with successive being (that which is constant)” [Critique of Pure Reason, § 8; 3, p. 66].

Time in Kant’s concept appears as a universal, primary form of systematization of sensory experience in relation to space, and at the same time the very condition of the possibility of this experience.

IN In space we contemplate only the external world, but in time we contemplate everything, including ourselves. But time for Kant is something more than a function necessary for perceiving the world. The role of time is global: it makes it possible connection between a priori categories and data of sensory experience , it is an intermediary between them. All our a priori categories can be actualized and applied to experience only due to the presence of time in our consciousness. Any strongest abstraction is based on ideas about time; the very category of reality would be impossible for our consciousness if time were not present in it.

So, according to Kant, time constitutes not only our empirical experience, but also our thinking, our ideas, our ideas, as long as they are based on the synthesis of experience and a priori categories. That is, time is the hidden foundation for any content of consciousness in which sensory experience is in any way mixed. It follows from this that the only territory in which time is not effective is the world of pure intellectual entities, the noumenon, as well as all the “illegal” ideas of pure reason not confirmed by experience. Time is a spontaneous ordering reaction of consciousness to the sensory world.

So, we have outlined the main points necessary for understanding Kant’s interpretation of time. As an objective phenomenon, time does not exist; it is entirely subjective and a priori (that is, not characteristic of the sensory world). But it is also not inherent in the noumenal world, which indirectly follows from the following phrase: “if we take objects as they can exist by themselves, then time is nothing” [Critique of Pure Reason; 3, p. 58]. Moreover, as a positive given, as a sphere of human consciousness, time also does not exist. We are forced to state that time, according to Kant, is only a form, method, function of consciousness. Time itself is alien to any contents; it is the idea of ​​a certain universal relationship of any possible contents.

So, the Kantian subject is a being with the ability to build temporary relationships. Inner contemplation of oneself is primarily an experience of time. How does time exist inside a person? It is a way of arranging something in the soul, but also “the way in which the soul influences itself by its own activity, namely by the positing of its ideas” [ibid.]. It is characteristic that it is from this temporality of the human “inner feeling” that Kant derives the following theorem: « A simple but empirically determined consciousness of my own

existence serves as proof of the existence of objects in space outside of me"[Ibid., p. 162]. That is, we can assert the reality of surrounding things only to the extent that we can assert our own reality. First, we are convinced that we really exist, and only then, based on this, we are convinced of the reality of the world around us.

So, Kant believes that time is something fundamentally human. But, although it is directly related to a person’s awareness of himself, the study of time is not equivalent to knowledge of the human being.

Alternative position: Merleau-Ponty on time

Let us now turn to the phenomenological understanding of time in order to understand the specifics of Kant’s formulation of the problem. The “phenomenological” aspects of Kant’s thinking have been noted more than once in philosophical literature. So Rozeev writes that the speculative isolation from the mind of everything sensory, that is, the separation a priori And AposterioriFor further logical operation of any one layer of thinking - this is phenomenological reduction or era. Mamardashvili also mentions reduction in connection with Kant: according to Merab Konstantinovich, Kant performs the procedure of phenomenological reduction when he claims that “the world should be so arranged according to its physical laws as to allow the empirical event of the extraction of some experience by some sentient being.” But despite the similarity of methods of cognition, different researchers can obtain completely different data and draw opposite conclusions from them. How much do Kant and Merleau-Ponty have in common in their understanding of the problem of time and what causes this? Let us analyze Merleau-Ponty's position.

1. First of all, the French philosopher declares that Kant’s characterization of time as a form of internal feeling is not deep enough. Time is not the most general characteristics“psychic facts”, “we have discovered a much more intimate connection between time and subjectivity.” (It must be said that Merleau-Ponty does not take into account here the role that time plays in the subject’s cognition and constitution of the world; after all, for Kant it is not just a form of internal feeling, but perhaps the main thread connecting man and phenomenon.) Further Merleau -Ponty argues that it is necessary to recognize the subject as temporary “not because of some

accident of the human constitution, but due to internal necessity” [Ibid]. Well, this statement does not contradict the Kantian view. A person, according to Kant, perceives everything in time also due to internal necessity; A.N. Kruglov even notes that Kant often explains the phenomenon of a priori knowledge not epistemologically, but psychologically and anthropologically. That is, a priori knowledge and forms of sensibility are such because this is how people are made and there are no other variants of rational consciousness available to our experience to make anything clear otherwise.

What is the essence of Merleau-Ponty's criticism of Kant? The point is that thinking about time as constituted by consciousness and in general, whatever it is, this means, according to Merleau-Ponty, to miss the very essence of time, its essence consists in transition. Constituted time is already once and for all determined, become, time, which in its essence cannot be. Merleau-Ponty's attempts are aimed at comprehending another, true time, when it becomes clear what the transition in itself is. With the intellectual synthesis of time that Kant speaks of, it turns out that we think of all moments of time as completely identical, similar, consciousness becomes, as it were, contemporary with all times. But treating time this way means losing it, because the essence of temporality is not that it is an endless series of identical “nows.” The essence of time is the opposite - that the past, present and future are not the same thing, they have some mysterious and fundamental difference, even though the future always becomes the present and then the past. “No dimension of time can be derived from others” [Ibid., p. 284], and the abstract idea of ​​time inevitably generalizes all its moments, makes them similar to one new point in space. Merleau-Ponty tries to think about time without losing sight of the individuality of each of its events.

Let's try to make sense of this criticism. First, does constituting time really mean depriving it of its specificity, its “core”? To constitute in the usual sense is to essentially substantiate something as such, to give reasons, to make it possible on the basis of certain principles. If consciousness constitutes time, then how can it deprive this time of its essence, which it itself imparts to time? Or is time a spontaneity that cannot have any definite principles at all, and the human mind imposes them on it? Then the essence of time does not fit into the ordinary scientific mind, which works through generalizations and abstractions. Merleau-Ponty most likely means

second. From his criticism of Kant the conclusion clearly follows: according to Merleau-Ponty, time is not a given of consciousness, and consciousness does not constitute or unfold time. Kant's criticism clearly reveals a desire to see time as something more than a product of the human mind.

2. Time - “this is not some real process, an actual sequence that I would only register. It is born from my connections with things(emphasis mine. - A.M.)"[Ibid., p. 272]. What is in the past or future for a person, in the surrounding world, There is at the moment - places that were once visited or will be visited, people with whom they were or will be familiar. That is, as mentioned above, “time presupposes a look at time.” But, in fact, according to Kant, time is born at the moment of the meeting of human consciousness and the phenomenal world. This is well illustrated by the controversy between Kant and Johann Eberhard on the origin of a priori ideas. Insisting that there is nothing innate in man, Kant calls the forms of space and time “originally acquired.” What is initially inherent in a person is only that “all his ideas arise in exactly this way,” that is, human consciousness carries within itself attitude towards objects not yet perceived, or, in other words, “subjective conditions for the spontaneity of thinking.” The possibility of temporal contemplation is innate, but not time itself. Consequently, if time is not innate, it is acquired by a person only at the moment of perception of the world, as soon as the phenomenon enters human experience.

And yet, according to Kant, time is still “rooted” in the subject, since the foundations of the possibility of time are a priori laid in consciousness. At this point, the views of the German and French philosophers fundamentally diverge.

3. According to Merleau-Ponty, existence itself is not temporary. To become temporary, it lacks non-existence, just as the movement of bodies requires a void in which they move. IN real world everything is entirely being, while man is recognized as the bearer of non-being. That is, time “temporizes” due to the combination of being and non-being, the latter being rooted in man. If non-existence is not inherent in the world, but is inherent only in man, is not non-existence then the essence of man? Merleau-Ponty does not ask this question, but regarding time he argues that it is formed from a “mixture” of being and non-being.

For Kant, being itself, of course, is also not temporary, for time is a purely subjective phenomenon. Kant practically does not talk about non-existence. Almost the only fragment that mentions

next to the concepts of time and non-being, is contained in the “Critique of Pure Reason”: “Reality in a pure rational concept is that which corresponds to sensation in general, therefore, that which the concept itself points to being (in time). Negation is that which the concept represents non-existence (in time). Consequently, the opposition of being and non-being consists in the difference between one and the same time, in one case full, in another case empty.” From this follows a conclusion that is directly opposite to Merleau-Ponty’s idea: it is not time that is formed through the interaction of being and non-being, but precisely being and non-being that exist thanks to time. It turns out that they are something like reservoirs of time, full and empty.

4. But here doubts arise - Are Kant and Merleau-Ponty really talking about time in the same sense? As is known, being and non-being for Kant are only categories of pure reason, the actual reality of which is very problematic to assert, and even meaningless, since these are just subjective principles of thinking. Thus, Kant, so to speak, does not bear any responsibility for all his interpretations of being and non-being. The same applies to time: it as such does not exist either in the noumenon or in the phenomenon. Is it the same with Merleau-Ponty? Being itself, as we have just learned from his text, does not have time. This means that time is somehow introduced there (through a person). At first glance, everything is so, and this is eloquently evidenced by Merleau-Ponty’s phrases, such as the following: “We must understand time as a subject and the subject as time” or “we are the emergence of time.” But the very statement that time needs being (as well as non-being) gives rise to questions. It can hardly need exclusively human existence, because it is impossible to deny the fact that human existence is a special case of existence in general. The situation becomes clearer when Merleau-Ponty begins to talk about objective time, as if leaving aside the role of the subject in the emergence of temporality. “The source of objective time with its locations fixed by our gaze must be sought not in temporal synthesis, but in the consistency and reversibility of the past and future, mediated by the present, in the temporal transition itself” [Ibid., p. 280]. Therefore, there is a certain objective time, it is extremely difficult for the subject to simply comprehend it. Another thought of Merleau-Ponty can be clearly perceived as a statement of the objectivity of time: “Time supports what it has given existence at the very moment when it expels it from

being - since a new being was declared by the previous one as impending to being and since for this latter to become present and to be doomed to pass into the past means the same thing” [Ibid].

We can conclude that Kant and Merleau-Ponty explicate the concept of time based on the fundamental different interpretations its ontological status. If Kant's position is defined and consistent, and time appears in it as a subjective form of sensory intuition, then Merleau-Ponty's position is very ambiguous. Either he speaks of time as impossible without a subject (the bearer of the view of time), or as an objective ontological force, like Tao. That is, time for Merleau-Ponty is both objective and subjective at the same time.

A comparison of the views on the essence of time belonging to Kant and Merleau-Ponty allows us to construct the following table.

There are fundamental differences in the considered explanations of the concept of time. They are due to the difference in approaches to understanding a person, i.e. differences in anthropological methods. Kant's model of human essence is based on the analysis of intellect and reason; rationality is considered here as a priority quality of a person. In addition, the fundamental thesis of this model is the provision of autonomy of a human being. Thus, Kant's model of human essence can be defined as autonomous-rationalistic. Merleau-Ponty, on the contrary, proceeds from an understanding of man as an immediate given; he defines his essence on the basis of a holistic analysis of the entirety of human existence. Merleau-Ponty is not interested in the abilities of a person, but in the very fact of his existence, the latter, according to the existential concept, is not closed on itself and is not autonomous. Human existence is defined as “being-in-the-world,” where man is a projection of the world, and the world is a projection of man. “In the emptiness of the subject in itself we discovered the presence of the world.” Consequently, the model of human essence built by Merleau-Ponty is directly opposite to Kant’s. There is no emphasis on rationality here, and man is not assumed to be an autonomous and self-sufficient being. This model can be called “open” or “total ontological”.

In conclusion, we must answer the question “whether understanding time opens up prospects for understanding the essence of man, based on the reasoning of I. Kant and M. Merleau-Ponty. First of all, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of the term “entity”. Traditionally under

essence is understood what a thing is in itself. The concept of “essence” has three semantic aspects. Firstly, it indicates the individuality of a thing, its difference from other things. We can say that essence is the secret of the uniqueness of a thing or the reason for its uniqueness. The second aspect: an entity is a constant component of objects, i.e. that which is not subject to change, despite its internal variability. Finally, the third aspect: essence is what constitutes a thing, what “exists” it by itself, gives it a basis, a principle, an essence. Considering all that has been said, is it possible to believe that time is the essence of man? Let us first turn to Kant's position.

On the one hand, according to Kant, the essence of things is unknowable, or rather, it is only partially knowable (at the level of phenomenon, to the extent that things are accessible to sensory contemplation). Kant's term “thing in itself” does not designate the unknowable essence of things, but rather the thing in the aspect of its unknowability. That is, up to a certain limit, any thing is knowable, but beyond this limit it is no longer knowable, this is called “a thing in itself” (at the same time, Kant considered the reality of things in themselves problematic). Thus, according to Kant, the essence of a thing is knowable to a certain extent, This assumption allows us to talk about the essence of man. If we agree with the above meaning of the term that interests us, time can well be considered an essential human quality, because This specifically human a form of contemplation (neither animals nor other intelligent beings probably have it), moreover, it is constant and unchangeable in any human consciousness. All this leads us to conclude that time (along with some other moments) realizes a person as a person. But we should not forget that time for Kant is just one of the ways a person communicates with reality, i.e. this is precisely the form, method, function, and not the main content of the human personality (as opposed to morality, freedom, reason, character). Thus, we recognize the essence of man as his way of being, his way of manifesting himself in phenomenal reality.

Merleau-Ponty considers the temporality of man as a special case of the objective temporality of being. It follows from this that time is not something exclusively human; Only one of the forms of time is “anthropomorphic” (and this form is most accessible to philosophical analysis). Moreover, he identifies time with being, because A person can spend time only in one way - living, living time. According to Merleau-Ponty, temporality is identical

being, and at the same time it is identical to subjectivity. That is, the essence of man is being itself, while time acts as a mediating link: “assimilating”, transforming objective time, man is included in being and is realized in it.

Thus, the considered concepts of time are opposite to each other both ontologically and methodologically, as well as in the aspect of revealing the essence of man.

Literature

1. Brodsky I.A. Letters to a Roman friend. L., 1991.

2. Gaidenko P.P. The problem of time in modern European philosophy (XVII-XVIII centuries) // Historical and philosophical yearbook, 2000. M., 2002. pp. 169-195.

3. Kant I. Critique of Pure Reason. Simferopol: Renome, 2003. 464 p.

4. Kruglov A.N. On the origin of a priori ideas in Kant // Vopr. philosophy. 1998. No. 10. P. 126-130.

5. Locke J. Works: In 3 volumes. T. 1. M.: Mysl, 1985. 621 p.

6. Mamardashvili M.K. Kantian variations. M.: Agraf, 2002. 320 p.

7. Merleau-Ponty M. Temporality (Chapter from the book “Phenomenology of Perception”) // Historical and Philosophical Yearbook, 90. M., 1991. pp. 271-293.

8. Rozeev D.N. Phenomenon and phenomena in Kant’s theoretical philosophy // Thought. 1997. No. 1. P. 200-208.

9. Chanyshev A.N. Treatise on non-existence // Question. philosophy. 1990. No. 10. P. 158-165.